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2Summary
This thesis explores issues in aesthetics with reference to Bergson. The 
first chapter outlines and assesses Bergson's interesting and subtle theory 
of humour, which emphasises the necessary lack of sympathy in humour, 
and its generalising, external methodology. In doing so it explores the 
different ways the motif of 'something encrusted on the living' functions 
on various levels. This is ultimately found to be an interesting account 
which has many merits.
The second chapter then begins to outline the theoretical structure of 
Bergson's account of humour in terms o f vertical and horizontal 
movement. This leads to an account of Bergson's critique of 'ordinary' 
conceptual language and a consideration of other alternatives, including 
metaphor.
The third chapter discusses Bergson's notion o f intuition and levels of 
interpretation - assessing what, if any, relation there is between Russian 
Formalism and Bergson's own understanding of poetry. The notion of 
levels helps to define Bergson's anti-modernism, when modernism is 
understood as the self-referential exposure of the art work's own 
conditions of possibility.
The fourth chapter examines several art forms. Music is discussed in 
some detail with particular attention being paid to the distinction between 
rhythm and melody, notions of repetition, creativity and difference. A 
comparison it then made between Bergson's thoughts on evolution and 
melodic creativity. This discussion is of importance not only for the light 
it casts on aesthetic issues, but also because music, or more specifically 
melody, is often given as an example of the heterogeneous continuity of 
duration. The thesis also examines painting, particularly in relation to 
duration, comparing it with photography. Bergson's arguments against 
cinema are then discussed. The thesis also examines how the role of 
sympathy functions in artistic production generally. Finally Bergson's 
ability to distinguish between art and philosophy is examined referring 
back to notions of self-reflexivity in art.
3INTRODUCTION
The Topic
This thesis is primarily concerned with aesthetics with particular 
reference to the French philosopher Henri Bergson, including the 
"justement célébré" third chapter o f his work Laughter.1
The reason for such particular reference is the explicit emphasis 
Bergson's aesthetics place on the involvement of duration in art, which 
considering the recurrent themes o f his work is unsurprising. Such an 
emphasis on duration engages Bergson in a series of positions on art 
which are original and in some cases unusual. Bergson's attack on cinema 
is a good example of such a position. On the other hand the art form 
which is most associated with time is music indeed one critic has gone so 
far as to claim:
Music is the art o f all creation and Bergson 
understands it best.2
As the author o f this thesis is an active composer as well as a 
philosopher, the centrality of sound and music to Bergson's aesthetics is 
immediately attractive.
1 Vladimir Jankélèvitch, Henri Bergson (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
1959) p. 122. (Henceforth, Jankélèvitch)
2 Hillary L. Fink, Bergson and Russian Modernism. 1900-30 (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1999) (Henceforth, RM) p. 44
4Secondly, Bergson's extremely detailed philosophy of humour has been 
much commented on, such commentary has more often than not isolated 
this work from Bergson's aesthetics. Given that philosophical 
considerations of humour are, at best, most often peripheral to aesthetics, 
it is interesting to see how Bergson tackles the issue. This is especially 
important considering the amount of humour present in some of the great 
art works of the twentieth century: Duchamp, Cage, Joyce and Beckett to 
name but four examples. It also seems peculiar considering the number of 
comic artistic works pre-dating this century such as, Tristram Shandy. 
Goethe's Faust. Cervantes' Don Quixote. Voltaire's Candide or Rabelais' 
Gargantua and Pantagruel (the last two directly attacking certain 
philosophical positions). So in this light the desirability of an examination 
o f humour and its relation to aesthetics constitutes another attractive 
reason for referring to Bergson's philosophy.
These, then, are the two main reasons behind this works' choice of topic. 
Why, however, has this thesis chosen to deal with humour and aesthetics, 
rather than selecting one of these topics? The simple answer is that 
humour and aesthetics are often treated as opposites which in some sense 
define each other through that opposition, an idea which will become 
clearer in the main body of this work.
5A Brief Outline
The thesis is divided into two main sections, the first section deals 
explicitly and specifically with humour.
The second section begins with chapter 2 and concerns itself with the 
theoretical structure of Bergson's account of laughter, examining in 
particular Bergson's use of the term 'motif and his distinction between 
central and peripheral examples of humour and the nature of the 
'connections' between the various central examples, on the one hand, and 
between peripheral and central examples on the other, i.e. vertical and 
horizontal movement respectively. In this connection Moore's account of 
the theoretical structure of Laughter will be examined and found to be 
inadequate. Bergson's account and criticisms of 'ordinary' concepts as 
used in philosophy will then be explored in order to assess Bergson's 
attempts to outline alternative types of concepts.
Chapter 3 will start by examining his description of intuition, a seemingly 
non-conceptual mode of knowledge. This will in turn lead to a discussion 
of the element /  part distinction which is important for understanding the 
difference between an intuitive understanding and one based on analysis. 
Poetic language will then be explored. Poetic language is seen to present 
the 'part' rather than the 'element'. Bergson's account of rhythm in poetry 
will then be discussed with reference to the Early Russian Formalist 
literary critics and Bergson's relationship to modernism in art, understood 
as the exploration of the basic conditions of possibility explored.
6Chapter 4 focuses on music, firstly looking at the general account which 
Bergson gives of music. This account emphasises the similarities between 
the understanding of music and poetry. Moving more deeply into 
Bergson's understanding o f music, the dichotomy between rhythm and 
melody is emphasised and explored. Particular attention is then paid to 
the notion of rhythm and the distinction between repetitious and creative 
changing rhythms.
According to Bergson, rhythm in both poetry and music works on the 
listener via a process o f  suggestion which is linked to rhythm. This 
process of suggestion involves a revelation o f truth, not only in poetry 
and music, but also in the aesthetic sphere in general. The differing 
relations between duration and painting, photography and cinema will 
then be explored. The truth which art attains, according to Bergson, is 
specific, as opposed to the general, which is the province of humour. 
How art accesses the truth in the case of both literature and painting is 
then discussed.
The creativity which is at the heart o f Bergson's notion of truth in art, 
which is equated with 'life' and opposed to repetition, is then explored in 
terms of processes which work with elements rather than parts, i.e. in 
terms of a homogeneous spatialisation. In this regard three processes 
which Bergson claims are humorous are examined in detail. This in turn 
then leads to an account o f word play, which Bergson opposes to living, 
flexible thought. The relation of certain processes in music, which are 
supposed to provide a model for creative change, is then contrasted with
7the humour producing processes, to demonstrate how or if Bergson can 
distinguish between them.
The distinction between art and philosophy is then studied in greater 
depth. In attempting to distinguish philosophy and art, issues of creativity 
and self-reflexivity are to the fore, in addition to intuition.
8Section I
Chapter 1
Introduction
The thesis will firstly examine the relation between humour and 
sympathy, phenomena which are, according to Bergson, incompatible. 
The reasons for this incompatibility will be shown to reflect directly on 
Bergson's whole conception of humour. The chasm between sympathy 
and humour is also important for the later discussion of intuition and art, 
which are both distinguished from humour by the very fact that they are 
said to require sympathy. The depth of insight attributed to humour, its 
inability to move beyond 'superficial' observations, leads to Bergson's 
denial o f self-mockery, our inability to view ourselves superficially which 
in turn leads to the notion that the type, rather than the individual, is the 
object o f ridicule - the individual instantiating the type. This notion o f the 
type is seen to be linked to humour's role as a normalising influence.
The thesis then concentrates on how Bergson uses the notion of 
inattention, something mechanical encrusted on the living, to describe 
various types of humour involving the eccentric and, more obviously 
perhaps, humour based on habit, both of which are seen as 'anti-life' 
impulses. The metaphysical basis for Bergson's attack on "habit" is then 
explored.
Types o f rigid behaviour which can be amusing, according to Bergson, 
are then discussed in greater detail: ceremony, unfashionable clothing,
9disguise as an explanation for racist jokes, rule-following behaviour in 
individuals and rule-following in sections of society, for example, 
particular professions. This section will conclude by suggesting that it is 
not a necessary pre-condition of something being a joke that it has a 
single point or a single meaning or indeed any 'meaning' beyond the fact 
that it tends to cause amusement.
HUMOUR AND SYMPATHY
10
Bergson's claim in Laughter, that humour and emotion are incompatible,3 
has often been taken at face value. Lacey,4 for example, merely presents 
a list of emotions which are compatible with humour in order to show the 
implausibility of Bergson's position. (Lacey, p. 191) Yet Bergson's initial 
claim is not this wide ranging. Bergson does not deny that some emotions 
are compatible with humour, only that amusement is incompatible with 
sympathy.5 Support for this interpretation is found in Bergson's first 
statement on emotion and humour where he uses pity and affection to 
illustrate his thought, both emotions being based on a sympathetic 
relation with the object of the emotion (Laughter, p. 4). However, later in 
I .aughter. when the distinction is reiterated (Laughter, p. 139), the 
examples used are sympathy, fear and pity.
Although sympathy and pity appear to support the more modest claim 
this thesis is ascribing to Bergson, fear might not. Fear of an object could
3 Michael Clark, "Humour, Laughter and the Structure of Thought." British Journal 
of Aesthetics Vol.. 27 / No. 3 (Summer 1987): p. 242. (Henceforth. HLST)
4 A. R. Lacey, Bergson (London: Routledge, 1989). (Henceforth, Lacey)
5 Bergson makes one exception to this rule and this relates to the absurd humour 
relating to dreams and false logics, where sympathy is required to make the humour 
acceptable. But even here the sympathy has to be checked in order that the absurdity 
is acknowledged and laughter can begin. Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the 
C om ic, trans. Cloudesley Brereton & Fred Rothwell (London: Macmillan and 
Company, 1911) pp. 194-7 (Henceforth Laughter)
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conceivably exclude a sympathetic relation. Yet context is all, as the fear 
referred to at this juncture relates to the theatre, it is the fear of the actor 
which is sympathetically transmitted to the audience, a fearing for a 
character on stage. As will be detailed later, Bergson thinks that the 
aesthetic in its authentic form, e.g. painting, or non-comic theatre, as 
opposed to the comic, is essentially defined in terms of a sympathetic 
relation between the 'viewer' and the art work. The cutting of this relation 
is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, according to Bergson, for 
amusement, whilst, on the other hand, preventing any humour being 
regarded as an art form. Art and comedy are thus, for Bergson, 
incompatible having different methods and raison d'etre.
The necessary incompatibility of sympathy and humour, in Bergson, 
plays a specific role - it enables laughter to be defined as humiliation 
which cannot be viewed in a disinterested manner. (Laughter, p. 136) If 
an individual were sympathised with in laughter, that individual would by 
that fact alone fail to be humiliated, according to Bergson. Humour 
denies the individual being laughed at authority, whilst at the same time 
seeking a certain authority over that individual - it attempts to effect a 
change in them. Authority in the case of humour is not that vested in an 
individual, for example a king - instead it is an authority radiating through 
a whole system. For example, long hair might be generally unacceptable 
in a society and result in that individual being put under pressure to 
change their hairstyle; the rule would be implicit, and part of 'public 
opinion'. In another society, or even in an institution, say among children 
in a school, the rule might be explicit, with appropriate punishments for 
disobedience.
12
What might be called normalising practices (implicit) as opposed to 
specific command structures (explicit) may be far harder, if at all, 
possible to define in terms o f rules. It is these normalising practices 
which are, for Bergson, at the heart of humour. These normalising 
practices, as Kierkegaard points out with regard to public opinion, which 
is often their source, can about turn and still be seen as consistent, 
because public opinion is an abstraction which belongs to no individual.6 
Humour on this model would be relative to public mores, and have little 
accountability for 'its' past instantiations, as the 'its' does not refer to any 
individual. Kierkegaard opposes public opinion to an allegiance to an 
individual who one follows, where there is responsibility which can be 
pinned down. You used to believe such and such, now you don't seem to, 
hence your opinions are not consistent.
Bergson's position, then, is that humour is incompatible with sympathy 
because humour essentially acts to humiliate an individual to effect a 
change in the subject of ridicule. The source of humour's authority 
initially appears to come from normalising practices, rather than from any 
specific command structure. Bergson's forceful advocacy of the 
incompatibility of humour and sympathy is tied to the very raison d'être 
for the comic, according to his account. Society must not have sympathy 
with the object of humour, otherwise humour will fail to achieve its
6 Soren Kierkegaard, The Present Age, trans. Alexander Dru (London: The Fontana 
Library, 1962). p. 69
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intended effect (Laughter, p. 196) as a useful method of social control. 
(Laughter, p. 197)
How convincing is the general claim that sympathy is incompatible with 
humour? The most plausible examples supporting Bergson's account on 
this point are those where amusement is at the expense of someone - like 
a child, for example, who has accidentally glued a toy plane to their nose. 
In this example, an individual's amusement at the plight of the child must 
be conquered if they are to truly feel sympathy towards that child, or 
rather, as Bergson puts it "... we must, for the moment, put our affection 
out of court and impose silence upon our pity." (Laughter, p. 4) 
Characters who, like Basil Fawlty, inevitably fail in whatever task they 
are undertaking, whether it is trying to impress food inspectors or get 
himself a 'better class' o f guest, (and the audience knows he will fail) 
must have no sympathy felt for them if the audience is to continue to be 
amused. But can Bergson's theory account for the phenomenon of the 
loveable rogue?
The very fact someone is a loveable rogue, Falstaff say, allows us to 
laugh at the incorrigibility of their exploits, whilst at the same time 
acknowledging that there is something wrong with them. What seems to 
be essential in this case is the coexistence of the two states, amusement 
and sympathy; as it seems one would stop laughing and have moral 
disapproval if one did not have sympathy. Sympathy in this case 
suspends moral judgement and allows amusement. Instead of 
discouraging Falstaffs behaviour by laughing, the laughter appears to 
encourage it, and there seems no reason on Bergson's account, why this
14
should be. It might be argued that it is only a certain part of the 
individual who is laughed at and that this is not the part of the individual 
which is sympathised with. Certainly Bergson argues that sympathy is 
alienated when the emotion in a comic individual is parasitic, does not 
affect the whole of them. (Laughter, p. 140) However in the case of the 
loveable rogue, it seems clear that it is in fact the same part of the 
individual which is sympathised with at the same time as it is being 
laughed at. So, contra Bergson, vice can arouse the emotions and still be 
humorous. (Laughter, p. 139) Having said that, when Falstaff is shown to 
be cowardly in Henry IV (Part I) and tries to artificially bloody his nose 
to make himself look heroic, the audience is meant to feel no pity for him, 
amusement here coming from the fact he cannot hide his cowardly 
behaviour from Hal. But it seems difficult to understand the laughter 
which accrues to him as a loveable rogue without sympathy being 
present.
Another possible problem for Bergson's account, as so far outlined, might 
relate to animals, for two reasons. Firstly, amusement at the behaviour o f 
animals might appear to require some kind of sympathy on the part of the 
amused individual, a kind of fellow feeling acknowledging that they are, 
in some way, like us. Secondly, it is unclear what authority laughter at 
animals would have even if, as Westermarck claims,7 dogs do dislike 
being laughed at. One way to tackle the first problem and avoid ascribing
7 This claim is attributed to Westermarck without any reference. Marie Collins 
Swabey, Comic Laughter: A Philosophical Essay ((Unspecified): Archon Books, 
1961). p. 212. The book contains no bibliography. (Henceforth Swabey)
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sympathy to humour involving animals is to claim that such humour is 
necessarily related to the human case, as Bergson indeed does. (Laughter, 
p. 3) Bergson argues for this position by claimingthat sympathy in 
relation to animals is a matter o f anthropomorphism, not fellow feeling. 
An example of such anthropomorphism would be the amusement at the 
sexual reproduction of squids, where one o f the male squid's tentacles 
filled with sperm detaches like a torpedo and moves to the female where 
it is inserted up her nostril in order to fertilise her. If there is anything 
faintly amusing about this account it lies in the relation human 
reproductive behaviour bears to that of squids, otherwise amoebas' 
asexual reproduction, which is even more foreign than that of squids, 
would presumably be even more amusing; which it does not appear to be. 
On the other hand, it would be possible be produce a humorous sketch 
where the reproductive behaviour o f human-like aliens was akin to that of 
amoebas. In this case again it is the relation to the human which allows 
the comedy.
Bergson argues a similar line with regard to inanimate objects which are 
deemed amusing solely through their relation to the human, (Laughter, p. 
3) in terms of us laughing at their creators. Laughing at animals does not 
require sympathy as fellow feeling, but instead a mere projection of some 
human characteristics, which does not involve sympathy. What is 
important for Bergson is not whether animals' behaviour can generally be 
understood without anthropomorphisation, but whether humour can be 
directed at animals in a non-anthropomorphistic manner, which Bergson 
plausibly argues it cannot.
16
The above considerations on humour involving animals and the relation 
such humour would have to the question of sympathy helps Bergson 
avoid the second problem so far highlighted, namely what kind of 
authority humour could possibly have over animals. The simple answer is 
that it does not have any, yet this is not a problem for Bergson. Animals 
are laughed at as i f  they were human, and thus as i f  the same normalising 
authority were being applied to them as is applied to other humans. 
Although this appears to remove the initial problem it does raise the 
question of whether laughter, as in the case of that involving animals, is 
in some sense "incorrect", as it fails to fulfil its normalising role, a point 
which will shortly become more pressing for this thesis.
Before this thesis can progress it must deal with a potential objection to 
the above position made by Swabey. Swabey claims, in contrast to the 
Bergsonian position outlined above, that a direct relation to humans is not 
necessary for humour. (Swabey, p. 32) Are there any examples which 
would suggest this were the case? Swabey gives two such examples - 
putting an elephant next to a mouse, and laughter at the puncturing of 
balloons. (Swabey, p. 32) Both these examples, however, appear highly 
questionable, the first because there seems nothing remotely funny in the 
mere contrast between a mouse and an elephant. If the reference here is 
to a scene which might be found in, for example, Walt Disney's film 
Dumbo, then it is surely the anthropomorphic treatment of the animals 
which is the basis of this humour. If Swabey is thinking of a joke based 
on the fact that elephants are supposedly afraid of mice, then the contrast 
between the might of an elephant and the powerlessness of a mouse 
would be an obvious case of anthropomorphism, as it would be seen as if
17
it were an irrational human fear, like the fear of non-poisonous spiders. 
So this 'joke' does not give any cause to amend the above claims with 
regard to 'animal humour'. What about the popping of a balloon, is this 
example a problem for Bergson's position? Certainly there seems to be no 
necessary relation to the human as it is not the creator of the balloon 
which is being laughed at and no human need even be present apart from 
the amused individual if a balloon attached to the ceiling falls off and 
bursts on a naked flame. This example would be relevant if Bergson was 
giving an account of all types of laughter, which he is not. Bergson’s aim 
is to give an account o f humorous laughter, (Preface, p. 383) and it would 
seem that any laughter elicited from the puncturing of balloons would be 
surprised rather than humorous laughter. It is not that Bergson has to 
deny that there are indeed cases o f laughter which are not humorous, but 
his account does not try to explain these cases, so they do not constitute 
counter-examples to it.
In addition to the apparently necessary relation humour appears to have 
to the human, another relation is also given as necessary by Bergson, the 
existence o f a community (Laughter, p. 6). Presumably, whether the 
community is actually present or the individual is merely aware of its 
values (if marooned on a desert island, say), a community allows 
sympathy between members of that community who are laughing, whilst 
excluding the subject of ridicule from sympathy; placing them in a 
partially ostracised position. Such ostracism, as Monro comments, is 
incompatible with hero worship,8 but only in the sense in which humour
8 D. H. Monro, Argument of Laughter (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1963) p. 61. (Henceforth, AoL)
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is directed against the individual who is the subject of the laughter's 
derision. Humour aims to exerts an authority over its object.
In conclusion, Bergson's position that humour is necessarily without 
sympathy appears untenable, whereas his position that humour must 
relate to the human appears more tenable.
19
Self-mockery
If Bergson is to maintain that humour is in some sense necessarily 
communal, then he will have to explain how self-mockery fits into the 
picture of humour he has painted. Bergson is often thought of as a kind of 
superiority theorist of humour: (Swabey, p. 10) a position which has 
often been criticised for its failure to adequately explain apparently 
sympathetic laughter, especially if it is self-directed. (Swabey, p. 213) 
Indeed, like Hobbes9 before him, Bergson appears to make no distinction 
between 'laughing at' and 'laughing with' the object of amusement, with 
no real account of pleasant condescension which can be affectionate as 
well as scornful. (AoL, p. 86)
Concentrating on the specific problem of self-mockery, there does not 
appear to be any immediate orientation towards a normalisation of 
behaviour in self-mockery, and it is not immediately clear what relation 
would exist between sympathy and humour in such a circumstance. 
Additionally, the social as a controlling mechanism would have to be 
internalised in some way by the individual and triggered in the case of 
self-mockery, which would certainly be a stronger claim than that the 
individual is subject to humour when other individuals who make up 'the 
social' find a particular individual amusing. A plausible account outlining 
how such an internalisation of humour would work might be conceivable, 
if it were not for another more pressing problem which Swabey brings to 
our attention. It is quite possible for an individual to laugh at him or
9 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1973) p. 27
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herself, but have no desire to transform or to remove what is laughable. 
(Swabey, p. 37) This is a difficult problem as it is obvious that, if 
laughter at oneself can be pleasurable, which seems to be the case, it 
would not act as an incentive for an individual to change; whereas in the 
case of being laughed at by others it might do so. Laughter in self­
mockery can give the individual who is both object and subject of that 
laughter pleasure.
The above problems which self-mockery might cause for Bergson's 
account of humour are in fact avoided by Bergson who denies that 
genuine self-mockery is possible and redescribes the phenomenon usually 
referred to as self-mockery in other terms. Bergson boldly claims that 
comedy is always based on the observations of others, never the self. 
(Laughter, p. 168) Such a position, although initially appearing 
unpromising, does have some positive features: at least some apparent 
examples of self-mockery can be redescribed in other terms. One 
example would be comics who, whilst apparently making fun of 
themselves are actually taking on the personalities of others, or taking on 
eccentricities, in order to make fun of them. In this instance there is a 
separation between the humorist and the part he is acting and whilst the 
self who is played is not conscious of their amusement value, the person 
acting them is. (Laughter, p. 146 In.) Hobbes, also attempting to 
redescribe the phenomenon of self-mockery, claimed that when 
individuals laugh at themselves they are laughing at their past selves, and 
these past selves are something they were now superior to. (AoL, p. 83) 
It could be argued that those examples of apparent self-mockery which 
cannot be explained in terms of the taking on of others' personalities or
21
mockery of a past self might be alternatively explained in terms of 
defensive laughter aimed against potential jokes which could be made at 
the individual's expense. One example of defensive laughter Ludovici 
gives is of a man laughing as he chases his blown-oif hat down the street. 
(AoL, p. 27) There are, however, two problems with this explanation.
Firstly, defensive laughter does not appear to explain all examples of self­
mockery: individuals often find themselves in ridiculous positions, 
laughing at themselves for slipping over in mud despite their best efforts. 
This behaviour is not always defensive, it can occur when individuals are 
alone. The only way to explain this and retain consanguinity with 
Bergson's account would be to claim that individuals habitually acted as 
i f  others were watching them. This kind of argument appears somewhat 
strained within the current context as individuals do not usually appear to 
act as if they are being watched in this way. Appearances might of course 
be deceptive but there is a second and more serious problem.
Bergson's claim that it is impossible to find oneself amusing has an 
epistemological basis:
... we are never ridiculous except in some point which 
remains hidden from our own consciousness.10 (Laughter, p.
168)
10 Plato argues a somewhat similar position in the Philebus when he describes 
comedy as:
... a vice which gets its name from a certain habit of mind, and is that 
particular form o f this vice which exhibits the contrary o f the state of 
soul spoken o f in the inscription at Delphi... entire ignorance o f self.
(Plato, "Philebus," The Dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett, 3rd ed.,
22
The reason why ridiculousness "... remains hidden from our own 
consciousness" is linked to the 'normalising' practices which have been 
identified with humour. Humour necessarily works by identifying 
generalities, which is one of the reason why it is inevitably a surface 
phenomenon. Bergson claims that comedy works in a manner not unlike 
science, bringing together several facts to produce an average. He thus 
claims that humour works from the 'outside', as the laughable would be 
demolished if it went too deep, (Laughter, p. 169)
There is, however, a problem relating to the generalised method of 
humour which has been assimilated to science and averages. Bergson 
claims that humour as a corrective moves to the general in order to 
correct as many individuals as possible; (Laughter, p. 170) and certainly 
if it were a surface phenomenon, formed merely by averaging, then it 
would of necessity apply to a large number: the problem is whether this 
generality is a necessary feature of humour. If comedy penetrated too 
deep into an individual, would it stop being comedy, or, on the other 
hand, is it general merely for practical purposes? If, as Bergson wishes to 
claim, it is essential that comedy act on the surface, then he must regard 
generality o f  application as an additional benefit. However, if humour is 
essentially general, then Bergson must seemingly also accept another 
consequence - that the general will be ineffective against the lone 
eccentric who is by definition not 'average'. Bergson could argue that it is 
the eccentric impulses found in all or most individuals which are given 
expression in the lone eccentric. Although initially plausible, this position
vol. Vol. IV (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892) p. 622.)
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seems ill suited to explaining the invented eccentricities of Exodor which 
no one would be likely to have, even in a reduced form. This, then, 
means that Exodor would have to be seen amusing on account of his 
'madness' being seen as a masquerade.
The above method of generality would not as yet appear to give sufficient 
grounds to assert that individuals never find themselves amusing - as 
even if humour does work by finding generalities on a 'surface' level in 
others, this would not necessarily prevent those generalities being applied 
to oneself. Bergson claims, in order to show that an individual cannot 
apply generalities to themselves, that what is amusing is in some sense 
external to that individual. (Laughter, p. 170) What Bergson means by 
this is that the amusing element is not part of the true self, but parasitic on 
it. There is thus some sense in which that which is humorous is 
unknowable to the individual. This position also ruling out the possibility 
of laughing at a past self, whether or not such a conception were possible 
for Bergson.
This superficial self is linked, in Time and Free Will, to a consciousness 
which has become spatialised. In this condition the self becomes a series 
of states which are linguistically fixed, general" and homogeneous, as 
opposed to a deeper profound non-spatialised self.12 *This superficial self
11 Jean Hyppolite, "Du Bergsonisme & I'Existentialisme," Jean Hyppolite: Figures de 
la Pens£e Philosophique. vol. 1 (First published 1949; Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1991) p. 446. (Henceforth B&E)
12 John Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
1999) p. 20. (Henceforth Mullarkey)
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is linked to society, and the common which cannot access our 'secret life,' 
(Jankelevitch, p. 192) it cannot but spatialise, the intimate time of this 
'secret life'.13 Given this kind of description existentialist philosophers 
have found it easy to give an exegesis of Bergson in terms o f an authentic 
and inauthentic self.14 Indeed such a position can easily lead to a critique 
of science as dealing with a common social and thus spatialised account 
of time, as opposed to the individual's authentic personal experience of 
time. It is then left to the individual to conquer the social spatialising 
commonness in order to find their own authentic self.
This kind of exegesis can be given an even more existential feel if 
emphasis is placed on the spatialised self composed of a multiplicity of 
moments, which are exterior to each other is compared to the unity and 
originality of our profound self. (B&E, p. 446) Indeed the unity of the 
profound self is linked to liberty, whilst the superficial is forgetful of the 
self, and determined.15
13 Georges Mourélos, Bergson et les Niveaux de Réalité (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1964) p. 56. (Henceforth Mourélos)
14 Hyppolite remarks that Bergson has had a profound influence on his generation, 
including Merleau-Ponty. (Jean Hyppolite, "Sense et Existence dans la Philosophie 
de Maurice Merleau-Ponty" Jean Hyppolite: Figures de la Pensée Philosophique, vol. 
2 (First published 1949; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991) p. 732 
(Henceforth SE)
15 André Robinet, Bergson et les Métamorphoses de la Durée (Paris: Editions 
Seghers, 1965) p. 34 (Henceforth Robinet)
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Yet despite this analysis there is also, to some extent, a lack of a specific 
self, in terms of some sort of unity, in Time and Free Will, the notion 
being replaced by the notion of a qualitative multiplicity, and by the time 
of Matter and Memory there are, as Mullarkey points out, multiple 
versions of the self according to various modes of duration. (Mullarkey, 
p. 21) At the most superficial level we exist as "... living automata ..." as 
opposed to the "... complex, creative thoughts and emotions wherein our 
whole personality is involved and which can never be repeated." 
(Mullarkey, p. 37) It is the first level which is amusing, that closest to the 
living automata. The amusing element does not involve our whole past, 
but only the most immediate part o f our consciousness. It is sometimes 
"[i]n a vice, even in a virtue, the comic is that element by which the 
person unwittingly betrays himself - the involuntary gesture or the 
unconscious remark." (Laughter, p. 146)
An example of this kind of behaviour would be Eugene Terre Blanche 
(head of South Africa's neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance Movement) who 
claims "I talk in my sleep. I give incoherent speeches, discuss politics 
with myself and address phantom public meetings"16 seemingly without 
any awareness of the amusement such an admission might cause. The fact 
he rides a horse called Attila and has "... portraits in my study of old 
Anglo-Boer war heroes, who I salute every day. Mounted next to them is 
my collection of Antelope heads. I usually shoot one or two Antelope
16 Marcelle Katz, "A Life in the Day o f Eugene Terre Blanche," The Sunday Times 
Magazine 22nd August, 1999: p. 50. (Henceforth, Terre)
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when I'm out hunting in the veld and then eat the meat. I love animals ..." 
(Terre, p. 50) merely makes him more amusing. It is Terre Blanche's 
candour and failure to understand his actions and pronouncements as 
bizarrely eccentric which is at the root of the amusement he causes. 
Granted, in this kind of case, humour might be 'invisible' to the individual 
who is the cause of amusement, especially in the case of eccentric habits 
(discussed in the following).
Whilst eccentric habits might not be noticed by the individual who has 
them, but the ideas that the amusing element in an individual's behaviour 
must necessarily be hidden from them seems to makes no sense in the 
case of small misfortunes, like slipping over in mud, even though it is a 
clear case of mechanical inattention to one's surroundings, or appears as 
if it is. It is surely possible to imagine how others would see us, in the 
case of a small misfortune, and find that amusing as opposed to only 
acknowledging what we might look like to others only after they have 
been amused.
Given Bergson's above position an individual could not laugh 
defensively, as to acknowledge the possibility that one was in some way 
humorous and try to deflect this potential humour before others found it 
amusing would already be recognising oneself as funny. All that humour 
has to work with are the 'surface' properties of other individuals, which 
are then generalised. Bergson refers to it as a "mechanism." The 
mechanism functions like a disease which overall shows justice when 
averaged out, but individually is often unjust. Humour is, then, often an
evil on behalf o f the greater good. (Laughter, p. 198) In the next section 
the thesis will begin to explore the purpose of this 'normalising force'.
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Flexibility versus Types
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The purpose of humour's normalising force is, on Bergson's account, to 
eliminate any disturbing (non-plastic) elements from society. This is 
important as Bergson maintains that the more plastic (i.e. flexible) the 
members of a society are on an individual level, the greater that society's 
stability will be. Laughter is an attempt to eliminate inflexibility 
(Laughter, p. 199), much of it manifested in social life.17 Bergson often 
refers to individual's inflexibility as eccentricities. (Laughter, p. 135 & p. 
17)
The argument Bergson presents linking eccentricity and social stability is 
based on a particular view of what eccentricity is. Eccentricity is seen as 
a lack of striving on the part o f the individual to adapt to their 
circumstances, (Laughter, p. 19) including their social surroundings. 
(Laughter, p. 135) As the eccentric lacks adaptability they will no longer 
be striving to keep in flexible relations, not only with their circumstances, 
but also with other people. These flexible relations between people are 
the essential foundation for the toleration of others in society. If there 
were no flexibility and hence no tolerance, then society would, in the 
most extreme cases, break up. Eccentricity is thus the inability to adapt 
and fit in with other wills without friction. (AoL, p. 113) As such 
eccentricity is a potential threat to social stability, and is therefore 
laughed at and, thereby, discouraged. As in most cases eccentricity is not
17 Michael Clark, "Humour and Incongruity," Philosophy 45 (1970): p. 21. 
(Henceforth H&I)
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extreme enough to be of real concern, it is dismissed by laughter without 
being given serious consideration. (Laughter, p. 133)
Bergson though does not only see inflexibility in terms of single 
individuals and their inflexible relations to others - but also in terms of 
groups who are inflexible towards others. Inflexibility in the relations 
between a group and the rest of society at large suggests separatist 
tendencies, a fracturing of the common consensus and a swerving from 
society's common centre. (Laughter, p. 19) Humour in this case can be 
seen as a process of normalisation preserving the pre-existing societal 
structures, as opposed to fostering change in them.
So humour, attempts to ensure that individuals in societies are flexible in 
their relations to each other, the society they are in defining such 
flexibility, as that society is in part creative o f the environment into which 
they must fit. Individuals who are inflexible lose their connection to other 
individuals - this forming the essence of an individual's comical status, 
(Laughter, p. 134) and of the lack of sympathy with which they are 
regarded. Laughter is thus a reflection of this exclusion, however 
temporary that exclusion may be.
According to Bergson, fictional comedy can identify various eccentrics as 
types, general categories into which individuals can be pigeonholed. This 
notion of 'type' helps Bergson counter an obvious objection to his social 
model of humour - the role fictional characters play in his account. This 
kind of objection would question why we laugh at characters who are 
pretending to have eccentricities, if humour is a matter of social control.
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when the audience are fully aware that the individuals in question are 
merely acting. Bergson can, however, quite easily maintain that when 
individuals laugh at a comic actor they are treating the actor with pretend 
eccentricities as if he did indeed have those eccentricities which required 
correction. This would, however, leave open the question as to why 
comic plays are put on in the first place: why should someone pretend to 
have eccentricities? This is where the notion of type helps Bergson. If 
fictional comedy merely identified individuals who were rigid eccentrics 
then the question 'why are there any comic actors' would be entirely 
reasonable, but if comic actors exemplify types, this problem is 
dissolved. As humour, for Bergson, can be based on the identification of 
types, then a comic actor can be taken as a general model or type, a 
caricature which exaggerates, but also allows similar exemplifications of 
the type to be identified in everyday life and laughed at. Indeed when 
someone takes on a comic character they always play a double part, 
according to Bergson, whilst the self who laughs is conscious, the self 
laughed at is not. (Laughter, p. 146fh) On this basis fictional characters 
could still have a useful social role. This explanation fits well with 
Bergson's fondness for Molière and the "type", e.g. Le Misanthrope. But 
can Bergson's account cope with all comic actors? Exodor from the 
television series Mork and Mindy may figure as a potential counter­
example here.
Exodor possesses highly unusual invented eccentricities. It is unlikely, for 
example, that individuals will meet someone who, when arranging the 
film for a stag night, will bring a completely empty reel of film to the 
party to watch instead of the expected blue movie. It could hardly be said
31
that this was an exaggeration o f how individuals usually behaved, and as 
such there would seem little point in trying to 'iron out' this type of 
eccentric behaviour with laughter. This is particularly important if the 
fictional token is supposed to act as a model for us to generalise from. 
(This example also raises the more general question of what type Exodor 
would exemplify.)
If specific types are to be laughed at, in order to discourage the rigidity 
they display, then the type which is causing laughter in each case has to 
be identifiable. This is particularly important if comedy is pointing to 
types to help us recognise and guard against them, like a disease, as 
Swabey claims. (Swabey, p. 11) Types are, as has been said, essential for 
the generalisation from any particular fictional example of the humorous, 
otherwise only a particular form of behaviour, if repeated, could be 
laughed at, but no extrapolation made to similar instances of behaviour. 
We must however be careful. It is not a case of looking at something 
comparing it to the model of the type possessed to see if it fits the type 
and then laughing. Instead general ideas are initially built up from habit 
resemblances which are characterised in terms of the same motor 
reactions being elicited by different sensations - they are felt - not 
represented, it is thus not as such a conscious process.18 * (MM) 
Generality is built up from these initial motor reactions by memory 
spontaneously grafting distinctions onto the spontaneously abstracted 
resemblances to form clear generalities, which can then be used to make
18 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul & W. Scott
Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1988). p. 160. (Henceforth MM)
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new motor mechanisms. (MM, p. 161) So a pure vital and social reflex 
laughter can rise to the comedy o f character.19 It is this automatic 
character and lack of conscious reflection which Bergson is referring to 
in Laughter. (Laughter, p. 198) a forgetfulness of self.20
To summarise: Bergson sees eccentricity as a form of rigidity in 
individual members of a society. This rigidity is threatening to society 
because society is founded on the ability of individuals to relate flexibly 
to each other. In order to generalise from particular examples of rigidity, 
Bergson invokes the notion of the type in fictional comedy, these types 
being what is identified and laughed at. Fictional characters embodying 
types, perhaps in an exaggerated form, would then act as models to allow 
individuals to identify and laugh at similar non-fictional individuals 
embodying the same type. It was latterly carefully noted how the notion 
of generality was initially a product o f similarity in motor reactions which 
was used as a starting point for the formation of generality which is at the 
basis o f the type.
So far the thesis has looked at the identification of rigid types but has not 
fully explored Bergson's account of the cause of rigidity. In the next 
section the thesis will do just this. The thesis will detail Bergson's 
identification of the major cause o f rigidity in individuals as inattention,
19 Frédéric Worms, Introduction à  Matière et Mémoire de Bergson (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1997) p. 179. (Henceforth Worms)
20 Jeanne Delhomme, Vie et Conscience de la Vie: Essais sur Bergson (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1954) p. 28 (Henceforth Delhomme)
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using an extended example to explore this explanation. This thesis will 
then look at another aspect of Bergson's notion of inattention, a series of 
dominant memories which are inflexibly applied by individuals. Given 
this notion of the dominant series of memories, another example will be 
used to explore inattention, as Bergson outlines it, and its relation to 
madness. The problems which madness might cause for Bergson's 
account of the fixed idea will then provide the link to the next section of 
the thesis which gives an initial analysis of Bergson's position as regards 
the relation between madness and the comic.
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Eccentricity as Rigidity
Rigidity, which Bergson has identified as the object of laughter, has as its 
chief cause inattention resulting in an inability to adapt oneself to one’s 
surroundings. (Laughter, p. 147) The comic character's attention to life is 
automated, without the involvement of pure memory, which, as we shall 
detail, gives the individual the power to adapt to vital and social 
circumstances. (Worms, p. 165) To a large extent this thesis has so far 
concentrated on what Bergson might refer to as humour relating to 
character, but for Bergson inattention equally applies to the man who 
falls over in the street. Falling over in the street is failing to adapt to the 
prevailing circumstances, or, if someone sticks their foot out to trip 
someone, it is made to look as if that individual has failed to adapt to the 
prevailing circumstances.21 (AoL, p. 130) Bergson's account thus does 
not shrink from examples of humour involving small misfortunes unlike, 
most incongruity or absurdity theorists,22 who usually either fail to 
discuss small misfortunes or struggle in attempting to discuss them. A 
recent example of this would be Clark who claims:
21 This kind of example, which includes pratfalls and the like, is commonly referred 
to as a 'small misfortune.' (AoL, p. 103)
22 One o f the first incongruity theorists was Schopenhauer who saw humour as a 
'mismatch' between perception and conceptualisation, although a full account is 
beyond the scope of this work. Arthur Schopenhauer. 'On the Theory o f the 
Ludicrous' The World and Will as Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne, vol. II (New 
York: Dover, 1966) pp. 91-101.
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... to be amused at the man we see slipping on a banana skin 
is to enjoy watching him slip because we see this as 
incongruous (H&I, p. 31)
Clark makes no effort in his 'explanation' to specify what is actually 
incongruous about slipping on a banana skin. Monro on the other hand 
honestly admits that the incongruity theory he is advocating is unable to 
give an account of small misfortunes, yet remains undeterred in his 
recommendation of it. (AoL, p. 254) To be fair to Monro, he does, as 
opposed to Clark, argue that ignorance and lack of skill must be absurd 
(AoL, pp. 50-51), if they are to cause humorous, as opposed to malicious 
laughter. An example of a humorous lack of skill would be a lock picker 
who was incapable of unlocking his own tool box (as in the film Up the 
Chastity Belt), or in the case of humorous ignorance someone who 
thought Nelson Mandela must be a well known student union leader as 
his name seemed to be on a large number of Student Union buildings. 
The problem is that slipping on a banana skin does not appear to be 
amusing due to this kind of "absurdity."
Bergson, on the other hand, is quite at home with small misfortunes and 
can fend off most lines of criticism. Monro asks, for example, whether 
someone suddenly deciding to sit on the floor for no apparent reason 
would be amusing, and not an example of being maladapted. The obvious 
answer from Bergson is that behaviour might not be maladapted, but 
when it resembles cases o f behaviour which are maladapted it is amusing. 
Again, if falling in Tom and Jerry cartoons is often not the fault of the 
characters but is still funny, then the fact that it is not a question of Tom 
not being able to adapt, or to avoid his fate, (Lacey, p. 192) does not
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matter as it resembles cases where he could have done so. This is one o f 
the ways in which laughter can, overall, show justice, despite it being 
'imprecise' in specific cases. This means that humour, for Bergson, is 
general, as it works on the level of outward resemblance, failing to make 
fine distinctions between situations, for example whether an individual 
falls over accidentally or on purpose.
The argument from resemblance which seemingly saves Bergson's 
position, however, also creates problems for him as it is unclear why, 
sitting down on the floor for no reason could not be considered 
humorous. Certainly Bergson could argue that pretending to fall over 
which is perceived as pretence is funny as it is a masquerade (Bergson's 
theories on masquerade being subsequently discussed by the thesis). This 
however could then mean that accidentally falling on to the floor could be 
seen to be amusing through its resemblance to pretending to fall to the 
floor. The question would then be which case was the central one and 
which the peripheral in any given instance. It is of course pointless to 
claim that most cases are laughed at because they are accidental, as this 
is exactly what is in question. Bergson however is committed to saying 
that falling over on purpose, if it is perceived as such, is not amusing, as 
it would then not be ill adapted behaviour due to inattention.
In addition to small misfortunes Bergson's account of inattention also 
relates to the eccentric character. But in order to assess the merits of this
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position it will be necessary to explore the account of attention given in 
Matter and Memory, written some four years prior to Laughter.23
Man, according to Bergson, functions between two extreme planes - 
dream on the one hand where there is no sense of reality and the 
individual is placed totally in the past, and action on the other which is 
totally in the present and inflexibly (Worms, p. 168, Mullarkey, p. 54, 
MM, p. 153) responds to stimuli with immediate reactions, like a lower 
animal. (MM, p. 153) Between these two extreme planes there are 
multiple levels of comportment which are vertically organised, (i.e. each 
plane exists virtually and awaits its actualisation) each being 
differentiated by the degree o f freedom and mechanism present. 
(Mourélos, p. 44) This account of attention is opposed to the one 
ascribed to Bergson by Bachelard, that of following each moment without 
taking in the whole.24 (Bachelard, p. 88) For Bergson the opposite is true 
of attention, it is the very length o f attention, the durational compass of 
events which are grasped together, not merely moving from moment to 
moment which defines attention. The compass of the attention span of 
any individual will determine, in one manner at least, how much of the
23 Worms has noted the importance o f  Matter and Memory in the understanding, of 
Laughter. (Worms, p. 13) Bergson additionally, continued to argue for many 
positions outlined in Matter and Memory for many years after its publication - six 
years later in the case of intellectual effort. (Mourélos, p. 103)
24 Gaston, Bachelard, The Dialectic o f  Duration, trans. Mary McAllester Jones, intro. 
Cristina Chimisso (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000) (Henceforth Bachelard and 
Chimisso respectively)
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'past' is still in the present, and additionally the efficacy of our action in 
the world, i.e. how far action is removed from the automatic.25
It is the automatism of the regular routines of motor schemes which have 
prevented life as creativity finding expression. There is no novelty in 
motor schemes, the past is merely repeated as the past, an indefinite 
repetition. (Delhomme, p. 55) Whereas matter appears to have no gap 
between its past and future, only a continuous repetition, (MM, p. 223 & 
Delhomme, p. 32) o f equivalent moments, (Robinet, p. 87) even the 
simplest living bodies are capable of spontaneous unforeseen movements, 
it is the greater complexity of the human nervous system which has 
increased the capacity for hesitation, (MM, p. 248 & Delhomme, p. 57) 
the gap which Bachelard praises Dupréel for placing between cause and 
effect which can allow the disruption of the mechanical, (Bachelard, p. 
97) in short, increased choice in the individual between multiple actions 
thus allowing life expression through liberty. This liberty thus gives a 
means by which life can find a means of expression and gain a non- 
conceptual knowledge of life by life. (Delhomme, p. 11) Thus inattention 
is in a quite literal sense anti-life. It is a becoming mechanical; (e.g. 
Laughter, p. 10, pp. 31-2) and the simpler the action is - the more 
mechanical it is, and also the more imitable it is, (Laughter, p. 33) having 
less novelty and hence life.
25 Jean Hyppolite "Aspects Diverses de la Mémoire" Jean Hyppolite: Figures de la 
Pensée Philosophique, vol. 1 (First published 1949; Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1991) p. 470 (Henceforth, ADM)
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This gap which prevents action being merely an immediate reaction, the 
span of attention, allows memories from the past to overlay current 
images in order that the present can be understood - memory images 
coming to fill perception spontaneously, (MM, p. 99) projecting interior 
images outwards. In order to outline this process in more depth we shall 
look to the three stage account given by Worms. Firstly there is pure 
perception which is the individual moving as close as possible to the 
immediate instant without memory, this is followed by a habit response 
which is an invariable bodily response to the world, followed finally by 
profound variable memories being inserted into the space of the image. 
(Worms, p. 122) It is the effort of conscious existence as a constant 
attempt to adjust the past to the present which represents this final stage. 
(Delhomme, p. 35) If too much of the past becomes present then 
recollections will be without utility to that which is being attended (MM, 
p. 153) and the relation to action will be weakened, conversely too little 
of the past will result in an automatic unadaptive response to the present 
which will fail to draw on the past. A man who is adapted to life has thus 
summoned all relevant memories to the point of action whilst excluding 
those which are useless or indifferent. (MM, p. 153 & p. 85) So on the 
one hand there is no effective action without memory,26 i.e. the past, as 
there is the need to appeal to analogous situations, (MM, p. 65 & 88) yet 
if too much o f the past becomes present and barely relevant memories 
come to the fore as well as entirely relevant ones, then action will be 
inhibited.
26 Milic Capek, Bergson and Modem Physics: A Reinterpretation and Re-evaluation 
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1971) (Capek, p. 290)
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Attention to life then consists in keeping the mind fixed on action and the 
world, (MM, p. 14) ensuring that analogous situations from the past are 
used to direct current action. Pure memory thus acts to retain the past in 
its completeness, but also to recreate the present by its insertion into the 
present. (Delhomme, p. 35) There are thus multiple qualitatively different 
levels on which mental life operates depending on the closeness to action. 
(MM, p. 14) Ultimately, for Bergson, involvement in the world is defined 
as material, versus the withdrawal from the world, which is spirit.27 
Hence Bachelard's demand for a withdrawal from the world is possible 
according to Bergson's position, despite Bachelard thinking this is not the 
case - however the point of total withdrawal is never actually reached. 
Instead the attention of pure contemplation, the abyss of the past (ADM, 
p. 480) is increasingly moved towards where past memories, relevant, or 
otherwise crowd in to overcome the present perception. The point o f total 
withdrawal is never reached because it is always the sensory motor 
apparatus which allows true memory to become present by appealing to 
the past. (MM, p. 153) There is always a reliance on the machinery of 
ordinary perception, (MM, p. 238) the nascent movement, which marks 
out the field of choice. (MM, p. 95) This nascent movement of 
recognition is utilitarian, to recognise an object is to know how to use it, 
(Mullarkey, p. 49) to sketch out motor movements in advance. (MM, p. 
93) When one's body recognises a city it is automatic and inattentive
27 Eric Matthews, "Bergson's Concept of a Person", Bergson and Philosophy ed. 
John Mullarkey (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 1999) p. 129 (Henceforth 
Matthews)
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(Worms, p. 115), one does not need to think about where one is going, 
(MM, p. 93) it is the playing out o f a motor accompaniment, (Mullarkey, 
p. 49) as opposed to having to stop at every junction. (MM, p. 93)
The immediate response is characterised by a motor response, a bodily 
memory storing the past in terms of motor contrivances, (MM, p. 77) 
'habits' which can be destroyed by lesions, as opposed to pure memory. 
(Delhomme, p. 55) Pure memory consists of specific events in an 
individual's life which cannot be repeated, (Mullarkey, p. 49) everything 
is remembered in its place and detail with no regard for utility. (MM, p. 
81) It is an unalterable and incorruptible presence (Delhomme, p. 31) and 
so cannot be forgotten. This means all forgetting must be superficial, an 
inability to access pure memory for some reason.28 (Capek, p. 164, 
Cariou, p. 103, ADM, p. 483) Bachelard refers to pure memory as "... a 
totally arbitrary supposition" (Bachelard, p. 61) However this seems 
unfair. For Bergson the constant preservation of memory, is a hypothesis, 
an extension of a line of facts, which can never be asserted as absolutely 
true, only as highly probable. (Capek, p. 165) It is because his conception 
of pure memory is based on a line of facts that Bergson can make the 
claims he does without them being merely arbitrary. Although a 
discussion of all the reasons Bergson gives for the existence of pure 
memory would take us to far from our current discussion, the most 
important will be briefly outlined. Bergson argues that as brain lesions
28 Marie Cariou, "Bergson and the Keyboards of Forgetting", Bergson and 
Philosophy ed. John Mullarkey (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 1999) p. 
103. (Henceforth Cariou)
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cause the loss of whole categories of memories, rather than the loss of 
specific memories, (MM, p. 238) forgetting is a destruction of the means 
o f access, rather than a destruction of the memories which cannot be 
recalled. From this he also concludes that pure memory is not physical, as 
in this case memory could potentially be destroyed, by brain damage say, 
so memory, although accessed by the brain, is not contained in it. (MM, 
p. 237 & Mullarkey, p. 37) Indeed memories are not stored anywhere as 
this spatial metaphor does not apply to them.29 (MM, p. 149, Cariou, p. 
108, Mourelos, p. 132, Capek, p. 173, Worms, p. 154, Matthews, p. 130 
& Delhomme, p. 28) Pure memory constantly changes as new memories 
become part of it, but not in a quantitative manner, like a series of 
separate memories, (Mourelos, p. 37) but instead in a qualitative change 
of the whole. (Delhomme, p. 166) To manifest itself memory must 
become an image, but his does mean it is an image, (Mullarkey, p. 51 & 
Mourelos, p. 127) it is instead a virtuality which is actualised as an 
image, via a bodily movement which selects it. (Mullarkey, p. 52)
Pure memory uses the past to adapt to present circumstances as part of a 
constantly changing creative equilibrium between memory and perception 
(Delhomme, p. 173) requiring constant effort (Mullarkey, p. 55, 
Delhomme, p. 37), as opposed to the rigid mechanisms of habit memory 
which merely repeat what has gone before. In short it introduces
29 P. A. Y. Gunter, "Bergsonian Method and the Evolution o f Science." Bergson and 
the Evolution of Physics, ed. P. A. Y. Gunter (Knoxville: University o f Tennessee 
Press, 1969) University Press, Bloomington, 1984) p. 92 (Henceforth Gunter)
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difference into the present allowing us to turn away from repetition.30 
(BCD, p. 56) Motor mechanisms remain identical to themselves, always 
unrolling in the same order (Delhomme, p. 35) they are invariable. 
(Worms, p. 123) An attentive reaction, on the contrary, will oscillate 
between the habitual motor response which is identical in diverse 
situations and acts to inhibit memory (MM, p. 85) and the discrimination 
of the individual situation via memory. (ADM, p. 475)
Attentive recognition is then between true and motor memory - it is an 
impure state. (MM, p. 90) It is knowing which perceptions to ignore and 
which to utilise which will determine attention. So attention acts to break 
the immediate response movement of habit bringing us back to the detail 
by drawing in complimentary images from pure memory, (Mullarkey, pp. 
49-50) to produce subtler movements. (MM, p. 101) This means that 
there are two process involved in the attentive interaction with the world, 
the movement relating to the object, and representation coming from the 
subject, (MM, p. 78) hence in perception there are two currents the 
objective movement and the subjective representation. (Worms, p. 118) 
This means that recognition is always between a motor scheme and a 
dynamic scheme in which memory images are organised at various virtual 
levels. (Worms, p. 114)
30 Gilles Deleuze, "Bergson's Concept of Difference" Bergson and Philosophy, ed. 
John Mullarkey (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) p. 56. (Henceforth, 
BCD)
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To summarise attention to life is dictated by how much of pure memory 
becomes effective in a bodily habit. (ADM, p. 477) There are thus a 
multiplicity of qualitatively different levels of attention to the world, 
absolute immediate habit at one extreme and absolute disconnected 
dream at the other. However in Laughter this attention to life is extended 
from the biological to the social, laughter always involving the group. 
(Worms, p. 178) It will be seen as the thesis progresses how this idea 
attention, or more specifically the lack of attention, functions in various 
amusing situations.
We are now in a position to assess a more complex case of inattention, 
the case o f the television detective, Lieutenant Columbo.
Lieutenant Columbo would appear to be the archetype of the rigid 
eccentric failing to fit into his surroundings and seemingly an ideal 
exemplification of Bergson's account. Columbo's humorous quality 
appears to depend, at least in part, on an apparent ambiguity between 
attentiveness and inattentiveness. This apparent ambiguity between the 
inattentive and attentive is such that the viewer is often left wondering 
whether Columbo is aware that he is failing to fit into a particular context 
or not. Columbo is a man who can read an individual's character from the 
most subtle nuances of their behaviour, piece together events from the 
smallest fragments of evidence, and yet appears completely unaware of 
his own eccentricity: think of his very old, broken down and shabby car 
which he refers to in one episode, apparently without any irony, as a 
continental model whilst looking at a rich suspect's expensive imported 
car; or his old overcoat which allows him to be mistaken for someone
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sleeping rough in one episode and often results in people failing to realise 
he is a detective with the Los Angeles Police Department. In one sense 
he is the epitome of attentiveness in his detective work, yet in another he 
seems the epitome of inattentiveness, and it is here in this ambiguity that 
most of the comedy lies. He is capable of standing in the middle of 
someone's lawn whilst saying "I didn't mean to bother you", where the 
ambiguity is exactly between the obviousness that he must know he is 
bothering them, whilst at the same time appearing completely unaware of 
this fact, despite the obvious acuity of his observational powers.
Seeing the humour relating to Columbo as a single type is a mistake, 
there are in fact a variety o f types occurring within his character.
Firstly there is his dress sense. This relates to two types of humour, i) 
There is a habitual element to his coat wearing, it is in some sense a part 
of him. In one episode his ever absent wife tries to get him to wear 
another coat, yet by the end of the episode he has retreated to wearing his 
old coat again. The coat is something which has come to define him, like 
a habit he cannot get rid of. The same kind of argument applies to his car 
which is almost a part o f  him, it stands out from its surroundings, it is a 
case o f inattention again, he fails to see how incongruous it is. Indeed 
when he fails to be recognised as a member of the police due to his 
appearance it is a case o f inattention to his surroundings, in terms of the 
'small society' he inhabits, i.e. he does not look like a policeman or realise 
that he is standing out with regards to his small society. As Bergson 
argues "[e]ach member must be ever attentive to his social surroundings; 
he must model himself on his environment; in short he must avoid
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shutting himself up in his own peculiar character ..." (Laughter, p. 135) 
His attentive detection skills and observation o f others only acts to 
heighten his inattention in other fields via contrast.
Secondly standing in the middle of someone's lawn, saying 'I didn't mean 
to bother you', when it is clear that he is, appears to be amusing on two 
levels marked out by short and long term attentiveness. The suspect can 
only see Columbo's short term inattentiveness in bothering them as 
opposed to his long term attentiveness in lulling them into a false sense of 
security, which often leads to their unmasking. It is not so much the 
ambiguity between short term and long term attention which is amusing, 
but instead a combination of two different sources o f amusement. Firstly 
there is the short term 'inattention' on Columbo's part which allows his 
behaviour to appear inattentive. This is amusing due to the failure to 
adapt to the particular situation, or appearing to do so. Secondly, 
Columbo's actions can be interpreted as a masquerade, a pretence at 
inattention. This pretence can be interpreted as immediately amusing, but 
also as long term attentiveness. In the later case it is not Columbo who is 
the source o f amusement, but instead the suspect who is lacking attention 
in not seeing Columbo's long term attentiveness. The length o f attention, 
i.e. the level worked on, will decide the source of the humour in this case. 
Bergson seems to suggest that it is necessarily the immediate mechanism 
which does not proceed from an act of reflection, (Laughter, p. 198) 
which identifies the source of humour, so for Bergson it must in this case 
be the short term inattention or the feigned inattention on Columbo's part, 
as opposed to the long term inattention on behalf o f the suspect which is 
the primary source of amusement.
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The above examples of inattention are not the only ones however as 
inattention is also manifested when things are moulded on ideas, 
(Laughter, p. 184) rather than ideas being moulded on things. The figure 
whom Bergson most tellingly invokes to exemplify this aspect of his 
account is Don Quixote de la Mancha. According to Bergson Quixote 
appears unable to adapt his ideas - to choose the correct memory from 
the recollections at his disposal (Laughter, p. 183) to fit the world: he tilts 
at windmills, for example, which he believes to be monstrous giants. 
When there is attention the mind is continually mobile adapting itself to 
the mobility of things - the moving continuity of life (Laughter, p. 183) 
This is not the case with Quixote. Certain recollections have become 
privileged, the giant from the romance he has been reading - and these 
wait the opportunity to push their way into consciousness at the slightest 
resemblance, so Quixote sees giants instead of windmills. (Laughter, p. 
183) It is a case o f  Quixote functioning on a particular level or set of 
levels. Levels of memory are differentiated according to how spread they 
are, i.e. how many discrete memories are present - the more expanded 
memory is the more points are present. (MM, p. 171) Each level has 
dominant points on which the others lean for support. (MM, p. 170) To 
fully actualise a memory, it is necessary to move to the appropriate level, 
although these levels do not pre-exist their realisation.31 It is because 
Quixote is functioning with certain dominant memories that these are 
manifested as dominant on certain levels and thus summoned to every
31 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism. trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New 
York: Zone Books, 1991). p. 64 (Henceforth Bergsonism)
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situation in order to interpret it. (Laughter, p. 184) This can lead to a rigid 
obstinacy which follows its own path - refusing to listen, in spite of 
interruptions. (Laughter, p. 185) Bergson describes this lack of 
adaptation as like someone walking in their sleep. (Laughter, pp. 183-4)
In Part I, Chapter VIII, of the eponymous book, Don Quixote charges a 
plain of windmills in the belief that they are in fact monstrous giants, 
despite the warnings of his squire Sancho. Afterwards the following 
exchange occurs:
'O my goodness!' cried Sancho. 'Didn't I tell your worship to 
look what you were doing, for they were only windmills? 
Nobody could mistake them, unless he had windmills on the 
brain.'
'Silence, friend Sancho,' replied Don Quixote. 'Matters of 
war are more subject than most to continual change.'32
Don Quixote then proceeds to explain how the giants had by black magic 
been turned into windmills "... to cheat me of the glory of conquering 
them." (Cervantes, p. 69) What is clearly evident in this section is that 
Quixote perceives via a set o f privileged recollections seeing what he 
wants to see as opposed to examining the thing in question. Additionally 
it is also apparent that even when Quixote sees that his interpretation of 
the situation is not fitting the world, the giants are in fact really 
windmills, he does not accept that his conceptualisation was mistaken. 
Instead of accepting that the giants were in fact windmills all along.
32 Miguel de Cervantes Saaverdra, The Adventures o f Don Quixote, trans. J. M. 
Cohen (London: Penguin Books, 1950) p. 69 (Henceforth, Cervantes)
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Quixote reinterprets the situation, black magic having turned the giants 
into windmills so he cannot conquer them. Rather than adjust his 
incorrect recognition to fit reality, Quixote adjusts reality to fit his 
incorrect recognition. As Foucault33 points out, the dominant scheme 
which Quixote places on the world is based on chivalric romances to the 
extent that, when something fails to resemble the chivalric romance, 
enchantment, which is derived from the chivalric romance, is used to 
explain the fact it does not resemble a chivalric romance. Quixote then 
appears to be a clear exemplification of Bergson's account of humour as 
related to the fixed interpretation. The notion of inattention introduced 
earlier is important at this junction again as Quixote is clearly functioning 
with a particular set of memories and is inattentive to his surroundings. It 
is because the memory is spread out in a dream like state that "[t]he 
mind, enamoured of itself, now seeks in the outer world nothing more 
than a pretext for its imaginations." (Laughter, p. 186)
In this section o f the thesis it has become clear that a general account of 
humour as directed at inattention, and specifically at 'the eccentric'. 
Having given such a positive appraisal o f the fixed idea in comedy, the 
thesis must now highlight one possible problem: the role of madness.
33 Michel Foucault, The Order o f Things - An Archaeology of  the Human Sciences, 
trans. unspecified (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970) pp. 46-50. There are 
potentially interesting links between Foucault's account o f madness and resemblance 
in The Order o f Things and Bergson's account o f resemblance and madness. 
Bergson's account will be developed further in the thesis, but further exploration of 
the link between his views and Foucault is unfortunately beyond the scope o f  the 
present work.
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The comic antics of Don Quixote in particular seem to be almost mad, 
possessed of a nigh dream-like insanity. Exodor from Mork and Mindy is 
actually portrayed as someone who is mad, yet also a comic figure. The 
question which seems most pressing is the exact nature of the relation 
between comedy and madness. Are the two separable, and if so, is the 
distinction between them one of degree or kind? The thesis will briefly 
introduce a borderline example between madness and comedy, that of the 
Texan Linus Roote. The example of Mr. Roote will be used in the 
following section to examine Bergson's claim that the difference between 
humour and madness, in terms, for example, of the fixed idea is the lack 
of sympathy in humour, as opposed to the standard response to madness. 
The tenability of such a claim will be examined below.
Humour and Madness
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In the previous section it was noted that there might be a potential 
problem distinguishing between humorous examples like those of Don 
Quixote, on the one hand, and madness on the other, if such a distinction 
is tenable, or indeed desirable. In any case, this distinction is important 
for Bergson as much of his account of humour looks to madness for a 
model of operation: as he puts it, humour is about acting as if mad 
without being so. To assess the merits of the distinction between madness 
and humour the thesis shall now introduce a potential borderline example 
between madness and humour:
Texan Linus Roote, in a nearly fatal act, shot himself, after 
he mistook students on their way to a 'Come as your 
favourite fish party' for invading extra-terrestrials - "I 
thought they wanted to do experiments on me," explained 
Mr. Roote.34
Such privileged recollections as those o f Mr. Roote, interpreting 
seemingly innocuous events (individuals in fancy dress) in terms of 
aliens, having, presumably, watched too many science fiction B-movies, 
seems close to madness, yet there also does seem to be something 
humorous about the example.
Madness, as has already been commented on is seen, by Bergson, as an 
imbalance in attention (Worms, p. 96), an excess of mental power,
34 Paul Sussman, "Unbelievable - The Mad World o f Paul Sussman," The Big Issue - 
In the North August 21-27: pp. 44.
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(Mullarkey, pp. 101-2) the question is what differentiates a comic 
imbalance from a mental imbalance.
For Bergson the behaviour of Mr. Roote would be amusing if it were like 
insanity, but also failed to arouse pity, since according to Bergson, if 
there was even a hint of sympathy, laughter could not occur, (Laughter, 
p. 185) this being linked to the contrast between superficiality and 
tragedy. The comic individual represents a distraction from liberty, but 
only a distraction, a partial or regional incident, as opposed to the 
seriousness o f liberty (Laughter, p. 79) which involves the whole 
individual, (Jankelevitch, p. 78) in short life. If the automatic or otherwise 
inattentive behaviour were related to the centre of a person's being, it 
would not be comic, but tragic (Jankelevitch, pp. 169-70) as the 
individual's deeper problems would elicit our sympathy, as in the case of 
madness. This is why Bergson emphasises humour's concentration on the 
automatic gesture, as a surface phenomenon, as opposed to the 
intentional action relating to the whole individual. (Laughter, p. 143)
Bergson's position on madness and humour immediately ring true, and the 
fact that the mad used to be objects of ridicule is not a sufficient 
argument against this position, as it is the very understanding of madness 
in the modem period as it relates to the total individual which prevents 
them from being the object o f laughter. So if the insane were viewed as 
having superficial problems then there would be no sympathy, which 
might explain the less piteous attitude o f past ages. Additionally if 
madness is not viewed as superficial, then the imbalance they suffer 
would be something which affected the liberty of the mad individual and
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would no longer be comic, but instead a matter of moral concern and thus 
tragic. (Jankelevitch, pp. 169-70)
The kind of analysis outlined in the previous paragraph allows for the 
possibility that individuals might behave as if mad, yet unlike the mad be 
regarded as amusing due to the lack of sympathy felt for them - their 
madness would be superficial. Figures like Exodor who are pretending to 
be mad are laughed at with a clear knowledge that they are in reality 
sane. Spike Milligan is funny as long as he is perceived to be mentally 
stable; the laughter could not continue if he were perceived to be really 
mad. Likewise, reading Nietzsche's Ecce Homo in some cases leaves the 
reader uncertain as to whether amusement is or is not the correct 
response, most obviously in relation to the apparent egotism of his 
chapter titles. In some sense if one pretends to be mad, and draws 
attention to the pretence, like Exodor, the very 'visibility' of the pretence 
might allow individuals to laugh at that which they generally would not, 
as sympathy is thereby removed. The very fact Exodor's behaviour is a 
masquerade might show that it is this, not the inflexibility of the type, 
their inattention, which is being laughed at in Exodor's case, a position 
which was previously criticised, but instead the rigidity accruing to a 
disguise. Bergson might then analogously argue that much fictional 
comedy works by presenting humorous types in a safe environment 
where the spectator can laugh without feeling they are directly attacking 
the individual. In a less piteous society, when the mad were a spectacle 
for laughter, there would be no need for this distance as sympathy would 
not be felt for them. Don Quixote in this sense is paradoxical. Cervantes 
goes to great pains to ensure that Quixote is perceived as mad, not merely
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someone pretending to be mad, and yet the reader is not supposed to feel 
sympathy for him. Cervantes was writing in a less piteous age so in this 
sense laughing at the mad was not, at the time he was writing, a problem. 
Yet Quixote is still amusing today, are individuals laughing at Quixote's 
madness nowadays?35 Whether being fictional acts as a means of 
distancing Quixote and his acts from us seems, at best, ambiguous.
In light of the above considerations how should the behaviour of Linus 
Roote, a modem Quixote of sorts be judged? If  Mr. Roote is viewed with 
sympathy as being mad then his actions would seemingly not be amusing, 
on the other hand his behaviour would be amusing if it was judged sane, 
but perhaps, stupid. An example which perhaps moves us into full 
madness would be that of Roseanne Greco, who ran over her husband 
Felix repeatedly with her car in the driveway o f their home in West Islip, 
New York, after becoming convinced that Felix had become possessed 
by the cartoon character Mickey Mouse.36 Ms. Greco's behaviour is 
bizarre and almost humorous, reality appears to have been supplanted by 
a specific idea, though perhaps not as clearly a fixed idea as some of the 
others highlighted earlier, but there is something mad here which prevents 
us laughing. It is surely not the case that serious injury to others separates 
Ms. Greco from Mr. Roote, as conceivably Mr. Roote might have shot at
35 It is notable that Romantic critics often played down Quixote's madness in their 
interpretations of his work as madness was, at that time, no longer considered a fit 
subject for laughter. See Anthony Close, The Romantic Approach to 'Don Quixote' 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
36 Victoria Times-Colonist, 25th o f February, 1989.
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the students dressed as fish, instead of himself. It seems there is 
something about madness which does prevent it being humorous and that 
the sympathy felt for the mad could be a plausible explanation for the 
lack of humour with regard to madness. This, then, means that Bergson 
can continue to distinguish between actions which are humorous, and 
those which would be humorous if the acting agent were not considered 
mad.
The next section of this thesis will turn to another form of behaviour 
which is close to madness and related to the notion of humour rather like 
a fixed idea, previously exemplified by Don Quixote: the repeating 
machine. After outlining this form of humour, a possible objection to 
Bergson's explanation made by Swabey will be examined and dismissed. 
The thesis then progresses in the following sections to further unpack the 
notion of fixity and inflexibility with regard to attention which it has 
already begun to outline.
The Repeating Machine
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The set o f dominant memories which tyranises perception in a Don 
Quixote like fashion is closely linked to another phenomenon which 
Bergson describes, mental inelasticity. Mental inelasticity is a moulding 
of the world on concepts, as is the dominant memory, but the difference 
in this case is that the individual does not attempt to reinterpret the world 
according to their wishes and expectations, but instead acts the same 
regardless of any prevailing circumstances. Such a state, as Monro points 
out, is somewhere between superiority and absurdity. (AoL, p. 55) 
Mental inelasticity is an absolute fixity - an example being the individual 
who says the same thing no matter what the circumstance: in short, a 
mechanical repeating machine. (Laughter, p. 74) Instead of the attention 
which was previously outlined there is an habitual response which means 
that perception is not reflected on - there is no zone of indétermination. 
(MM, p. 45) This results in the repetition of the actual movement 
(Delhomme, p. 28) and the elimination of memory. (Delhomme, p. 33) It 
is a mistake, according to Bergson to deal with memory purely in terms 
of learnt habits and the ability to repeat. (MM, p. 83) Memory should 
instead be linked to creation. (ADM, p. 469) This is because of the clear 
distinction drawn, by Bergson, between habit memory and pure memory, 
in fact Bergson claims that habit memory is only called 'memory' because 
we remember having acquired it. (MM, p. 84) Habit is foreign to our 
personal selves, it ceases to have the mark of history, a specific place in 
time where it was acquired, unlike pure memory which records 
everything in its individual place. (MM, p. 83) Instead habit reduces us to 
the bodily (Worms, p. 101), a "... revenge offensive of matter ..." 
(Jankélèvitch, p. 170) or what Gunter refers to as the "materiality o f  the
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conscious mind." (Gunter, p. 32) It is a move towards the equivalence of 
moments, as opposed to the unique, (MM, p. 247) relying on repetition 
and quasi-identity, (Worms, p. 279) it ceaselessly repeats the past, each 
moment being causally deducible from the previous. (ADM, p. 478 & 
Mourelos, p. 108) Habit memory is a mechanism which has been 
acquired by the accumulation of the past, (ADM, p. 476) rather than the 
independent souvenirs of pure memory which are each unique and not 
acquired by habit. (Worms, p. 99) Thus habit acts the past rather than 
calling up an image, (MM, p. 151) it is the prolongation of useful effects. 
(MM, p. 88) Because habit memory merely acts the past it is ultimately 
closed, (Cariou, p. 105) its acquired movement being invariant (Worms, 
p. 102), any apparent variation of a habit being a change caused by forces 
external to habit memory: (Worms, p. 104) the external forces in this case 
being pure memory coming in to disrupt the habitual response, to subvert 
linear causality. (Delhomme, p. 167) The attention given by the habit 
response is thus automated, functioning without pure memory, which, as 
we have commented, has the power to adapt to vital and social 
circumstances. (Worms, p. 165) It is exactly this machine-like 
inflexibility which is occurring in the case of humorous repetition. In its 
denial o f creativity the mechanical fixed order interrupts life, being the 
opposite movement to creation, (Delhomme, p. 179) an indefinite 
repetition. (Delhomme, p. 125) So discouraging habit through laughter 
encourages the creativity of life - what in Matter and Memory was seen 
as the task o f inserting liberty into the material world.37 (ADM, p. 472)
37 Although Bergson does treat matter as deterministic, (Robinet, p.66) a neutralised 
consciousness without memory (Jank£tevitch, p. 21, (Keith Ansell-Pearson, "Bergson 
and Creative Evolution/lnvolution: Exposing the Transcendental Illusion of
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The commonness of habit shows the rarity of free will, (Mullarkey, p. 26) 
and this fall into habitual patterns can be seen, ultimately, as the denial of 
liberty and moral responisbility (Jankelevitch, p. 159) and as such an 
ethical demand, rather than merely being a lack of authenticity in denying 
the basic conditions of life, (Mullarkey, p. 106) i.e. liberty and creativity 
i.e. difference as opposed to spatial repetition.
It is this notion of the machine like habit, as opposed to free will, which 
renders the comic individual's apparently automatic gestures amusing - 
they are inattentive as regards the world. This automatic humorous 
repetition gives the impression that something has somehow been 
wedged into an individual's psyche which every so often is triggered, for 
example a catch phrase, which somehow seems to inevitably end up
Organistnic Life", B ergson  and Philosophy ed. John Mullarkey (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1999) p. 158 (Henceforth KAP), Delhomme, p. 40, p. 6, 
Cariou, p. 100, (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, In Praise of Philosophy, trans. John Wild & 
James M. Edie. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963) p. 10 (Henceforth 
In Praise), Robinet, p. 64) he also acknowledges that this is an assumption made 
because the distance between the rhythm o f matter and that of ourselves is so great. 
(MM, p. 248 & Capek2, p. 236) It is this temporal difference (Worms, p. 279) which 
has diluted the 'memory' o f matter to the extent where it is almost quantitative, 
(Worms , p. 278) which is referred to when Whitehead comments tht the universe is 
material in proportion to the restriction of its memory.
Additionally Capek makes much of the relationship between physical micro­
indetermination and Bergson's thought. (Capek, p. xii, p. 283) Additionally Milic 
Capek, "Bergson's Theory o f Matter and Modem Physics," Bergson and the 
Evolution of Physics, ed. Pete Gunter (Knoxville: University o f Tennesse Press, 
1969) p. 297, p. 299, p. 303, p. 320, p. 322, p. 327. (Henceforth Capek 2)
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being said by the individual, what ever the situation. The best example of 
such a repeating machine is the aptly named Trigger from the television 
series Only Fools and Horses, who constantly calls Rodney Trotter by the 
name Dave, insisting it is his name no matter what is said. The individual 
thus acts as a 'repeating machine', since they are in some sense out of 
touch with 'life', finding it impossible to adjust to the correct plane of 
action. This plausible description, is not without its critics, for example 
Swabey.
Swabey claims that jokes based on repetition, presumably including 
Trigger's Dave, do not involve genuine laughter, as they are only laughed 
at through habit. (Swabey, p. 147) The laughter which a repeated action 
causes for Swabey is conditioned (in the behaviourist sense), though it 
seems unclear what reinforcement would be present in this case. 
Presumably because something is amusing in the first instance, when the 
thing which is amusing is repeated, the first amusement is remembered 
and 'applied' to the second instance. This kind of account appears to fly in 
the face of the irritation caused by telling an initially amusing joke 
repeatedly. The constant telling o f a joke does not reinforce the initial 
humour, but acts instead to negate its humour. The negation o f that which 
is humorous through repetition would seem to point to a different kind of 
explanation: the one, in fact, which Bergson gives. It is the repetition 
itself which is the source of the humour, the habit of the individual 
provoking laughter, rather than any habituation on the part of the 
audience.
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It would thus seem that the concepts of mental inelasticity and the fixed 
response can explain a certain set of examples very well, in terms of the 
habit as a fixed repetition of a word or gesture (Trigger), an acting on a 
single plane, or the fixed viewpoint based on a dominant memory which 
is applied without correct discrimination, failing to move to the correct 
plane, on the one hand, and on the other mental inelasticity (Don 
Quixote's adventure with the wind mills.) The next section will link the 
notion of inflexibility and lack of attention on the small scale, which we 
have so far been discussing, to a positive account o f social flexibility. The 
link to a positive account of large scale social flexibility will be made via 
a consideration of conversational rigidity and lack o f attentive adaptation.
Humour and Habit
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The above analysis can be extended so as not only to cover inattention to 
life in the 'Quixote' (dominant memories) or 'Trigger' (repeating machine) 
sense, but the break down of communication due to the failure of the 
communicating parties to adjust to each other's utterances. Individual's 
actions being dominated by certain habits which they fail to adjust. An 
example of this kind o f behaviour might be Proust's characters who often 
act with a parrot-like obstinacy.38 Instead of conversation being a process 
o f mutual adaptation, there is an absolute failure to adjust by either party, 
so in effect communication breaks down. (Pilkington, p. 170) It is a lack 
o f the ability to adjust to find the same plane or rhythm as the individual 
who is being communicated with which is here at stake. Extending this 
model, it is also clear how the individual conversation can act as a model 
for the flexibility of society's interactions on the larger scale. On such a 
social model each individual would be attempting to act flexibly in 
response to others' actions in order to create a fluid and tolerant whole. 
Constantly adjusting their planes o f action to ensure understanding.
However Bergson wishes to go further claiming that one cannot help but 
see society as a living being, so any fixity in societal structures can be 
perceived as a habit or something inert on the surface of a living society 
like a masquerade and can thus be laughable - examples of masquerades 
include ceremonies, which are like clothes on the social body. (Laughter, 
p. 45) Bergson thinks that all clothing is like "something mechanical
38 A. E I’ilkinglon, Bergson and his Influence (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1976). p. 168 (Henceforth. Pilkington)
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encrusted on the living" (Laughter, p. 37) and it is only when fashions are 
outdated that this becomes obvious. (Laughter, p. 38) Clothing on this 
model is a social habit, like ceremonies which only become amusing 
when they are in some way removed from the social fabric, e.g. become 
outdated. What Bergson seems to say is that a ceremony is amusing when 
it is looked at on a level which neglects its function. A ruling by a 
university that graduands at graduation ceremonies should not wear fancy 
dress brings out the absurdity o f wearing a large black cape and mortar 
board hat (academic fancy dress) and the ludicrous nature of the 
ceremony. The implications o f this are that those wearing outdated 
clothing are eccentric not because they have failed to move with society's 
fashions, but instead because all clothes are intrinsically funny when 
viewed on a certain level, the same being true of ceremonies, it is only 
that the viewing of the form without the function allows them to be 
regarded on a certain level on which they are laughable. This is especially 
the case where formal procedures act to make the living behave in 
formulaic manners. (Laughter, p. 45) It might appear difficult to explain 
the amusement gained when watching old television adverts, which on 
the cusp of fashion date very quickly. However if these, like modish 
furniture, are seen as a part of a society, their laughable quality will not 
be present, as opposed to being seen on a level where only their 'form,' 
not their 'matter' are attended to (Laughter, p. 45) at which point they will 
be regarded as laughable. Bergson uses this question of levels to explain 
why many things are comic de jure - but not de facto. (Laughter, p. 37) 
This is because on the level of custom we have become "... deadened to 
their comic quality." (Laughter, p. 39)
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Before continuing, a summary of the moves made so far. The thesis has 
argued that humour, for Bergson, was, in the first instance, portrayed as a 
force for social normalisation. This role of social normalisation was said 
to consist in removing inflexibility, particularly that which involved 
inattention to life. The thesis then went on to examine the various forms 
of inattention outlined by Bergson, and latterly concentrated on those 
involved in habit. Bergson's extension of habit into the societal realm was 
then discussed.
Masquerade and Disguise
64
In addition to describing clothing as the rigid non-living encrusted upon 
the flexible, Bergson claims that clothing is a disguise. Clothes in this 
manner are analogous to ceremony which Bergson, as the thesis detailed 
above, saw as an extraneous fixity on the social body. So, to give a non­
clothing related example, Bergson claims that individuals, when seeing 
Blacks for the first time, mistake them for Whites in disguise, and this is 
why individuals laugh at Blacks. This interpretative position was 
suggested to Bergson when "... an ordinary cabby ... applied the 
expression "unwashed" to the Negro fare he was driving" (Laughter, p. 
40), taxi drivers of course being well known for their liberal and racially 
tolerant attitudes. Before assessing the overall merits o f  Bergson's 
account of disguise, an examination of the implications o f the 'Black 
disguise' is desirable, as this is an extremely telling example. On the one 
hand, there is an inflexible attitude on the part o f the taxi driver, seeing 
Blacks as merely Whites in disguise,39 due to a fixed idea he has of all 
people being White. On the other hand, the taxi driver is laughing at the 
Black individual in question for his blackness, this being seen as rigid 
clothing on the White body. Thus it is a habitual level of dealing with 
individuals which means the individual is laughable because they fail to 
fit into the habitual level at which the taxi driver is functioning. Rigidity 
thus attaches to both the amused individual and the object o f amusement, 
depending on which perspective is taken. So an individual observing this
39 A discussion o f the full racial implications o f this line o f thought is beyond the 
remit o f this work. See Frantz Fanon, Black Skin. White Masks, trans. Charles Lam 
Markmann (New York: Grove, 1967)
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scene could either laugh with or at the taxi driver. The normative power 
o f  laughter here appears to be questionable. Bergson could possibly be 
defended if one said that humour was often unjust, and this work has 
already quoted Bergson making such a statement, so gratuitous racism 
might be one o f the examples of the injustice of humour, where humour's 
targets are overall just. Such a statement, obviously, does not tell us if the 
humour is just, or give us any criteria for discovering the justice of 
humour or otherwise in any particular case, indeed it might be argued that 
Bergson's point is actually more subtle than has been suggested. Whilst 
'Blacks as Whites' appears to be treated as an example of a disguise 
Bergson seems to suggest that it is not a central example but rather one 
on the periphery and as such is amusing only in that it bears a 
resemblance to the central or source cases of disguise, so it can be seen 
as 1. unjust and 2. due to the taxi driver's lack of attention in allowing his 
plane of thought to be such that the level worked on is too close to that of 
dream meaning associations which are not entirely relevant have been 
allowed to enter into perception.
Sully seems to be much in tune with Bergson's thought when he claims, 
according to Monro, that "[i]t can probably be laid down as a general 
principle that anything which masquerades as another thing is ipso facto 
laughable." (AoL, p. 47) There do, however, appear to be unlunny 
disguises - the cold blooded killer who is disguised as an old woman for 
example. It could be argued that although this example does not initially 
appear humorous, under certain circumstances it could have the potential 
for laughter. What this suggests, however, is that it is not merely the 
disguise which is important. So Bergson's account would seemingly be
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unable to explain why a disguise which was recognised as a disguise 
might not be funny. Seemingly, the only possibility would be to maintain 
that sympathy was present in some manner in this example, though 
exactly how is uncertain.
In the next section several themes from the previous discussions of 
Bergson's thought will be brought together. The notion of the 
conversational society whose members react flexibly to each other will 
be contrasted with institutions which do not act flexibly towards 
individuals outside them. This notion will be linked to both the worry 
which society has about separatist tendencies swerving from the common 
centre, and the Don Quixote like memories which dominate action. This 
line o f enquiry will finally be tied into the notion of extreme automatic 
rule following, another form of rigidity.
The Jobsworth
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Bergson thinks, as has already been indicated, that a society, if divided 
into sections, worries about individual groups swerving from the common 
centre and that laughter acts as a potential cure for these separatist 
tendencies and encourages an embracing of the whole. (Laughter, p. 176) 
In Laughter Bergson sees these separatist tendencies in the vanities of 
particular professions who place themselves above all others. (Laughter, 
p. 177) The amusement in this case again revolves around the notion of 
habit being trapped on a particular plane: individuals being so jammed 
into their own world that they cannot see beyond it, or in some cases 
cannot talk outside their own mode of discourse. (Laughter, p. 178) This 
is a case o f misapplication of jargon, using one set of habits in 
circumstances where they do not apply and thus inattentively failing to 
adapt, to move to the correct level. This behaviour, as this thesis has 
already commented in regard to Don Quixote's outlook, protects the 
individual, but also stops them being creative, adapting to the particular 
needs in question. It is from this logic that the 'jobsworth' arises, the 
official who works like a law of nature (Laughter, p. 46), a becoming- 
mechanical which is itself laughable, (Laughter, p. 53):
The assassin, after despatching his victim, must have got out
the wrong side of the train, thereby infringing the
Company's rules. (Laughter, p. 46)
Humour in this case attacks the rigid habit which means the individual 
follows the Company's rules without flexibility, resulting in the 'job's 
worth' being unable to adjust to life, (Laughter, p. 14) the company's rules 
being the major concern, not the murder committed by the assassin.
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Monro makes a general attack on Bergson which it is appropriate to 
consider here, claiming that his theory leaves humour unable to question 
the inadequacy o f conventions and thus incapable of carrying out a 
critique of society as a whole. (AoL, pp. 132-3) The first part of this 
criticism appears ill founded, yet it is not. The thesis has already 
described Bergson's account of amusement at ceremonies, but inadequate 
conventions are not being questioned through humour in this example. In 
this example instead, the ceremony is only amusing when viewed at a 
non-functional level. This means that the function and the adequacy of 
conventions is irrelevant to the laughter. The second half of Monro's 
attack presupposes that humour can criticise society as a whole, as 
opposed to merely criticising various parts o f a particular society. 
Whether such an attack is possible will depend on humour is a purely 
social phenomenon: if so, any criticism humour is capable of will also be 
from a societal position and Monro's criticism will be irrelevant and 
Bergson does appear to take this view. (Laughter, pp. 176-7) In both 
cases humour's inability is just a feature of what humour is.
Extending Bergson's thought with regard to the jobsworth gives a 
plausible explanation of another type of humour best exemplified by the 
"Australian Laura McKenzie [who] stopped her car at a red light - and 
waited two days for it to change. 'How was I to know it was broken? It 
was red, so I just behaved properly,' she said from hospital where she 
was being treated for dehydration."40 McKenzie sacrificed herself to the 
good by preserving a particular system and not trying to make an
40 Anon., Fortean l imes Febuary/March 1994: p. 8.
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exception for herself. In the same way as the jobsworth acts inflexibly 
with regard to his professional bodies rules, so the 'McKenzie' acts 
inflexibly with regard to the larger social sphere's rules. Flexible 
behaviour involves a tension, an ability to function on the correct plane, 
knowing when to move away from the habitual and mechanical, when to 
adapt. This of course does not then mean that stopping at traffic lights 
shows amusing automatism, only not knowing when an exception should 
be made, flexibility in short. This possibly suggests that although humour 
might not be able to criticise the adequacy of conventions per se, it could 
criticise the level at which an individual is working, i.e. the relevance of 
the habit and conventions to a particular instance. However Bergson does 
want to claim that the more self-justifying a profession, the less its 
habitual rules can be seen to be useful. (Laughter, p. 177) This results in 
the public being treated as if it had been made for the profession rather 
than the other way round. (Laughter, p. 178) So there is a limited sense in 
which Bergson does think humour can questions the adequacy of 
conventions.
Morality and Humour
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Although the thesis has looked at the social aspect of humour in relation 
to ceremonies, it has not yet examined the link between the social and the 
moral in humour. This section will consider this larger scale concern and 
its implications for the depth of humour's insight. Can humour be linked 
to specific moral ideas or will its values always be at the mercy of social 
fashion?
Previously Bergson has often seemed to take a clear line with regard to 
the issues at stake, even if subsequent probing has shown the line taken 
to be less clear than it initially seemed. However, this is not the case with 
regard to the social/moral distinction; for example, within the same 
paragraph Bergson says:
It must be acknowledged, however, to the credit of 
mankind, that there is no essential difference between the 
social ideal and the moral. We may therefore admit, as a 
general rule, that it is the faults of others that make us laugh 
by reason of their unsociability rather than of their 
immorality. (Laughter, pp. 138-9)
Laughter acts with regard to the social ideal, but only because there is no 
essential difference between the social and moral ideal. This means that 
any moral force laughter has is a product of it acting in lieu of the social 
ideal, as opposed to it acting with a moral purpose. Thus matters of 
humour are distinguished from issues of morality. Falstaff is laughed at in 
virtue o f the incorrigibility of his actions, as has already been argued, and 
it is this incorrigibility which suspends moral judgement, spectators know 
his actions are wrong, yet fail to condemn them. This is the opposite of
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the position argued by Bergson where it is the lack of arousal of 
sympathy which allows laughter at the immoral. (Laughter, p. 139)
This lack of moral judgement can of course be opposed to the situation 
where the supposedly moral is rendered amusing by exposing it as 
immoral, which appears to be what Bergson means by dissecting to 
disgust. (Laughter, p. 128) Humour, in this sense is narrowly defined in 
opposition to irony. Irony is the pretence to believe that what should be 
done is being done, while humour is describing what is being done and 
believing that it is what should be done - humour is the counterpoint to 
irony. (Laughter, p. 127) Again Bergson seems to think that irony, like 
humour involves the very idea o f the good:
Irony is emphasised the higher we allow ourselves to be 
uplifted by the idea of the good that ought to be: thus irony 
may grow so hot within us that it becomes a kind of high- 
pressure eloquence. (Laughter, p. 127)
This whole account of irony, however, is part o f a larger account of the 
process of transposition in which it is the process itself which is amusing. 
This means that the good is only used as a given which is processed, the 
humour being in the transposition rather than in any criticism or moral 
position. In irony there may be an attempt to give moral guidance, but if 
there is this will necessarily be secondary to the humour itself.
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Flexibility and * Self-Negation'
Having already seen how humour is unable to criticise ceremonies in 
terms of their usefulness it is necessary to look at cases where humour 
does seem to be aimed at a systems usefulness. To do this it will be 
necessary to examine jokes made at the expense of systems which do the 
opposite of their prescribed function. These jokes do not appear to be 
aimed at the prescribed function of the system in question, but at the 
tension between what they should be doing and what they are doing. A 
good example would be the robots in General Motor's fully automated 
plant in Detroit which began painting and welding themselves to other 
robots and ripping the doors off cars on the assembly line: "Not an 
equivalence any longer between rationalisation and automation, but 
hypermodem corporations as real Bataillean scenes of cancellation, 
catastrophe, and exterminism."41
The point here is not necessarily that one does not want systems 
producing cars, the laughter is instead at the failure o f this particular plant 
to fulfil its function. There would obviously be little plausibility in 
thinking that the purpose o f the laughter in this case was to assist in the 
production o f correctly working car plants - if laughter was aiming to 
steer designers towards such a goal, it would hardly seem an effective 
manner of achieving this end. The laughter, if it is a corrective, is 
indicating that car plants which effectively produce cars are what is
4'Arthur Kroker "The Possessed Individual - technology and the french postmodern" 
(Montreal: New World Perspectives, 1992) p. 131
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needed.42 The problem is that car plants effectively producing cars in an 
automated manner would be highly inflexible as regards their ability to 
adjust to their environment. So the very automation of tasks could lead to 
the robots being viewed anthropomorphically with amusement at their 
stereotypical behaviour. Thus the system aimed at would not be one 
suited to adaptability but a correctly functioning fixed system. In the case 
of the self destructive car plant, its rigidity does not appear to be the 
source of amusement - unless one is laughing at the rigid non-adaptive 
behaviour of the robots, but instead the self-negation would be revealing 
the fixity and non-adaptability which was already present in the 
automated factory, but not seen as such. It is important to note that in this 
case, it would not, as in the case of ceremony, be a question of viewing 
the system devoid of its function, as it is the very disparity between its 
intended function and its actual manifestation which is amusing. So 
Bergson could provide a plausible explanation of why self-destructive car 
plants are amusing. In doing so, however, another example of humour 
functioning to criticise a system, although in a limited sense, would be 
given.
Bergson can not only explain the humour in the case of the 'self-negating' 
car plant, but also the amusement relating to the verification principle. 
The verification principle stated, roughly speaking, that propositions were 
either tautological, verifiable in principle by observation, or meaningless.
42 Tinguely's self-destroying mechanical sculptures which inevitably fail to destroy 
themselves fully are in some senses not amusing, because their self destruction is 
intrinsic to them, as is their failure to destroy themselves (e.g. Homage A New York 
(I960).
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Unfortunately when these criteria were applied to the principle itself, it 
was found to fall under the category of meaninglessness. It would appear 
that the system in this case is amusing because it is being rigid. As in the 
case of the car plant it is the fixed inadaptive nature o f the system which 
is exposed by the systems own failures in attempting to interpret too 
much of the world on one particular level.
Must Jokes have Points?
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Up to this point the notion that humour can have a distinct function has 
been taken for granted while the thesis has outlined and examined the 
account Bergson gives of this function. Underlying Bergson's notion of 
function is a corresponding notion that jokes necessarily have a butt. If, 
however, it is not necessary for a joke to have a definitive butt, or point, 
then it would seems less plausible for Bergson to hold that humour does 
have a distinct function, attempting to remove rigidity and inattention to 
life.
The thesis will now examine this line of argument and question whether 
there 1. must be a single point to a joke, and 2. understanding this point is 
necessary if an individual is to know what they are laughing at. The thesis 
will now take an example to see if there can be multiple points to a joke.
Consider the story of an American business man who 
offered the Pope a million dollars if he would substitute the 
phrase 'Shell Oil' for 'Amen' in all Catholic services ...if 
anyone is criticised in the story, it is the business man who 
is unable to see the difference between his sordid sphere of 
activity and the rarefied atmosphere in which the church 
operates. (AoL, p. 243)
Who is the butt of this joke? Monro thinks it is the business man because 
he is trying to apply the logic of his sphere of activity to another one 
where it does not fit. So it is the businessman who is being criticised, 
shown to "have no values." It could of course be "Americans" who are 
being criticised, as they have such a crass way of dealing with the world, 
thinking that they can just buy anything, as opposed to, perhaps, other 
businessmen. Alternatively, the same kind of accusation could be being
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levelled at oil companies, American oil companies, or Shell Oil. All these 
might be the butt of the joke, but what about the church? Perhaps the 
joke is a critique of the church, the Catholic church specifically, the 
current Pope of the Catholic church, or the current Catholic service as in 
each case it could be an attack on that aspect o f the church, or the church 
as a whole, for its commercialism. Monro makes this point more forcibly 
with regard to Mr. Pickwick, (although he does not seem to realise it 
applies to this example) when he asks if individuals are laughing at the 
incongruity o f the individual (Mr. Pickwick) or what the individual is part 
of. (AoL, p. 99) The point is that even if there was the possibility of 
picking out an individual who is apparently being criticised, it is in no 
way certain that the individual in question is the butt of the joke as he 
may be being criticised only as a representative of a particular system. 
There is thus a question o f the level of generality at which a joke is 
working, narrowing from the church to the individual Pope each being an 
engagement on a particular level with qualitatively different attention. 
The question though is which of these levels should the joke be engaged 
upon.
Perhaps, although there can be multiple possible butts to a joke, the 
intention o f the teller, or the circumstance in which the joke occurs 
defines the specific butt from several possible ones. Turning to the 
question of intention first, it can be asked whether it would be wrong to 
laugh at someone reporting the story to us if they did not intend it to be 
amusing. Whether someone intended a story to be amusing or not would 
seem irrelevant to its actual amusingness. Granted there might be 
circumstances where it was wrong to laugh, for social or cultural reasons,
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but this would be a mere suppression of amusement. What if the intention 
of an individual when telling the 'Pope Joke' was to criticise the Pope and 
the individual being told the joke took the butt instead to be American 
business men? Would the laughter then be incorrect? What would 
'incorrect' mean in this situation? The intention appears irrelevant. But 
surely there must be a notion of missing the point of a joke. The thesis 
does not deny this as a possibility. What is important to note here is that 
missing the point of a joke is to misinterpret the basic information which 
the joke provides - which would include not noticing a double meaning or 
pun, which would be seen on one level but not another. In the case of the 
'Pope joke' the information can be understood perfectly and yet yield, as 
has been shown, several interpretations. Thus on the one hand there are 
several interpretations relating to several levels which are all equally 
appropriate from the information which is given by the joke, and on the 
other, there is the possibility of misunderstanding the basic information 
given by the joke.
Having dealt with the intention of the teller, would the context necessarily 
limit the meaning of a joke? Certainly, if the 'Pope joke' was told in an 
environment which was anti-American, the joke's butt might well be 
interpreted as Americans. It might even be said that in such an 
environment taking the butt to be anything other than Americans would 
be a mistake. This thesis can quite happily accept this conclusion, 
because it would not prevent the other meanings being present. The 
environment might change the interpretation, but not the possible butts of 
the joke, although this might suggest the butts were virtually present as 
tendencies. However not only can other environments give different
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butts, which would be correct for that environment, the individual 
corresponding to the correct level, but also that there are environments or 
contexts which do not necessarily identify any particular butt to a joke. 
From this argument it follows that there is no necessary point to a joke, 
if, as is the case with the 'Pope joke' there are multiple butts, each of 
which in turn has a different point connected to it and a different level of 
possible attention.
In reply to the above, Bergson might have argued that the very fact one 
cannot give a definitive butt to the 'Pope joke' does not detract from the 
fact that there is rigidity in trying to impose the categories appropriate to 
one sphere of activity onto another i.e. the inattention is a question of 
operating on the wrong level. However this Bergsonian line of argument 
would have to, if it were to be effective, decide who was being criticised 
if laughter was to indicate the inattention to be removed, yet the 
possibility o f multiple butts would prevent this in certain environments. 
Bergson also cannot maintain that it is rigid thought which is being 
criticised as it is uncertain whose thought would be the object of such a 
critique - which sphere placed in which.
There is a more general point which is sometimes made with regard to 
humour. If jokes do, of necessity, communicate something, why are jokes 
left unamusing when they are analysed to explain their communicative 
point, if the point is in fact the amusing element? It could be argued that 
the presentation o f a point is as important as the point itself, so merely 
explaining or directly presenting the point would not be amusing. The 
other alternative is that in some jokes it is the very ambiguity which is the
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point and an explanation which resolves this ambiguity also destroys the 
joke.
Expanding the logic of the latter position further. Swabey thinks that 
individuals must know what they are laughing at for that laughter to be 
comic (as opposed to merely mad, say). (Swabey, p. 3) This thesis, on 
the other hand, wishes to extend the current argument and maintain that 
amusement at something does not necessarily guarantee knowledge of a 
reason for laughter. If an individual senses that there is something 
incongruous in a situation, this can be enough without the necessity of 
further explanation to provide a reason for this laughter. 'G. E. Moore 
doing philosophy is like a man dancing in treacle' (H&I, p. 26) seems 
amusing without any need to move beyond the incongruity of the 
statement itself: to say exactly what is incongruous about it.43 It is not 
always necessary for an individual to know why they are laughing in 
order for that laughter to be comic.
Certainly in talk about the comic there is the presumption that there is 
often a point to particular jokes, that something is being communicated. 
Swabey, as has already been detailed, claims that jokes must always have 
direction, import, gist etc. (Swabey, p. 16) This process of'getting a joke' 
presumes that in laughter individuals must know what they are laughing 
at, must know what is incongruous, say, in the joke. If "... you do not 
know what you are laughing at your laughter fails to be comic. Without
43 Clark interestingly thinks this example points to a deeper congruity, (HLST, p. 
243) but fails to spell out exactly what this congruity might be.
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penetration of a confused state of affairs and its transcendence, there is 
no relish of the ludicrous." (Swabey, p. 3) What the thesis wishes to 
claim, however, is not that individuals are laughing at nothing, the claim 
is instead that amusement at something does not necessarily guarantee 
knowledge of the reason for laughter, that is what makes something, for 
example incongruous. But in each of the cases it is still the inattention, 
the placing of things on the wrong level, which is at stake, so in this 
sense Bergson's account is still tenable - it is just that the corrective 
function appears to have been lost.
Summing Up
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The first section has detailed how Bergson's account is reliant on the 
incompatibility o f humour and sympathy. This position was initially 
explored in terms o f humour relating to animals and also of the laughter 
elicited by the loveable rogue, for example Falstaff. In the case o f 
animals, sympathy was found to be lacking and such humour to be 
capable of redescription as anthropomorphism. On the other hand, 
humour at the exploits of the loveable rogue appeared to actively require 
sympathy if they were to be humorous at all. The whole question o f 
sympathy was linked to the purpose o f humour - to remove inattention 
and rigidity in society via humiliation.
This lead the thesis to address the phenomenon of self-mockery, as it was 
clear that if an individual could laugh at themselves without necessarily 
wanting to change themselves, then humour in this case would be 
ineffective. The thesis then suggested, after examination, that Bergson's 
denial of self-mockery was untenable. Bergson described social stability 
in terms of flexible relations between individuals and claimed that the 
rigid eccentric threatened social relations by his inflexibility, typically 
caused by an inattention to life.
Bergson's account of the identification of the rigid eccentric in humour 
was then explored and seen to involve the notion of 'types'. This method 
of working via type identification was also seen to involve a level o f 
generality in its dealing with others.
Bergson's account of inattention (Don Quixote) and repetition (Trigger) 
were seen to provide good explanations of the humour involved in these
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kind of examples. It was found, in addition, that Bergson account could 
distinguish between humour and madness in a plausible manner. The 
whole notion of repetition and inattention in Bergson’s account was then 
pursued further in terms of its relation to social rigidity.
Social rigidity was then shown to be applied by Bergson to humour at 
ceremonies, fixities on the living body of society. Fixity in this case was 
described as disguise, which for Bergson is always necessarily humorous 
when viewed on a certain level. A second line o f argument on Bergson's 
part was then elucidated. This line of argument attempted to show how 
individuals who are part of a particular profession can become embedded 
into their professions to such a degree that they act as if the rules o f that 
profession were sacred, in short the 'jobsworth'.
After looking at the specific types of social humour Bergson describes, 
the thesis then went on to look at more general questions about the role 
of the relation between humour and morality. Was humour merely 
concerned with social mores, or was it capable of providing moral 
guidance? This was answered in the negative.
The section then finished with two possible larger scale criticisms of 
Bergson's explanation of humour. The first, whether humour relating to 
'self-negating' systems could be explained by Bergson. The second and 
more sweeping criticism which finished this section tried to show that 
conceiving humour in terms of an essential social function was mistaken. 
For there to be such a social function there must, in turn, be a clear 
identification of the object of ridicule. This thesis argued that jokes did 
not, of necessity, have to have a clear object o f  ridicule, and thus did thus
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not need to have a point. Hence, it was suggested that any account 
proposing a necessary social function for humour would be flawed from 
the outset.
Section II
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Introduction - Commonness, Art and Repetition
This thesis has so far looked closely at Bergson's account of laughter and 
has found that the conception of rigidity and inattention has yielded a 
number of insights into various types o f laughter. The discussion of these 
issues will necessitate an examination of Bergson's thoughts on language, 
repetition, duration and art, and the relation of these to the comic. The 
discussion of language will centre on Bergson's position on concepts, as 
they are narrowly defined and the notion of the fluid concept which he 
proposes as an alternative. The role of intuition, as a non-utilitarian mode 
of access to things, will be subsequently examined to discover what 
Bergson understands by the term, and how effective his account of this 
mode of access to things is.
Intuition is important as it is linked, by Bergson to the very possibility of 
art, whilst distancing it from philosophy. This examination will be of 
particular importance for both art and philosophy as metaphor is one 
example of a fluid concept. The task will then be to distinguish artistic 
intuition, as Bergson explains it, from philosophical intuition which is 
directly linked to the notion of 'duration'. One important question for 
Bergson in his examination of the relations between art, philosophy and 
humour is, what constitutes the correct 'unit' for duration, the answer 
being: the moving part as opposed to the immobile element, that which 
can be repeated. The apparent characteristics of life will then be used to 
introduce several new types of humour which are based around the 
repetition of elements, repetition appearing inimical to life. Repetition as
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a process, in humour, will be compared to artistic techniques and their 
relations to creativity.
The account will finally conclude with an assessment of the tenability of 
Bergson's account of humour and his account of aesthetics. It will also 
assess whether he proposes a tenable alternative to concepts as they are 
narrowly defined.
The starting point for our examinations, will be Bergson's own account of 
the methodology and strategies to be found in his work in general, and 
specifically, the structure o f his thought in Laughter. This will begin with 
an examination of Moore's44 account of Bergson's methodology.
44 F. C. T. Moore, Bergson - Thinking Backwards (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996.) (Henceforth Moore)
Chapter 2 - 'Concepts' and their Alternatives
Motif vs. Formula
This section will concentrate on Bergson's own characterisation of his 
philosophical practice in Laughter. The starting point will be Bergson's 
claim that his account of laughter does not consist of a formula, but 
instead presents a motif to be found in humour. Monro dismisses 
Bergson's comment as mere rhetoric, yet this seems an inadequate 
response. (AoL, p. 112) F. C. T. Moore, in contrast to Monro, does take 
this distinction seriously, however it will be suggested that despite this 
there are problems with the account he gives, both exegetically and in 
terms of the position he outlines.
Moore attempts to describe Bergson's method in Laughter in terms of 
productive knowledge, a view apparently requiring that humour always 
be deliberately produced. Instead of attempting to explain counter­
examples, Moore claims that Bergson's account cannot be argued against 
by counter-examples, as Bergson is simply not giving an account in terms 
o f necessary conditions.
The denial o f the relevance of counter-examples results, it will be argued, 
in a trivialising o f Bergson's aims in Laughter. Another more positive line 
is then extracted from Bergson - the 'central' / 'peripheral' effects model, 
which does allow counter-examples. The thesis then departs from Moore 
in order to explain what he fails to: the connections between the various 
central cases of humour.
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Without Moore(ing)
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Bergson, according to Moore, is not interested in offering a definition of 
humour, such as for example: humour is the enjoyment of incongruity for 
its own sake. For Moore, such definitions would presumably be regarded 
as 'formulas'. Instead of offering a definition (formula), Moore thinks 
Bergson is giving us the procedures for making something funny. (Moore, 
p. 67) Moore, gives a description of how an approach in terms of 
necessary conditions might work in the case of humour, and then opposes 
this to the notion of fabrication which he finds in Bergson's account.
Something is seen, on the necessary condition model, to be amusing 
because individuals possess certain criteria (which the particular model 
has defined as the relevant criteria) for judging something to be amusing, 
and when the thing in question satisfies these criteria it is judged to be 
amusing. (Moore, p. 68) Instead of the necessary condition model he has 
described, Moore thinks that Bergson's is interested in describing how a 
joke is produced. (Moore, p. 69) Moore describes this in terms of 
outlining recipes for the production of humour which are to act as general 
guides. (Moore, p. 69) Taking his own account of recipes literally, Moore 
describes how two cooks might be given the same recipe but produce a 
different result. Moore claims that these different results do not show that 
the recipe lacks precision as it is the very nature of the recipe to be 
imprecise. (Moore, p. 69) The instructions for recipes capture the 
essentials of the fabrication procedures, whilst there are multiple ways 
that these instructions can be implemented. This kind of productive 
knowledge grasps the procedures by which an effect is produced, but 
does not thereby mean those with this knowledge will be able to correctly
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implement it. Thus productive knowledge is not the same as learning how 
to write jokes, or a comedy. (Moore, p. 70)
After giving the above outline of what he considers to be Bergson's 
position, Moore puts forward a potential objection: there appear to be 
examples of humour which are not "... deliberately fabricated to be 
funny", (Moore, p. 70) falling over in the street to use Bergson's example. 
Fabrication, to extrapolate from Moore's position, appears to entail that 
humour is produced deliberately,45 i.e. thought out in advance, and with a 
definite aim or purpose to amuse and a consciousness of this aim. On the 
other hand fabrication would not necessitate that the joker, say, was 
conscious of all the productive processes they were using to create 
amusement, but that amusement was the intended result.
Instead of trying to argue that this apparent counter-example is not in fact 
a counter-example, Moore argues that there can be a multitude of 
apparent counter-examples to Bergson's account of productive 
knowledge, all of which are however irrelevant, as Bergson is simply not 
giving necessary and sufficient conditions. (Moore, p. 71) This is an odd 
response, for two reasons. Firstly, many of Bergson's examples do not 
appear to assume that there is any deliberate production of humour, so it 
seems odd that Moore should attempt an exegesis which portrays 
Bergson primary argument as based on these tenets. Secondly, as Moore 
himself points out, productive knowledge is not about how to write, say.
45 J. L. Austin, " Three Ways of Spilling Ink,” Philosophical Papers, ed. J. O. I Imison 
& (i. J. Wamock, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) pp. 272-87.
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a tragedy, but about the recipes which would be required to do so; this 
means there can be non-fabricated situations which can be treated as if  
they had been fabricated.
At times Moore seems to trivialise Bergson's account by making it sound 
like general advice to the aspiring comic, (Moore, p. 75) and hardly 
philosophical at all. If  this stance is assumed with regard to Laughter. 
then Bergson's account is indeed impregnable to assault by counter­
examples, as it fails to give a positive account of humour in the first 
instance to criticise.
In addition to the 'trivialising' move, Moore extends the model of 'recipes' 
in line with Bergson's account of central and peripheral cases. On the 
central / peripheral case model a central recipe is examined which can 
produce most cases of a certain type, then from this other peripheral 
cases which have "... similar or related modes o f production ... " (Moore, 
p. 72) are traced. So, to take the analogy to recipes seriously, a central 
case might claim that in order to make an omelette, eggs are required. 
Such a claim would not then be refuted by the existence of vegan 
omelettes made without eggs. Vegan omelettes are so called by virtue of 
the resemblance they bear to non-vegan omelettes. (Moore, p. 72) As 
Lacey puts it "... we laugh at cases which bear a superficial resemblance 
or accidental relation to the central case or to cases themselves so related 
to it." (Lacey, p. 195)
Further textual support for the central case-with-peripheral-effects-model 
can be found in Laughter, when Bergson claims that several "...
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witticisms are constructed on the same model. We might make up any 
number of them, when once we are in possession o f the recipe." 
(Laughter, p. 64) From this quote it might seem reasonable to suppose 
that Bergson is indeed producing recipes, accounts giving productive 
knowledge. Bergson additionally says that there is something beyond 
mere 'mechanism' in the creation of a joke, that although there may be a 
model to be copied, there also has to be something which allows the joke 
to be acceptable and it is the making acceptable which constitutes the art 
of the comic.46 Acceptable in this context has two basic meanings. Firstly 
to take something which is potentially funny, say a ceremony, and make 
it actually amusing. Secondly to make a false logic seem as if it could 
almost be true. We follow such logic, for a moment, before withdrawing 
into laughter. (Laughter, pp. 196-7) More will be said about the notion of 
acceptability in the next chapter. Bergson's description as it has been 
outlined so far seems perfectly in keeping with Moore's exegesis of his 
position in terms of productive knowledge. One might know all the 
productive processes involved in writing a comedy, but still not be able to 
write one. The problem with Moore's account is that he then proceeds to 
outline various central cases and there attendant peripheral cases without 
outlining what links these central cases.
46 Bergson is n o t  here referring to what Walton refers to as "... c a u s e s  but not 
o b je c t s  o f  my amusement ..." examples of causes being comic timing, canned laughter 
and so forth which act to promote or heighten laughter. (Kendall Walton. 
"Understanding Humour and Music," The Interpretation o f Music: Philosophical 
lissavs. cd. Michael Kraus/. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) p. 261 This point will 
become clearer when acceptability is dealt with in the next chapter. It is more a case 
of the joke appearing 'natural.' (Laughter, p. 64)
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In contrast to Moore, it shall be maintained that it is not merely a case of 
finding the recipe behind each central case of humour, as Moore seems to 
think, and then finding how these relate to peripheral examples, but 
instead of starting with central cases of humour which are produced from 
the basic tendency behind humour - inattention - and then tracing 
resemblances to peripheral cases from the central cases so produced. 
From these central cases peripheral cases can then be traced which 
resemble some central case.
So, to be clear: according to Moore, there are recipes behind each central 
type of humour and around these are peripheral cases which are funny 
due to their resemblance to the central case. This thesis differs from 
Moore's exegesis in two ways. Firstly in maintaining that Bergson thinks 
there is a basic tendency from which central examples are produced. This 
is because in each type of comedy there is a variation on the theme of the 
particular central example, and also the general theme. (Appendix, p. 
156) Secondly in maintaining that counter-examples are not theoretically 
irrelevant to Bergson's account, though they might turn out to be in 
practice if his account is 'correct'. Bergson argues against giving 
necessary and sufficient conditions because such conditions trace a circle 
which is too wide, (Appendix, p. 156) so general as to be o f no real 
value. He does not want to enclose laughter in a formula which is very 
large and very simple,47 as this would annul "... the degrees of whose 
highs touch on the finest cultural works, all of which must keep a social
47 Henri Bergson, Oeuvres (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1959) p. 383.
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function - the correction of "moeurs" [morals, customs, habits, manners]" 
(Worms, p. 179) Bergson instead claims that although his definition 
might be considered too narrow, the importance of peripheral examples 
should not be underestimated. (Appendix, p. 156) As peripheral examples 
bear an outward resemblance to central cases they can still be amusing, 
whilst not conforming to the narrow 'definition' given. A counter-example 
would, given the above, be a humorous example which was neither a 
central case of humour on the one hand, nor a peripheral case related to a 
central example on the other. Ultimately, an example will be explicable in 
Bergsonian terms if it can be traced back to humour’s original productive 
tendency. Either directly in the case o f central examples, or indirectly in 
the case of peripheral examples.
In order to examine how faithful to Bergson this interpretation is, the 
following passage will be considered:
It would be chimerical to try to derive all humour from a 
single simple formula. In a certain sense, there is a formula; 
but it does not unfold uniformly. In other words, we must 
stop at occasional dominant effects here and there which are 
derived from it. These act as models, each surrounded by a 
circle of new effects resembling the model. The new effects 
are not derived from the formula, but are funny by virtue of 
their relation to the models which are derived from it.48 
(Moore, p. 72)
Bergson's position can be summarised as follows. There is a formula, but 
this formula cannot be simply understood, instead there can only be
48 This is quoted from l.e Rirc. p. 28, by Moore although 1 have modified Moore's 
translation o f the french slightly.
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dominant effects derived from it, that is, central cases which are then 
'surrounded' by other cases which resemble these. The circle of effects 
which resemble the central cases, their model, are not directly related to 
the initial formula, but are instead funny by virtue of their resemblance to 
those central cases which are related to the initial formula.
Two types o f connection can now be distinguished:
(i) That between the central formula and the various central cases of 
humour which are produced from it.
(ii) The outward resemblances which link peripheral and central cases of 
humour.
(i) It is possible to trace back a tendency, to find an image which is the 
interpenetration of several ideas or theses. Bergson demonstrates this 
process with regard to Berkeley's philosophy identifying four theses49 
which he then proceeds to show are interdependent. Bergson then 
progresses a stage further showing how it is not merely a case of 
interdependence but instead o f a mutual source for these theses, an image 
which allows it self to be seen, being almost matter, yet cannot be 
touched, being almost mind. In the case of Laughter the image is of 
something encrusted on the living. This image is the nearest it is possible 
to get to an intuition in expression as the only other mode of expression, 
the concept, is a spreading out of the image - a developing into a system.
49 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (Totowa, New 
Jersey: Littlefield Adams & Co., 1965) pp. 115-8) (Henceforth CM)
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The intuition is itself inexpressible and above the image - a motif which 
diversifies little by little to form the precise images and concepts - fixed 
and discontinuous. (Mourélos, p. 218) It is this process o f development 
which 'connects' the various central examples of humour. In a sense each 
of the central examples functions analogously to a 'stopping point' in the 
indivisible movement of thought’s development which goes beyond 
numerical categories, (Delhomme, p. 64) yet even though the central 
examples are 'stopping points', in one sense, they are never as such still 
elements which can be rearranged at will, but like parts, lines from a 
poem, which although not giving the whole meaning, cannot be merely 
juxtaposed and rearranged at will and which are meaningful in 
themselves. Moving from the intuition to the image and then to concepts 
requires an increasing subdivision, like the multiplication o f cells dividing 
into a complete organism, becoming more and more spread out as it 
moves through successive planes, creating sentences, to express itself 
which, although diverse, can each express the same meaning. (CM, p. 
121) The structure of the intuition and the image near to it, is the opposite 
of a numerical (quantitative multiplicity) where everything is actual - 
existing in discrete juxtaposition, it is instead a qualitative multiplicity 
which cannot be divided without changing in kind. In the case of a 
qualitative multiplicity there is a move from the virtual to the actual - the 
lines of development and the parts do not pre-exist their creation, i.e. a 
qualitative multiplicity actualises itself by producing its own lines of 
differentiation. (Bergsonism, pp. 42-3) It is not a question, as it would be 
in a numerical multiplicity o f  rearranging a series of juxtaposable pre­
existing elements, but instead o f creating new ideas. The present does not 
contain the future in disguise (Delhomme, p. 95, Capek, p. 100, Capek 2,
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p. 310) ready to be assembled, it is thus impossible to say what a 
philosophical theory will be until it is complete. (Jankelevitch, p. 28 & 
Mullarkey, p. 4) So in this sense truth only appears retrospectively, 
(Mullarkey, p. 7, In Praise, p. 29) develops not by fitting an external 
existing frame on to each thought in a reductive manner,50 but instead 
through the change of thought itself, as well as its matter, there is thus no 
separation between the idea and its expression. (Delhomme, pp. 63-4)
So on the one hand there is a geometric plan which works by assembling 
juxtaposed spatialised elements, and on the other there is a model of 
organic growth which is without arrest and gradually appears in greater 
and greater clarity - termed a vertical rather than a horizontal movement, 
(Delhomme, p. 50) a creation. (Mourelos, p. 93) The organic has an 
internal vertical causality where the structure is always a product of 
differences internal to the multiplicity, whereas the horizontal has 
differences which are always external and develops across a plane. In the 
vertical organic development planes are traversed, not as separate pre­
existing entities which can be visited, like various simultaneously existing 
juxtaposed rooms in an homogeneous space, (MM, p. 145) but are 
instead created in the very act of traversal. (Mourelos, p. 106) This is 
what it means to think in time. (Paradis, p. 12) Each change in level 
changes the whole. As each move is due to an internal actualisation 
whose lines do not pre-exist their creation, neither the result, nor the 
scheme for its production is predictable. It is not a case of spatialised
50 T his includes deduction, a global structure which is supposed to represent thought. 
(Paradis, p. 16)
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cause and effect relationships, but instead of durational, free and creative 
becoming, (Delhomme, p. 35 & Mourelos, p. 109) each plane being both 
a repetition of other planes, but also different from them, (Mullarkey, p. 
136) which is what Merleau-Ponty means when he describes duration as 
"the continual birth which makes it always new and, precisely in this 
respect, always the same."51 In this sense Bergson cannot be precise 
(Mourelos, p. I l l )  as no law can explain the move between planes 
because of its very creativity. (Delhomme, p. 52) So there is a formula or 
a motif, but it does not unfold uniformly, or predictably, it is repeated on 
each level, but at the same time it is different on each level it is repeated 
on. This is why there are the various ways in which humour functions in 
I .«tighter each o f which is unfolded from the basic intuition and which 
functions differently on each particular plane it is actualised on.
With respect to (ii) the connections are very close to the structure, 
according to Bergson, of dreams. Dreams give "... an illustration of the 
law with which we are well acquainted: given one form of the laughable, 
other forms that are lacking in the same comic essence become laughable 
from their outward resemblance to the first." (Laughter, p. 187) So what 
kind of links are created in dreams which are analogous to those between 
various jokes? In order to answer this question it will be necessary briefly 
to look at dreams and the form of resemblance which Bergson thinks is
51 Making Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Bergson in the Making". Signs (1960), trans. 
Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1964) p. 184. 
(Henceforth Making)
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Reason and Dreams
This section is concerned to articulate how resemblance functions within 
dreams and to relate this to the connection between central and peripheral 
jokes. Bergson however also cites dreams themselves as a source of 
humour, so the method by which peripheral jokes are linked to central 
examples is also a means for the production of jokes. These two facets 
will then inevitably run through the following account.
Bergson claims that dreams are related to humour as they allow a play of 
ideas where the rules of reason are relaxed. (Laughter, p. 187)
When the comic character automatically follows up his idea, 
he ultimately thinks, speaks and acts as if he were dreaming.
Now, a dream is a relaxation ... To break away from logic 
and yet continue to string together ideas is to indulge in play 
... So comic absurdity gives us the impression of playing 
with ideas. Our first impulse is to join in the game. This 
relieves us of the strain of thinking. (Laughter, pp. 195-6,
AoL, p. 117)
The comic has its own logic, a method in madness, (Laughter, p. 2) and 
for Bergson dreams are somewhat like madness, a loosening of the 
individual's attention to life which keeps the mind fixed on the part of the 
material world concerning action.
The thesis has already detailed how attention to life is poised between the 
realm of dream and action, attention being characterised by the bringing 
of the correct level of memory into the present situation, and how dreams 
and madness are a loss o f equilibrium between motor mechanisms and 
pure memory: (MM, p. 174 & Matthews, p. 130) which is why Bergson
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maintains that all the psychological symptoms of madness can be found 
in dreams. (MM, p. 174) Instead o f memories relating directly to the 
situation in question overlaying perception, in dreams other memories 
which bear a superficial relation come forward to overlay perception. 
(MM, p. 154) All the 'forgotten' details, those images on the fringe come 
back to the foreground, (MM, p. 85) indeed in one sense dreams are a 
privileged state in that they present the total self without limitation. 
(Mourelos, p. 129) However care must be taken as memory images are 
not pure memory, (Mourelos, p. 126) the totality of our past experience 
which constitutes our personality. (Mourelos, pp. 126-7) This is simply 
because pure memory has already moved to another level to become a 
series o f images, (Mourelos, p. 127) and dreams are already images. 
(Mourelos, p. 129) Dreams move away from limiting habit and 
automation (MM, p. 155) towards personal recollections, a wider 
conscious plane (MM, p. 241) defined by a slower rhythm. (MM, p. 207) 
However the cohesion between the mass of accumulated memories and 
motor schemas is lost in dreams, (MM, p. 173) the attention to life is 
dispersed. (Delhomme, p. 37) In a dream everything on the plane of 
memory is particular, nothing resembles anything else, (MM, p. 155 & 
BCD, p. 56) whereas automation is the exact opposite seeing only 
resemblance. (MM, p. 155) So in the atomisation of individual moments 
spirit rejoins matter as spirit moves towards the equivalence of moments 
which define matter (Delhomme, p. 36) and leaves dreams indifferent and 
disinterested. (BCD, p. 58) All of the past is equally present no matter its 
relevance.
1 0 0
The reference Deleuze uses to support his exegesis at this point is 
interestingly from Creative Evolution. In this text Bergson characterises 
the move towards the plane of dreams in terms of the understanding of a 
poet reading his verse.52 At the highest level of tension understanding is 
of the poem as a whole, but gradually as tension decreases there is a 
move to the material realm, firstly in terms of hearing each word as a 
sound,53 followed by a move to individual phrases, sentences, words and 
finally letters. Each level seemingly leads to an increase in complexity, 
but actually shows merely a deficiency of the will. Here the atomisation 
of speech into individual letters robs the text of its meaning, there is no 
attention to what is being communicated. This point will be returned to in 
the subsequent. What is important again is the notion of memory and its 
preservation of the past to allow an understanding of a whole, and its 
absence in totally atomised states.
52 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (Lanham: University 
Press of America, 1983) pp. 209-10) (Henceforth CE)
53 The work of Berio seems a case in point here. Thema - Omaggio a James Joyce 
(1958) for instance, moves between intelligble speech and broken phonemes. The 
piece plays with notions o f timbre and meaning within an initial recording o f a short 
section from Joyce's IJlvsses which undergoes editing and electronic processing. 
Peter Manning, Electronic and Computer Music (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) p. 
80. Circles (1960) for Female Singer, Harp and Percussion by Berio "...transcribes a 
musical circle from understandable language to disconected vocal sound and back 
again. The singer physically circles on stage, joining different instrumentalists and 
blending her voice with that particular sound." Mark Morris. The Pimlico Dictionary 
of Twentieth Century Composers (London: Pimlico, 1999) p. 250.
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Despite this atomisation o f memory the intellect must try to give a 
semblance of meaning to perception,54 resulting in the production of 
connections which are apparently senseless. Dream-logic, in trying to 
bind the incoherent memories together forms a counterfeit of normal 
reasoning. (M-E, p. 123) This is exactly what the quotation which the 
thesis started with described as a relaxation of reason. The logic of 
madness is one of exuberance (Jankelevitch, p. 206), rather than the 
concept o f disorder which Bergson criticises, it is a different type of 
order, (Jankelevitch, p. 214) an order where any perception brings 
memory into the present without limit.
Thus in dreams, according to Bergson, the external is fitted by the 
intellect to what it wishes to receive, there is, as detailed above, the 
sensori-motor equilibrium is lost. The dream example for this kind of 
behaviour which Bergson gives is the sound of wind in a chimney which, 
when heard asleep, becomes either a howling beast or a tuneful melody. 
Whatever outside event is heard when an individual is dreaming is 
interpreted in the dream's own terms. (Laughter, p. 187) This is why 
dreams are described as a random processing of the external, (Laughter, 
p. 188) external sensory data are connected to memory in a way which 
allows the two to diverge (M-E, p. 127). In this state there is no longer 
any question of attentiveness, wakefulness, (M-E, p. 155) of the careful 
fitting o f the external to the internal (which requires attention and thus the
54 Henri Bergson, Mind-Energy : Lectures and Essays, trans. H. Wildon Carr 
(Westport, Conneticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1975) p. 115 (Henceforth, M- 
E)
102
movement between planes), the occurrence of exclusion in the realm of 
recollection, in short: adaptation. (M-E, p. 125) Dreams are instead 
characterised by disinterest, detachment and disregard for life. (M-E, p. 
126, p. 155 & p. 96)
In waking life, the rhythm of interpretative memory would be matched to 
perception, (M-E, p. 130) the appropriate levels of memory would be 
moved between. There is a need to "Bring the interpretative memory to a 
state of tension, let it pay attention to life, let it, in short, get out of its 
dream: immediately the outside events will beat the measure for its 
walking and slacken its pace..." (M-E, p. 130) As humour is 
characterised as an inattention to life, and dreams are an example of 
inattention to life, it is of little surprise that Bergson should see dreams as 
a good source for humour.
Bergson's account particularly emphasises the role of vision in dreams. If 
hearing has a certain openness to interpretation, then what about vision? 
In the case of visual perception, the free interpretation of data received 
during sleep is explained in terms of the individual's perception of their 
eyelids and the light coming through them which produces coloured 
blotches. The coloured blotches are of an indeterminate nature which 
reason tries to fit to memory, instead of accepting them as coloured 
blotches. The example Bergson gives is the absurdity of an image 
changing from a daisy lawn to a billiard table in a dream. (M-E, p. 128) 
In this case it is the mind trying to get a fix on vague green blotches 
which the dreamer is seeing through their eyelids. This is why "... in 
dream the interpretative memory of the visual sensation regains its
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freedom; the fluidity of the visual sensation prevents the memory 
adhering to it ..." (M-E, p. 130) The very vagueness of sensation allows 
multiple interpretation. Memory takes the chance to insert itself into 
perception. The past which no longer acts inserts itself into the present to 
become actual and in doing so ceases to be memory, and instead 
becomes perception. (MM, p. 240)
As has already been stated, there is something potentially humorous 
about the logic of dreams, the loss of attention to life - the break down of 
the sensori-motor equilibrium allowing inappropriate memories to be 
linked to perception. This form of outward resemblance, as has already 
been pointed out, is linked to potentially humorous things / situations, yet 
it appears unclear from the exegesis so far given why the mixed up 
images of dreams should be humorous and not just surreal. Not that 
surrealism cannot be humorous, but that quite often it fails to be. Indeed, 
if the resemblance described as working in dreams immediately 
corresponds to anything, it is surrealism, e.g. the Paranoiac Face.55 This 
photograph o f native Africans in front of a hemispherical structure, when 
rotated clockwise by ninety degrees, resembles a Picasso style face.56 
There is no connection between the two images in terms o f symbolism,
55 First Published in I .a Surréalisme au Service de la Révolution. December 1931. 
Reproduced in Jessica Hodge, Salvador Dali (London: Park Lane, 1994) p. 25.
56 It seems somewhat unfair to chastise Bergson for missing this point as surrealism 
(at least the artistic movement) had not yet been bom. However, it will be shown that 
Bergson's account does try to distinguish humour from what might now be termed 
surrealism.
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function, logic or design. Instead there is only an outward resemblance 
between the Picasso style face and the African's and their structure which 
allows the one to be transformed into the other by moving our attention to 
a different plane, however it initially appears unclear how Bergson will 
be able to distinguish the surreal from the humorous. It is being 
maintained here that, for Bergson, a link exists between the outward 
resemblance which connects central and peripheral jokes and that which 
creates superficial and potentially humorous links (e.g. puns). What is 
important in the case of humorous outward resemblance, and presumably 
also in the case of the connections between central and peripheral jokes, 
is that the resemblance is one which might be truthful or realistic, that is 
that it does not move too far from the correct level, the connection does 
not become too faint. (Laughter, p. 42 & p. 187)
The notion of apparent truth or realism is what allows dream logic, to 
counterfeit reason. Extreme dream like states obviously lack any veneer 
o f truth or realism. I f  they do counterfeit anything, it is most likely to be 
madness, which, as has already been commented, is sharply distinguished 
by Bergson from humour - madness evoking sympathy which humour 
must not have. This is why, although dreams can be a source of humour, 
displaying many absurdities (Laughter, p. 186), they usually, like 
madness, involve a loss of actuality by reason (M-E, p. 59) and are thus 
to be pitied, not laughed at, if occurring in waking life. Humour, for 
Bergson, is, more like a case of reasonings which might be taken to be 
true in a dream, but are actually false. Thus Bergson side-steps the 
criticism that dreams appear more surreal than humorous via his criterion 
o f apparent truthfulness.
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An example of a joke which exemplifies this dream logic would be 
believing Blacks to be whites in disguise. (Laughter, p. 41) Presumably 
the logical chain would be something like this: people are white skinned, 
individuals who are dirty have dark colouring. Black people have dark 
colouring, so this means they must be whites who are dirty. What is 
crucial in this whole discussion is the role of resemblance. There is an 
outward resemblance between a dirty white individual and a black­
skinned person. (The racist implications of the taxi driver's 'joke' will 
again be ignored.) It is again a case of the attention to life being relaxed 
and the individual moving towards the plane of dreams.
The 'logic' in the example of the 'Black disguise' is not a counterfeit of 
logic as it is understood in terms of syllogisms, sorites and so forth. 
Bergson says that the counterfeit logic in dreams is a logic which is 
dreamt by a whole society, (Laughter, p. 41) an enlargement on the 
societal level which mimics that on the mental level. (Worms, p. 179) 
Bergson is saying that part of what makes the outward resemblance 
acceptable in dreams which are potentially humorous and the connections 
between peripheral and central examples of humour is that there is a 
general appearance of truth o f realism about them. They are not 
individual or singular but instead, there are laws of the 'imagination', or 
habits (Laughter, p. 42) by which outward resemblance can be 
understood. These 'laws' often go against the logic o f reason (i.e. what 
would conventionally be referred to as logic), but in humour still have to 
be reckoned with. (Laughter, p. 41). Bergson sees this logic of the 
imagination, when it works in establishing connections between central
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and peripheral jokes, operating on a level not far removed from 
behaviourist 'generalisation'.
Watson and Rayner, whilst 'Little Albert' was visiting hospital for wet- 
nursing, hit two metal bars behind the infant's head whilst presenting 
white rats to him. This procedure induced a fear o f  white rats in the child, 
which then generalised to similar objects, rabbits, cotton wool, a white 
beard etc.57 These associations would be examples of 'outward' 
resemblances caused by the generalisation to be found at a certain mental 
level. Bergson claims jokes based on disguises are generalised in a 
similar manner:
A man in disguise is comic. A man we regard as disguised 
is also comic. So, by analogy, any disguise is seen to 
become comic, not only that of a man, but that of society 
also, and even the disguise of nature. (Laughter, p. 42)
In both cases, the outward resemblance ties together individual elements 
which have no underlying really significant connection in nature.
So, jokes involving 'outward' resemblance, and the connections between 
central and peripheral jokes, are both based on the 'laws of the 
imagination'.
57 J. B. Watson, Behaviourism. 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press and 
Phoenix PB, 1930).
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Motif vs. Concept
The previous section has outlined two forms of connection - the first 
vertical, the second outward horizontal. In the case of humour, this means 
that there are central examples of rigidity and inattention, and peripheral 
examples which bear an outward resemblance to some one of the relevant 
central cases and multiple central cases which are linked by a vertical 
movement.
Bergson claimed that he was not trying to produce a formula for humour, 
but instead a 'motif. Moore maintained that this distinction between a 
motif and a formula corresponded to a distinction between productive 
knowledge and an account of necessary conditions. This thesis, on the 
contrary, maintained that there were two notions of connectivity in 
Bergson's account which complicated the distinction. It was not merely a 
case of finding central recipes and then extending these, as Moore 
argued, but instead a matter of finding the initial tendency which was 
productive in each o f the various central examples, and then looking at 
the outward resemblance between central and peripheral examples once 
this has been found. So it will be a case of a tendency moving through 
different planes creating qualitatively different central examples on each 
plane. In the above discussion it was suggested that the vertical 
relationship between central examples was linked to a notion of creative 
change. It will be argued below that formulas, in contrast give predictable 
results and necessarily fail, according to Bergson, to capture the object of 
their study. It will only be through understanding exactly why a formula 
cannot capture its object that the account can in the next section begin to
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outline how an image might function, and why Bergson is not totally 
against linguistic expression.
In order to understand the more positive account of linguistic expression 
which Bergson gives the negative side o f his account will also be 
examined. The capacity of certain concepts to 'kill' duration, and also to 
Tcill' thought by attempting to halt its authentic movement by negating 
difference and novelty through homogenisation will lead to Bergson's 
attack on the notion that 'thought' can be seen as a mere rearranging of 
pre-existing components. It will then be the task of the next section to try 
and understand what alternatives Bergson has to offer to the concept 
(narrowly defined) which merely functions as an element to be 
rearranged.
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Concepts
In the Introduction to Metaphysics Bergson's critique of space is joined 
by a critique of symbols, space being both their condition and effect. 
(Worms, p. 210) Concepts act to remove difference, they solidify 
qualities into objects and allow the manipulation of the real, (Delhomme, 
pp. 131-2) i.e. their function is not based around comprehension, but is 
instead pragmatic. (Gunter, p. 29) Such solidification leaves becoming 
regarded as a series of discontinuous states or things which can be 
juxtaposed and all exist simultaneously distinct and clear (Delhomme, p. 
65) in an imaginary space - this is the ideal limit o f the intellect. 
(Delhomme, p. 57) Concepts thus end up with the same stability as 
objects in space. (Mullarkey, p. 167) Indeed logic, as traditionally 
understood, is spatial, leading to permanent immobility, an eternity of 
death. (Delhomme, p. 96) Language can thus be seen, in one sense, as the 
origin or Zeno's paradoxes, (Cariou, p. I l l )  in its failure to capture 
becoming, instead relying on the stability of objects, occurring one after 
another and infinitely divisible. Because of this juxtaposition language 
spatialises duration to allow it to be divided, which is against its nature - 
(Delhomme, p. 147 & Capek, p. 129) language fails to grasp continuity,58 *
yet conversely, as Mullarkey points out time appears to kill any attempt
58 It must be carefully noted that whilst Bergson has been accused of looking to 
continuity rather than separation in duration, by Bachelard, amongst others
(Bachelard, p. 67 & Chimisso, p. 7), his concern is always with a heterogeneous 
continuity which encompases difference in its continuity being neither a series of 
disconected instants, nor a single undifferentiated continuity. As Mullarkey puts it 
there is never a simple continuity, but always one in change. (Mullarkey, p. 136)
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at its theorisation, (Mullarkey, p. 151) if only because of its constant 
invention. This seems to be a view found in several of Bergson's works: 
Mullarkey, for example, finds reference to this position in Time and Free 
M il, Duration and Simultaneity. The Creative Mind and Creative 
Evolution. This killing of theorisation is linked to the logic of solids and 
the symbolic world which can ultimately replace the real world. 
(Delhomme, p. 132) This logic of solids is best characterised as the 
production of immobilities from mobile reality, and whilst such a process 
is useful when dealing with geometric solids (Jankélèvitch, p. 164) its 
wider application to all circumstances produces serious problems. 
(Delhomme, p. 79)
This process is ascribed to the intellect which marks off the boundaries of 
bodies59 and acts to solidify and divide reality60 - the ensuing 
spatialisation allowing elements to be juxtaposed and time to be 
mechanised, and placed in homogeneous space. Having been spatialised 
time can be reversed, as if the past could be repeated, (Delhomme, pp. 
95-6) or elements o f it taken and rearranged at will. Concepts are also 
responsible for the bivalent logic, or logic of clean-cut oppositions (MM, 
p. 245) where it is a case o f choosing between mutually exclusive
59 Paul Douglass, "Bergson and Cinema: Friends or Foes?", Bergson and Philosophy 
ed. John Mullarkey (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) p. 210 
(Henceforth Douglass 2)
60 Mark Antliff, "The Rhythms o f Duration: Bergson and the Art o f Matisse", 
Bergson and Philosophy ed. John Mullarkey (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1999) p. 187 (Henceforth, Antliff 2)
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oppositions, like the mutually impenetrable bodies o f classical physics 
which cannot simultaneously occupy the same location. (Mullarkey, p. 5) 
Because concepts can be juxtaposed and are impenetrable to each other 
their rearrangement concerns only the relations between elements, 
(Capek, p. 66) law like relations of sameness and equivalence becoming 
primary, premises and consequences rather than a concern with 
becoming. (Mourelos, p. 158 & Delhomme, p. 106) Such an emphasis 
leaves the interior of the things themselves untouched. (Mourelos, p. 158) 
The intellect can thus form an infinite number o f connections and 
combinations o f concepts (Delhomme, p. 77) without any real creativity 
being present.
The spatialisation of elements, in this case the concepts o f language, 
leads to a notion o f novelty as a mere rearrangement of these elements, 
yet novelty is not reducible to such a notion. (CM, p. 82, Pilkington, p. 
116, Mourelos, p. 69 & Delhomme, p. 52) In this sense Bergson can be 
seen to be opposing both atomism and associationism and the whole 
conception of linear sorites as a means of producing novelty. (Laughter, 
p. 152 & Jankelevitch, p. I l l )  Indeed association can be characterised as 
a failure to recognise difference, understanding becomes the same coming 
from the same, as opposed to a genuine emergence, (Mullarkey, p. 39) or 
what Jankelevitch refers to as a radical renewal, (Jankelevitch, p. 288) it 
is as if everything had happened before. (Delhomme, p. 96) This means 
that a purely conceptual thought leaves the result predictable, (Robinet, p. 
174) and is ultimately a geometry of the mind opposing novelty and 
failing to correspond to reality. (Delhomme, p. 4) This conceptual 
thought is derived from the necessities of action which require
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spatialisation, (Delhomme, p. 49) rather than the need to recognise 
difference, to correspond to actuality.
This geometric tendency o f  the mind is linked to matter which has a 
tendency to produce closed systems which can be treated as geometric, 
(KAP, p. 152) but ultimately it is only science which moves to complete 
closure. (Mullarkey, p. 74) Science allows perfect repetition, 
bidirectionality and quantification, (Mullarkey, p. 74) but it is an 
abstraction, (Capek, p. 332) a partial view of practical intelligence. 
(Robinet, p. 112) Partial as Bachelard said with more positivity than 
Bergson, because different parts o f an experiment are treated as either 
essential or detail. (Bachelard, p. 74) It is also partial because it is 
concerned only with the material relations between bodies which have 
been fragmented and the causal relations so accruing.61 (Worms, p. 22) 
So science works on immobilities and permanent forms and laws which 
deny time and have fixed points. (Delhomme, p. 91) Such a study of 
relations is, for Bergson incapable of replacing intuition - the 
metaphysical investigation o f the object. (Delhomme, p. 84) Science, on 
this view, is essentially concerned with looking at 'matter' and as such 
misses 'life'62 *
61 The extent to which such an account applies to non-classical physics is debatable, 
certainly Einstein believed that the world was governed by laws and comprehensible 
to us, but at the same time the science which has evolved is not one which can 
construct reality from laws, but is instead a highly speculative one "... whose ultimate 
meaning men have difficulty agreeing on." (Making, p. 193)
62 l.es/ek Kolakowski, llergson (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1985). p. 91
(Henceforth, Kolakowski)
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... to be an immense mathematics, a single system of 
relations which imprisons the totality of the real in a mesh 
prepared for it, it becomes knowledge purely relative to the 
human understanding. (CM, p. 196)
Science is also always aimed at practical utility, (Mullarkey, p. 126 fn. 
85) but the real world is always, as William James said, "... more 
intricately built than science would allow." (Quoted - In Praise, preface 
by John Wild & James M. Edie, p. xiii)
However this distinction between science and metaphysics is radicalised 
in the introduction to The Creative Mind where it is no longer a case of 
metaphysics getting to reality and science failing to do so, but instead of 
both science and metaphysics touching reality, but in different ways. 
Science can touch reality, not relatively, but absolutely.63 (CM, p. 37) 
Science deals with matter and spatial time, whereas metaphysics deals 
with l'espirit and concrete duration, metaphysics using intuition64 and 
science using analysis. Thus science and metaphysics come to be 
considered of equal importance. (Robinet, p. 149)
63 "For it is the essence o f science to handle s ig n s , which it substitutes for the objects 
themselves. These signs undoubtedly differ from those o f language by their greater 
precision and their higher efficacy; they are none the less tied down to the general 
condition o f the sign, which is to denote a fixed aspect o f the reality under an arrested 
form." (CE, p. 329)
64 Intuition will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter, but it is enough to 
note for the moment to note that "... to think intuitively is to think in duration." (CM, 
p. 34)
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The question might then be of whether there are not two principles at 
work in science, one a mathematicising quantitative and conceptual 
understanding, which is reliant on the other intuition, to get to the mobile 
which is then spatialised. (Gunter, p. 35) This process might not, 
however be constant but instead there might be the genius who changes 
the paradigms of scientific thought through intuition (Mourelos, p. 66) in- 
between periods of spatialising consolidation, as science is of essence 
located in a domain of conceptual symbols and analysis. (Mourelos, p. 
67) This movement which can quite easily be seen as a movement 
between the openness of intuition and the closure of geometric analysis.
Indeed Bergson does attempt to show that science and discovery is based 
on intuition at its heart, and the attempt to get to the mobile, even 
arguably in the Introduction to Metaphysics. (CM, pp. 190-1) Because 
science is practical it needs symbols, but this is not the case with 
metaphysics, which can be enlarged, as opposed to the specific 
usefulness of symbols. Infinitesimal calculus, which is an attempt to 
grasp mobile becoming from within, despite needing symbols for its 
practical application (CM, p. 190) This, however, is a highly unusual way 
to interpret infinitesimal calculus, even for Bergson.
Bergson often criticises the division of movement into small sections, as 
opposed to the grasping of a whole movement, (for example CE, p. 22) 
so it seems odd that he should wish to praise a method which seems to do 
exactly this. Deleuze has no explanation for Bergson's seeming ambiguity 
over the issue of calculus, (Bergsonism, p. 121 fn. 23) claiming the
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account is intended as an analogy. Perhaps the major concern here is that 
infinitesimal calculus involves the rate of change, albeit by infinitesimally 
small amounts, as opposed to a constant change, like that which traces a 
movement by referring only to its start and end points. Thus, for Bergson 
infinitesimal calculus in this instance is an attempt to capture change 
itself, (Gunter, p. 34) despite differential calculus being reliant on the 
stability o f change at certain points. (Robinet, pp. 20-1) However, this 
attempt to capture change is framed in terms of the ability "... to calculate 
the state of the system at any given moment... a static moment." (CE, p. 
22) This will become more important when discussing Bergson's attitude 
towards change and movement. Metaphysics, he claims, does not aim at 
application, hence according to Bergson, it needs no symbol. (CM, p. 
191) A symbol would be required if metaphysics were, to enter into 
discourse, but this is not its purpose. There might be another way to read 
Bergson's reference to infinitesimal calculus in terms of a distinction 
between a true and a false infinite, but any attempt to develop such a 
reading will have to wait until this thesis has dealt with the element / part 
distinction, which will in turn lead to the two notions of the infinite, the 
true infinite being found in art. This would be couched in terms of 
infinitesimal calculus trying to get to the mobile part rather than the still 
element, but in dividing up into an infinite number o f  parts, infinitesimal 
calculus is not going to get to the mobile, and thinking it can is a 
delusion, based on homogeneous space.
An alternative to the spatialisation wrote by concepts would be to insist 
upon Bergson's account of intuition as a series of particular coincidences 
which are o f necessity non-linguistically expressible, (Matthews, p. 121)
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on the basis that language can only identify particulars by general terms 
making the metaphysical incommunicable. (Matthews, p. 121) 
Additionally Rescher's exegesis o f Bergson maintains that, if reality as 
we experience it is always unstable and concepts are always something 
fixed and stable, then they will not be able to adequately characterise 
such instability. This would again push the argument back towards an 
ineffable intuition. (Rescher, p. 18)
These views have lead to Bergson being interpreted as having a minor 
role for language in his philosophy,65 and leads Deleuze, influenced by 
Bergson, to a theory of film which eschews literary criticism in favour of 
a theory o f images according to Lecerle. (Lecerle, p. 201) The pure 
movement images which are at the heart of such a theory are reified by 
language, so there is thus an attempt to get back to the pre-linguistic, to 
the matter which forms signs, rather than the signs themselves. (Lecerle,
p. 202)
However this position, as regards concepts means that in Time and Free 
Will, as Mullarkey comments, "Bergson seems to be in an embarrassed 
state as regards his own language of time: how can he express a 
philosophy of genuine durée if such a thing is inexpressible in virtue of 
the spatialisation wrought by language?" (Mullarkey, p. 22) Indeed if 
language cannot represent time without spatialising it, how is philosophy
65 Jcan-Jacqucs Lecerle, "Berkeley: Bishop or Busby? Deleuze in Cinema." Thinking 
Art: Beyond Traditional Aesthetics, ed. Benjamin. Andrew & Osborne. Peter 
(London: Philosophical Forum / Institute o f Contemporary Arts. 1991) p. 197 
(Henceforth Lecerle)
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possible? (Mullarkey, p. 150) Furthermore if it is impossible to 
linguistically express duration, as Mullarkey reminds us, philosophers 
will have to rely on an immediate grasping of duration through intuition, 
yet this " ... would hardly seem to be a good place to begin one's 
philosophy." (Mullarkey, p. 150) There is, however, an alternative which 
could remove Bergson from this embarrassed state. Even though duration 
might be "repugnant to the very essence of language", it might still be 
possible to suggest duration using linguistic means. (Capek, p. 129 
quoting Bergson's letter written to Lovejoy) One of these linguistic means 
would be the use of metaphor.
Muldoon interestingly takes Bergson's position in the second introduction 
to A Study in Metaphysics: The Creative Mind (CM, p. 42-3) as an 
attack on the usage of metaphor which "... leads into confusion and 
deception",66 a view which he modified in Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion (1932). Bergson's actual position is that metaphor is often a 
more literal expression than abstract concepts. (CM, pp. 42-3) His wider 
position, expressed in his earlier essay Introduction to Metaphysics is 
that intuition cannot "... be enclosed in a conceptual representation" (CM, 
p. 168), but that images (including metaphor) can direct consciousness to 
an intuition. (CM, p. 166) Bergson, according to De Man, sees poetic 
images coming closer "... to what perception and sensation are actually 
like, much closer than the purely intellectual representation of reality
66 Mark S. Muldoon, Henri Bergson and Postmodernism," Philosophy Today 
(Summer 1990) p. 185. (Henceforth HBP)
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found in the scientific concept." (De Man, p. 154) This closeness is due 
to the subjective nature of experience, the constant presence of memory, 
intuition and the imagination which have become, for Bergson, an 
integral part of perception, and which are also an essential part of 
metaphorical expression. Hence contact with the 'outside world' will be 
similar to the experience found in works of art in terms of its subjective 
vagueness. It is true that Bergson does claim that the 'inner life' which "... 
is all at once, variety of qualities, continuity of progress, unity of 
direction ... cannot be represented by images" and (CM, p. 165) again 
Bergson claims that in the case of duration a metaphor can only express 
unity or multiplicity, whereas duration is in fact both simultaneously, 
(CM, p. 165) yet these statements by themselves are misleading (Robinet 
making a similar point with regard to indivisible continuity and radical 
creation. (Robinet, p. 91)) What is important in the first instance is that 
images do not replace intuition, but instead give a direction and a 
disposition towards an intuition, from which they have been produced 
and secondly that as a metaphor cannot express both unity and 
multiplicity at the same time more than one metaphor will be required to 
point to an intuition. (CM, p. 166 & Mourélos, p. 62)
So although it might be impossible for a concept to represent indivisible 
continuity and radical creation at the same time it might still be possible 
to suggest these facets with more than one metaphor:
No image will replace the intuition of duration, but many 
different images, taken from quite different orders of things, 
will be able, through the convergence of their action, to 
direct consciousness to the precise point where there is a
certain intuition to seize on. (Antliff, p. 345, CM, p. 195 
quoted in RM, p. 131 fn.)
As one metaphor does not give sense without another (Robinet, p. 91) 
their combined effect cancels out their individual inadequacies to make a 
"... dynamic imageless awareness of durée réelle" (Capek, p. 328) 
possible. (Mourélos, p. 75) So life is like the unrolling of a coil and also a 
rolling up - but is in fact neither (Douglass 2, p. 219) to use Bergson's 
example.
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These metaphors are best selected to be as different as possible so "... 
anyone of them will be prevented from usurping the place of the intuition 
it is instructed to call forth, since it would then be driven out immediately 
by its rivals." (CM, p. 166) What is important is that despite their 
differences they all demand the same attention as they all have the same 
degree o f tension. Metaphor in bringing in subjective components of 
experience attempts to move the individual to the correct plane so as to 
be able to grasp the intuition which the metaphors are pointing to, 
although consciousness must acquiesce to this effort. (CM, p. 166) 
Opposed to the effort required to get to the level of images are simple 
concepts which merely replace the object they symbolise without effort. 
These concepts in their generality erase difference. Whereas images, as 
we saw with regard to vertical movement previously, are poised between 
a symbolic conceptual expression, on the one side and a direct 
consciousness of reality on the other. (Mourelos, p. 76) In a sense any 
expression will be a deformation and not fully adequate to the initial 
intuition of duration, but at the same time language is, as Janketevitch
puts it, both an obstacle and a necessity, in the same way as an eye is the 
organ o f vision and an obstacle to it (Jankélèvitch, p. 247) in its 
necessary limitation. Language is thus necessary to point us to an original 
intuition via suggestion, but at the same time the multiple metaphors must 
be used to prevent us lazily becoming fixed on a particular image as if it 
were a simple concept which could replace the intuition.
So an intuition once gained may "... return to symbols, to language, to 
abstract representations in order to express itself." (Gunter, p. 34) An 
intuition is not after all inexpressible, despite what are, according to 
Matthews, Bergson's misleading statements to the contrary,67 (Matthews, 
p. 121) an original philosophical intuition is introducible into language. 
(ADM, p. 468) It is not a case of doing without concepts but instead a 
case o f  using fluid concepts (metaphor being an example of one of these). 
(Matthews, p. 121) Given that Matthews interprets Bergsonian intuition 
as necessarily personal, qualitative and perspectival (Matthews, p. 125), 
he distinguishes between two sorts of language - the first expressive, 
unique and personal, the second scientific, general and socially 
expressible. (Matthews, p. 122) However we must be careful here to 
understand that it is not two different types of concepts which are at 
stake, but instead two different uses o f language. So, for example, in Two
67 ”... metaphysics is a break with symbols ..." (CM, p. 194) Lacey connects this line 
of thought, via Lindsay's analysis, to Plato's comments in the Seventh Letter on 
words. (Lacey, p. 160) Plato, Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII. trans. Walter 
Hamilton (London: Penguin, 1973) p. 137 (342 marginal number). To examine this 
connection further would take us too far from the present task.
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Sources of Morality and Religion, it is a case of doing violence to 
language, avoiding the simple concept, finding words which express 
something which they were not intended to, (TSMR, p. 254) which is 
what the creation of a metaphor, simile or comparison does - the former 
being one example of a fluid concept, its "... boundaries as yet unfixed."68 
(Mullarkey, pp. 152-3)
68 Hausman also directly links Bergson's account o f fluid concepts to metaphor. Carl 
R. Hausman, A Discourse on Novelty and Creation (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1975) p. 82.
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Fluid Concepts
Bergson makes a distinction between two kinds of concepts.69 The first 
kind of concept is the one which has so far been discussed: it is stable 
and fixed. This type of concept is opposed to "... fluid concepts, capable 
of following reality in all its windings and of adopting the very movement 
of the inner life of things." (CM, 190) (Lacey, p. 163) General concepts 
are fixed. They negate difference and homogenise, unlike the perceptions 
they ultimately refer to - the concept and perception do not coalesce. 
Fluid concepts, according to Bergson, are opposed to such fixity in that 
they involve a constant recasting of the categories of thought in order that 
reality, that is, perception, may be followed as closely as possible. If the 
mind continually recasts its categories then "[i]n so doing it will arrive at 
fluid concepts, capable of following reality in all its windings and of 
adopting the very movement o f the inner life of things." (CM, p. 190) For 
Mullarkey, as we have already indicated, one example of a fluid concept 
would be a metaphor. He argues that a metaphor is capable of "... 
adopting the very movement of the inner life of things" and can actually 
be a part of reality, not in terms of a solid object, but as a movement.
A metaphor, according to Mullarkey, shares something in common with 
its two sides, that there is, for example, something in common between
69 In representing Bergson's position such that language acts merely to linguistically 
grid the fluid 'real', Battersby over-simplifies his position. (Christine Battersby, The 
Phenomenal Woman - Feminist Metaphysics and Patterns of Identity (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1998.) p. 34.
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an immense wave and life. This is not to say that there is one or more 
common features which can be found in both, but instead that a metaphor 
imitates the movement animating the lines of both life and a wave. By 
this Mullarkey suggests not that the specificity and difference between 
waves and life be reduced, that things always be generalised and seen in 
terms of other things and never for themselves, an accusation which 
Mandelshtam made against the symbolists (RM, p. 70), but instead that 
the movement which each instantiates and individuates be given without 
being abstract. (Mullarkey, pp. 152-3) This in effect means that a 
metaphor identifies the same generative process on both its sides and 
additionally, Mullarkey argues, the metaphor is itself part of a generative 
movement, so its boundaries are as yet unfixed. (Mullarkey, p. 154) This 
means that a concept can coincide with a movement because it is part of 
a reality and an instantiation of this movement as opposed to being a 
relationship of signifier to signified, in this sense expression is creative of 
what is expressed. (Mullarkey, pp. 154-5) Mullarkey refers to Delhomme 
in this regard, and some o f her other comments are relevant to the current 
discussion.
Firstly words are independent of thought, according to Delhomme, as a 
thought can be phrased in multiple ways, (Delhomme, p. 23) this is 
because there is a tendency which is realised in the very act of writing, 
whose meaning is not pre-existent, as Janketevitch argues. (Janketevitch, 
p. 233) So it is not a pre-existing idea which finds expression but instead 
the continuity of a certain direction of attention, a movement towards, or 
an intentionality. (Delhomme, p. 144) So it is a case o f actualising the 
virtual, (Delhomme, p. 145) rather than revealing the hidden already pre­
existing possible. So in the case of metaphor the actual creation of a
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metaphor is a realisation of a tendency which already existed but whose 
individuation creates something genuinely new.
The impression might have been given in the above that metaphor was 
superior to scientific concepts, and indeed Mullarkey does extol the fact 
that metaphors move away from a logic of rigid duality's. (Mullarkey, p. 
154) However Mullarkey cautions us that in fact it is a case of two 
different types of concepts which function in different spheres. Scientific 
concepts apply to one sphere where they, according to Merleau-Ponty, 
form a mathematical and linguistic expression, rather than a direct 
notation,70 whilst metaphor, which appears vague and indistinct applies 
in another realm. (Mullarkey, p. 154) Although metaphor is taken as an 
example at this point, there is no unique mode of expression for 
philosophical thought, as different levels of reality translate into emotion, 
images or concepts, for example. (Mourelos, p. 62) What is important is 
that the ease of rearranging fixed ready made concepts does not trick us 
into thinking that we are doing philosophy.
Given the importance of metaphor and the creative use of language the 
next section will focus on Bergson's account of poetry and examine the 
relation between intuition and art.
70 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "K inste in and the Crisis of Reason". Signs ( 1 960). trans. 
Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1964) (Henceforth 
ECR) p. 197
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Chapter 3 - Intuition and Poetry
Intuition before Symbols
The thesis, in attempting to explicate Bergson's position as regards 
concepts has suggested that there is a basic intuition to which several 
images point, and has suggested that philosophy does not have to rely on 
a non-symbolic mode of access to duration. However the issue of how 
individuals remove themselves from the utilitarian modes of access to 
things is still to be explored and will ultimately cast light on the artistic 
process as Bergson understands it and the relationship of art to 
philosophy. In describing intuition, the role o f sympathy will be of 
primary importance. The deep knowledge intuition gives is in direct 
contrast to the superficiality which Bergson wishes to ascribe to humour. 
This discussion will eventually, in the following section, lead to a 
distinction between an element and a part, which has already been 
broached with regard to the rearrangement of concepts above. In order to 
outline Bergson's thinking as regards intuition, the thesis will firstly 
examine his distinction between absolute and relative knowledge. This 
examination will utilise Bergson's example of the photograph, which will 
then be contrasted briefly with Cubism and the cut-up technique of W. S. 
Burroughs. Photographs are seen by Bergson as rigidly cutting up the 
world using homogeneous space, thus giving incomplete relative 
knowledge, a knowledge linked, perhaps, to the visual in Bergson's later 
works. In opposition to this relative knowledge Bergson proposes 
absolute knowledge which is a perfect coincidence with the object of 
knowledge: this knowledge requiring 'sympathy'.
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The difference between absolute and relative knowledge is expressed by 
Bergson in terms of a difference between the use of symbols and 
viewpoints employed, and an 'absolute knowledge’ of a thing. (CM, p.
159) His point as regards the use of symbols is that the absolute may be 
understood symbolically, but knowledge should not be dependent upon 
them - symbols should not come first. This is doubly important when he 
talks about the axes of reference (CM, p. 159) for a movement where 
what is clearly at stake is not the denial o f symbols per se, but instead the 
move away from a homogenising quantitative Cartesian understanding of 
movement. This is because concepts, as they are strictly understood, as 
simple properties, will never be able to get to reality as they are always 
an extraction from reality and the weight given to each will of necessity, 
never be able to be determined.
That is, symbols necessarily represent discrete sections or viewpoints on 
a thing, whereas an absolute knowledge has, in some senses, no 
viewpoint. To explain this distinction, Bergson takes the example of the 
knowledge an individual might have of a city. An individual can never 
truly know a city from photographs which have been taken of that city.
Using intuition, a near coincidence with the object, individuals can invert 
the ordinary direction of thought and move from reality to the concept 
rather than vice versa. (CM, p. 183) Instead of a surface (relative) 
relation involving perspectives, intuition attempts a 'deeper' relation, 
requiring flexibility to keep the self and object nearly coinciding - the 
object's qualitative movements being nearly corresponded with.
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The photographs might give every possible view or angle which could be 
taken of the city, but this is not the same as being in the city in 
question.71 (CM, p. 160) This example is telling in several ways. On the 
one hand photographs are representations and thus present the individual 
with secondary and hence mediated experience. Anthropologists have 
found that certain peoples cannot interpret photographs.72 (Douglass 2, p. 
217) Secondly, each of the photographs by their very nature are still, they 
do not give us movement, they freeze discrete moments. Photographs are 
thus symbols, fixed elements which inadequately signify a mobile 
actuality. Homogenised space has been stretched beneath them to allow 
their division. Thirdly, the photographs of the city are two dimensional 
pretending to give the three dimensional. Fourthly, photographs are 
visual. These four facts, for Bergson, mean that an individual who had 
photographs of a city from every possible angle would not have a true 
knowledge of the city. Instead the knowledge would at best be partial, at
71 Just as David Hockney's Pearblossom Hwy 11 - 18th April 1986 (1986) made 
using hundreds of overlapping photographs can never give us absolute knowledge of 
Pearblossom highway at its intersection.
72
"... we r e g a r d  the photograph ... as the object itself (the man. 
landscape, and so on) depicted there.
This need not have been so. We could easily imagine a people who 
did not have this relation to such pictures. Who. for example, would 
be repelled by photographs, because a face without colour and even 
perhaps a face reduced in scale struck them as inhuman."
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. O. F.. M. Anscomhe 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958) p. 205e.
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worst confusing. The attempt to connect the individual photographs into a 
whole, for Bergson, would be fruitless. The whole mobile reality cannot 
be reduced to a fixed series of homogeneous elements, however 
comprehensive. This view may be contrasted with that of the author W. 
S. Burroughs.
According to W. S. Burroughs in The Adding Machine.73 the individual’s 
experience of reality is never of wholes. One sees part of a head and a bit 
of a leg from which a whole is created. His cut-up method, an artistic 
embodiment of this observation, works in an analogous manner to the 
presentation of'simultaneous' separate views in the cubist works of Pablo 
Picasso and Georges Braque. In Burroughs, the cut-up technique cuts text 
up, written by Burroughs then systematically rearranges these fragments 
into new and often startling sentences. For Bergson, Cubism acted 
precisely as a demonstration of the problem of not grasping wholes, not a 
graphic demonstration of the basic condition of our perception.74 *
Extrapolating from his position would hypothetically yield the same 
response to Burroughs and to the following statement from J. Calder's 
introduction to The Ticket that Exploded:
73 W. S. Burroughs, The Adding Machine: Collected Essays (London: John Calder, 
1985).
74 Bergson criticised Cubist works for attempting to move from analysis to the work 
of art. Because the cubists took this path they failed to grasp wholes. Despite his 
disapproval, aspects of Bergsonian philosophy continued to exert their influence on 
the Cubists. (Mark Antliff, Inventing Bergson: Cultural Politics and the Parisian
Avant-Garde (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993) p. 3.)
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Words and clichés inhibit and imprison the mind in familiar 
associations and patterns. To cut up these clichés is to free 
the words and as The Ticket tells us, the mind as well: "the 
more you run the tapes through and cut them up the less 
power they will have."75
The problem with such a position for Bergson is that words cut up and 
rearranged in random associations might free individuals from patterns of 
thought which they have become trapped in, but on the other hand the 
random association of words just gives the appearance of new paths but 
the random connections are in many ways close to the absurd, and thus 
could at most, provide a source for potential jokes, and little else. This 
process just seems to emphasise the homogeneity of language, or rather 
treats them as elements as opposed to taking them as a whole. Instead 
there are a series o f fixed and immobile segments which can be shuffled 
and rearranged at will.
So Burroughs' cut-up, cubism, and photography76 all give a rigid 
perspective on the world, one in opposition to the fluid perception of the 
continuity of life. Additionally, the very fact they are visual, as shall be 
detailed in the subsequent, is also a cause for concern as the visual can 
have difficulty grasping wholes, according to Bergson's post Matter and
75 W. S. Burroughs, The Ticket that Exploded (London: Paladin, 1987). p. 7 
(Henceforth Ticket)
76 Deleuze is surely right when he comments that for Bergson it was as if there had
always been cinema and hence photography. (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1_The
Movement-1 mage, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: The 
Althone Press, 1992) p. 2) (Henceforth Cinema 1)
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Memory position.77 Visual discrete entities can be contrasted with sonic 
entities, which are always positioned between the continuous and the 
discrete. Burroughs, for Bergson, would merely be treating the verbal as 
discrete elements in the cut-up technique, as opposed to understanding it 
in terms of the sonic as a flow which is both continuous and 
heterogeneous. Bergson, as already mentioned, does think there is an 
alternative to the symbolic fixed mediation which cuts up the world, this 
being 'absolute knowledge'. The question, of course, is what an attempt to 
gain an absolute knowledge of a thing unmediated by symbols would 
consist in and how such knowledge could be achieved. To examine this 
question the thesis will initially look to the account given in An 
Introduction to Metaphysics, supplemented by Matter and Memory but 
will then look to the later Creative Evolution, in order to outline a 
maturer view on intuition.
There are 3 fundamental thesis with regard to our knowledge in Matter 
and Memory, according to Worms, firstly that habitual knowledge is 
relative and imperfect. Secondly that this habitual knowledge is not 
relative to the constitutive structure o f our knowledge, but is instead 
contingent and caused by the necessities of living and acting. This means 
that "common" facts are an adaptation o f the real to utilitarian interests. 
(MM, p. 183) The internal or external continuity is broken up into 
elements - distinct words or independent objects, which are then added
77 Martin Jay interestingly sees Bergson's account o f the body, primarily in Matter 
and Memory, as an attack on ocularcentrism. Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes - The 
Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University o f California, 1994) pp. 192-209.
131
together with a superadded bond to form an empty diagram which is as 
empty as the parts it holds together. (MM, p. 183) It is taking this 
discontinuity as a starting point, which, according to Bergson, allows the 
possibility of several metaphysics, leading, eventually, to Kant's ding-an- 
sich and the inaccessibility of things. (MM, p. 184) Thirdly that we can 
move beyond this habitual knowledge, but not by going beyond 
immediate sensible experience. (MM, p. 187 & Worms, p. 201) It is not 
that empiricism sets too high a value on experience, but that its 
experience is not immediate contact between mind and object, but instead 
arranged for the greater facility of action and language. (MM, p. 183) As 
contact is mediated by practical considerations the internal structure of 
things are not followed. (MM, p. 184) Perception is a limitation of what 
is not of interest, (Mullarkey, p. 48) a simplification of reality. (Capek, p. 
282) It is thus necessary to disengage from the exigencies of life to rejoin 
concrete matter. (MM, p. 185, Worms, p. 212) To get to knowledge 
before it takes a turn towards utility and becomes properly human - (MM, 
p. 184) to perceive the singularity o f the individual. (Mullarkey, p. 158) 
Thus Kant, according to Bergson, demonstrates only the impotence of the 
intellect when it is enslaved to bodily necessities and the satisfaction of 
his wants. (MM, p. 184)
These theses are developed in Bergson's later work and come to 
represent two types o f knowledge, one where there is no distance 
between the true and the real, and another which by division and 
spatialisation, has attempted to understand through sameness - indeed the 
intellect can become almost totally disengaged from things. (Delhomme, 
p. 93) Intuition is a reality given immediately as an undivided continuity,
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as opposed to being tied to the exigencies of social life, and practical 
adaptation. (Matthews, p. 122) This attempt to get away from the 
exigencies of social life resembles the Epoche in as much as it attempts to 
cast off the everyday prejudices and let phenomena speak for themselves, 
(Gunter, p. 28) rather than relying on scientific and logical significations. 
(SE, p. 732) It is thus an attempt to understand things in themselves 
without translation. Indeed Matthews claims that the need to get to a 
description o f our actual experience of the world, as opposed to the 
construction o f explanatory theories brings Bergson's position close to 
that of phenomenology. (Matthews, pp. 118-9 & p. 123) Indeed certain 
phenomenologists, particularly Levinas, have expressed a similar need to 
get to a living concrete reality as opposed to the abstract. (Trotington, p. 
290)
As we have already suggested, practical needs mean things are 
immobilised, cut and shaped to utilitarian needs (Jankelevitch, pp. 128-9) 
which means perception is usually closed to what is going on in the 
environment, but this does not mean that "... there is nothing there." 
(Mullarkey, p. 141) But in order to perceive what is there it is necessary 
to break habitual patterns of thought (Capek, p. 59), indeed it is these 
according to Capek which have lead to much of the opposition to the new 
physics, (Capek 2, p. 324) particularly in the tendency to deal with the 
subatomic in terms of solid immutable particles. This move beyond habit 
in intuition will always require an effort. (Worms, p. 260) If intuition 
were passive and habitual it would fail to act flexibly, would not adapt 
itself to the world, would be a mere watching "... 'as a dozing shepherd 
watches the running water"', (CM, p. 184) or what Bachelard calls
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reverie. However as intuition always moves beyond habits of thought in 
each philosophical exploration, intuition will, of necessity, always have 
an element of self-critique of its own methods. (Worms, p. 260) Intuition 
and will always attempt to be open, be in sympathy with reality, to 
perceive what is usually not perceived, as opposed to closing down and 
attempting the mastery and control o f reality. (Mullarkey, p. 122) This 
has two major consequences. Firstly that intuition as an attempt to move 
beyond habits will provide a different solution on each occasion to 
counter whatever habit is in question.78 Secondly, as Mullarkey points 
out, the constant adaptation to reality required by sympathy, will be 
different for each intuition, if for no other reason than reality is itself in 
flux. (Mullarkey, p. 159) So although intuition is not "... a mathematical 
essence which could be summed up in a formula," (CM, p. 34) it does 
have a fundamental meaning: "... to think intuitively is to think in 
duration." (CM, p. 34)
So it is not a question of mere affectivity or sentiment, nor mere 
sympathy according to Mourelos, but also reflection. (Mourelos, p. 64) 
The identification of 'mere sympathy' here identifies only the possibility 
that sympathy can give intuition by itself, not that sympathy plays no 
part, as without a sympathetic connection to reality the openness which 
intuition requires will be impossible. This openness, if understood only in 
terms of empathy would leave intuition able to relate only to other 
conscious beings, and would thus be limited in scope, and could not
78 Alain de Lattre, Bergson: Une Ontologie de la Perplexité (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1990) p. 282 (Henceforth De Lattre)
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provide a "... basis for a general method of metaphysics." (Matthews, p. 
120) The necessity for reflection, as well as sympathy, underlines the 
active nature of intuition as opposed to the passive intuition of Schelling, 
for example. (RM, p. 23) It is a question of an intellectual sympathy. 
(Delhomme, p. 162) Intuition then is a naive fresh vision which does not 
interpret in terms of associations and souvenirs, (Jankelevitch, p. 239 & 
Delhomme, p. 162) nor in terms o f measurement, relation or comparison, 
looking instead at the object for itself, (Mullarkey, p. 122) but it is also 
one which has to be worked at. It is a knowing from the inside rather than 
a translation into terms other than itself, the living reality, rather than a 
discursive knowledge: (Mourelos, p. 71) it is a return to the individual 
and unique. (Mullarkey, p. 158 & HBP, p. 74)
In An Introduction to Metaphysics. Bergson presents the description of 
intuition as a conclusive distinction between external analysis and internal 
entering, (CM, p. 161) the former making a distinction between agent and 
things acted on (Matthews, p. 121), the later making barely any 
distinction between the subject and object. (Worms, p. 209 & Matthews,
p. 120)
Intuition first of all signifies consciousness, but immediate consciousness, 
vision which is hardly distinguished from the object viewed, knowledge 
which is contact and also coincidence.79 An attempt to coincide, to gain 
absolute knowledge (CM, p. 161) in this sense, would seemingly 
necessitate, as in Schopenhauer, a despatialisation of the object and
79 Henri Bergson, La Pensée et le Mouvant - lissais et Conférences. (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, I960)p. 1273
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viewer for such a coincidence to occur. Yet this is not what Bergson 
argues. Bergson deliberately takes the example of movement in space to 
show that even space "... the variability nearest to homogeneity ..." (CM, 
p. 181) can be understood in terms of intuition, without there being a 
variety of views or perspectives on an object. This notion of being 
without perspective is an attempt to remove ourselves from the frame of 
human necessities which see space as a homogeneous medium over 
which movement traverses and instead correspond to the movement itself 
in its qualitative specificity. It is a case of being part of a movement 
rather than a spectator on that movement, but coincidence, does not 
imply a despatialisation, but instead a movement with the processional 
inner change of the object. This is what is meant by a 'coincidence', the 
attempt to place oneself within the object through 'intuition.' (CM, p. 178)
This kind of approach has lead to intuition being regarded as a semi­
divine state, a direct non-symbolic access without a point of view, but 
this is only the 'negative side' of Bergson's approach. (In Praise, p. 12) As 
Worms comments it is only in An Introduction to Metaphysics that this 
distinction between external analysis and internal penetration is so 
conclusively drawn. (Worms, p. 209) It is the distinction between the 
sympathy o f instinct, which is incapable of modification and progression 
(Delhomme, p. 135) and the geometry of intelligence which is drawn in 
Creative Evolution which gives a more advanced account of intuition.80
80 It is interesting to note that Duration and Simultaneity returns to the account of 
intuition given in Introduction to Metaphysics whilst Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion looks to the account given in Creative Evolution.
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These two tendencies81 which are enshrined in man, are, in a sense 
moving in opposite directions. (Delhomme, p. 57) Intuition is like instinct 
in that it requires a sympathy, an immediate consciousness, yet it also 
requires an effort, so it is more than mere immediacy. (Mullarkey, p. 158)
In C reative Evolution intuition is given as an alternative to the instinct / 
intellect (Jankelevitch, p. 165) and rationalism / irrationalism 
dichotomies, (Mourelos, p. 60) which are, in one sense, moving in 
opposite directions. Intuition is instead a higher union of the two 
tendencies from which both instinct and intelligence originate. (CE, p. 
178) Bergson defines instinct as an unconscious (CE, p. 145) unlearned 
awareness of living things, (Gunter2, p. 174) which results from a felt, 
rather than thought sympathetic relationship, an ability to suffer with, 
(Mullarkey, p. 79) to detect the other's feeling of vulnerability. There is, 
for example, an instinctual sympathy between a wasp and the caterpillar 
it paralyses but does not kill, (CE, p. 174) it is this sympathy which 
allows the wasp to know where the caterpillar should be stung. To sense 
the caterpillar from within, rather than externally. (CE, p. 174) This 
sensing is part of a developing relationship between the two creatures, 
one which is only puzzling if seen in terms of two separate things which 
must somehow be joined together. Instead it is a case o f  a continuity, a 
relationship which has developed over time. (Mullarkey, p. 79) This is 
why instinct can understand life because it is part o f a continuous 
process. (Mullarkey, p. 79) Each living thing has the same origin and
81 It should be carefully noted that for Bergson instinct and intelligence are never 
pure states. (CE, p. 135)
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retains something of that origin, this is the basis of sympathy. (Gunter, p.
174) The instinctive knowledge the wasp has of the caterpillar is derived 
from the unity of all life, (CE, p. 167) the original origin of life abiding, 
according to Bergson, in all its parts. (CE, p. 54)
To be more precise each organism is the development from a virtual 
whole which creates its lines of development in its realisation, so 
meaning the whole does not resemble the lines it produces, and is thus 
creative of difference. On the other hand there are multiple planes in 
virtual coexistence in the whole which means that although each line is 
differentiated from the others it also carries the whole with it, virtually. 
Each of the individual lines, as a species, is the realisation of a virtual 
level each of which are virtual repetitions over an infinity of other levels. 
So in each the actualisation of a particular level does not negate the other 
levels which are carried, virtually within each level.82 So the instinctive 
knowledge each insect has for its prey, can be divined or foreseen. 
(Robinet, p. 123) It is however not a prediction of the future or a case of 
induction, but a remembering. (Jankélèvitch, p. 157) This is to be 
understood in terms of the whole of life functioning like a memory, a 
series of virtual planes which are actualised but still carry, virtually that 
which is yet to be actualised.
Despite the power of instinct and the ability it gives to know the thing 
from inside, there is a downside. Instinct is narrow "blindly lucid" 
[aveuglément lucide] and fixed. (Jankélèvitch, p. 158) It resembles habit
82 This account mirrors that to be found in Chapter 5 of Deleuze's Bergsonism.
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in its fixity, (Jankelevitch, p. 159) if not in its method of acquisition. It is 
an unvarying mechanism, (Robinet, p. 124) which is linked to the 
structure of each species - indeed if the structure changes so does the 
species. (Mourelos, p. 155) This adherence in instinct is a content 
without form, whereas the intellect is based on a mobile sign which is 
flexible, but has no content. (Mullarkey, p. 80) There is a fusion in 
instinct between the object and subject, (Delhomme, p. 59) if such terms 
even make sense, whereas in the case o f the intellect there is an absolute 
separation between subject and object. The intellect, because of this 
separation, is turned away from immediate action, (Mourelos, p. 157) 
allowing reflection on possible actions, which can replace real action, 
consciousness can exist. (Delhomme, p. 57) One of the reasons that there 
are, as Bergson comments, objects which intelligence searches for but 
cannot find and intuition finds but cannot search for (Jankelevitch, p. 158 
& Delhomme, p. 57) is the self-consciousness o f the intellect:
"... the intellect alone ... troubles itself with theory ..." (CE,
p. 160)
The second reason is the non-adherent relation of the mobile sign to its 
referent, which leaves the intellect concerned with relations, rather than 
individual objects, (CE, pp. 150-1) whereas intuition is concerned with 
individual objects, and so is not concerned with relations. (CE, p. 151) 
So despite intellect and instinct having a common origin and hence being 
carried in both plants and animals, (Mullarkey, p. 80 & Mourdlos, p. 152) 
they remain different in kind, even though they are to some extent 
complementary. (Mourelos, p. 153) However intuition and intellect never 
exist in their pure states. (Mullarkey, p. 79) Although the intellect
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dominates over instinct in humans it always has a fringe of intuition, and 
conversely instinct moves in a conceptual atmosphere. (Mullarkey, p. 78)
The above clearly shows why intuition cannot be reduced to mere 
instinct; it is an instinct which has become self-conscious and capable of 
adaptation, in short it has become disinterested. (Gunter2, p. 175) Whilst 
intuition can go to intellect, the opposite movement is not possible. 
(Mourelos, p. 236) Intuition is the origin of both the intellect and instinct 
(Mullarkey, p. 160) and thus has the qualities o f both of these tendencies, 
produced by its bifurcation. Intuition is possessed of sympathy and the 
openness to the other, from instinct, whilst also being disinterested 
(intellect) and open to several life forms. (Mullarkey, p. 159) This 
openness, as it is not attached to one particular life form, allows us to 
understand the universal, life in general, without it being a theoretical 
abstraction. (Mullarkey, p. 159) Intuition thus connects our individual 
understanding of life to total life. (Delhomme, p. 177) In this sense our 
understanding of life is based on our carrying of its intention which is 
never fully realised, (In Praise, p. 23) i.e. it is because the individual is a 
partial realisation of life that they can gain access to life as a whole. This 
point mirrors Capek's understanding of intuition with regard to duration. 
Drawing on Ingarden, Capek proposes that although the individual 
content of duration might be unique in each case there is some underlying 
structure to duration which is always the same.83 (Capek, p. 168) This
83 Because o f this singular notion of duration, Merleau-Ponty maintains, it is possible 
not only are we implicated in duration as a whole, but can also access other 
durations, although such access of necessity changes duration as a whole. (In Praise, 
p. 15) This seems to be the point being made by Bergson's example of the sugar
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structure seems to be perceived in a non-sensual manner, (Capek, p. 168) 
which can, be understood, as the grasping of a tendency. It is what these 
tendencies all possess which allows their origin to be traced. Thus it is 
necessary, to move against the natural associative tendencies of the 
intellect, towards dissociation. (Mullarkey, p. 39) This dissociation acts 
to find the initial processes which lead to the bifurcation of the original 
unity. (Mullarkey, p. 161)
... it is by taking opposites in their extreme difference that
intuition perceives their reunion. (Making, p. 185)
Indeed Deleuze describes two distinct sorts of intuition in Bergson. 
Firstly that which gives the difference between things, and the second 
which traces divergent lines of fact to a probability. (BCD, pp. 43-4) In 
Bergson's account of science, for example it is a case of taking all the 
facts and combining them to locate a primordial unity. (Mourélos, p. 65) 
But intuition is more than this in that there has to be the initial 
dissociation into instinct and intellect, for example, in order that the 
virtual point at which they converge, intuition, can be discovered behind 
them, or the creativity of the élan vital separated from matter which is 
then rejoined at a virtual level "... confusingly also called life or élan 
vital." (Mullarkey, p. 81)
Once the particular intuition is found as a virtual point it is possible to 
develop it into a scheme via reflection and analysis. (Mourélos, p. 72) 
Because an intuition is traced from a series o f lines which point to the
dissolving in water, which is dealt with in the subsequent.
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original source of production intuition can be seen as a means of reliving 
the lines o f production through fluid concepts, which translate / express 
tendencies. (Robinet, p. 149) In this sense Mullarkey's description of 
fluid concepts as being a part of the process of reality means that they 
can be part of the process of intuition as they are not merely an attempt to 
grasp intuition after the fact, but are instead a part of the grasping itself. 
This would mean it was not a case o f an indirect presentation of the 
direct level of intuitive knowledge (Mourelos, p. 72) as Bergson seems to 
suggest. (CM, p. 168) Instead the two movements, that of the fluid 
concept, and that of reality would in some way coincide, intuition even 
being defined as a coincidence of two movements by Delhomme. 
(Delhomme, p. 165)
This kind o f argument is suggestive o f the need to get into the same, or 
rather the analogous rhythm as the object of contemplation in Matter and 
Memory, as opposed to the ego-ism o f laughter which withdraws rather 
than attempts to get into an analogous rhythm to the thing in question.
The notion o f sympathy which has been discussed above, is in clear 
contrast to humour, which was characterised by its denial of the 
sympathetic relationship. It is clear from the above analysis o f intuition, 
that if humour did involve sympathy, it would have the possibility of 
gaining more than an outward relation to the object of humour, and this is 
what Bergson wishes to deny. This distinction is important as humour, for 
Bergson must be distinguished from 'serious' providers of knowledge - 
mysticism, art and philosophy, all of which rely on intuition and are not 
'superficial'.
More Photographs
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The thesis above has begun to explore what exactly Bergson means by 
'intuition'. It has been seen that intuition is an absolute knowledge which 
is gained through a coincidence between the knower and the known. The 
question of how intuition might relate to Bergson's distinction between 
the part and the element will now be discussed, elements being allied to 
'concepts' (as narrowly understood) and parts, the account will suggest, to 
motifs. This exploration will start by examining Bergson's well known 
criticisms of cinematographical movement. These criticisms hinge on the 
element / part distinction, a distinction which will be seen to function in a 
similar way with regard to language.
Bergson's description of poetry will then be examined to see how the 
element / part distinction works in a practical situation. This will in turn 
lead to a distinction between two kinds of infinite, one true, and one 
false. The true infinite is linked to the part which is necessarily the 
subject o f intuition. The false infinite, on the other hand, is linked to the 
element which is analysed not intuited. The account of poetry also 
importantly gives another description o f language which attempts to 
circumvent the problems associated with homogeneous concepts cutting 
up the world, only giving shadows of their referents and so forth. The 
attempt to circumvent the problems Bergson associates with language 
will be seen to involve a rhythmicisation o f language. In order to 
understand Bergson's exact approach to poetry and its rhythmicisation of 
language, the thesis will compare Bergson to the early Russian Formalist
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literary critics,84 who appear to be forwarding a superficially similar 
account of poetry.
In order to understand the role intuition plays in Bergson's philosophy, 
the thesis will now examine Bergson's account of movement. One manner 
of understanding movement is exemplified by the photographs of 
Etienne-Jules Marey. Marey used a series of photographs taken in very 
quick succession to capture a movement - most famously a horse 
galloping. This picture series (chronophotography) demonstrated that 
when a horse gallops there is one point when all its feet do leave the 
ground. Here a number of individual 'poses' (to use Deleuze's term) are 
used to indicate the movement, details of which are not visible to the 
naked eye - all the legs of a galloping horse leaving the ground at once. 
This however is not, for Bergson, an understanding of movement, even 
though it would seem to give greater information about the movement 
than would otherwise be available. Marey's photography is the perfect 
example of a process of 'analysis' for Bergson, it is the attempt to 
recompose a movement from pre-given segments, as opposed to grasping 
a whole.
This division o f movement is a product of the homogenisation o f space, 
which has already been briefly mentioned. Homogeneous space is
84 Early Russian Formalist literary critics will hereafter be shortened to Formalists. 
This designates critics including Shklovsky, Tomashevsky, Eichenbaum et al, as 
opposed to Jakobson, Bakhtin, Tynyanov et al.
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amorphous, inert and can be divided into an infinity of instant positions. 
Each of these instant positions pre-exists its realisation and results in a 
notion of movement being over a pre-existing space, with each point of 
the movement bom 'anew' with no coherence between its past and 
present, (MM, p. 187 & p. 218) and without futural novelty. (Capek, p. 
131) These instant positions are still identical units which give a 
quantitative understanding of movement, via a series of immobilities. 
(Delhomme, p. I l l )
This homogenisation of movement is itself the product of the practical 
bent of the mind dividing extension into absolutely separate objects. 
(MM, p. 245 & Cariou, p. 106) This requirement for the absolute 
separability o f objects results in the production o f a relationship of 
container to contained (Delhomme, p. 93) and a series of objects which 
can be juxtaposed and given simultaneously, (Delhomme, p. 96) what 
might be termed a geometric order. (Cariou, p. 107) Instead of a 
changing series of qualities, there are a series of fixed quantities which 
remain unchanged over time in absolutely independent bodies. 
(Delhomme, p. 85 & p. 90) It is homogeneous space which allows the 
idea of a permanent object with stable qualities over time (Delhomme, p. 
93) as its infinite divisibility can be stretched beneath moving bodies 
which are seen to be separable from the medium they are travelling in. 
(MM, pp. 209-10) Yet homogeneous space is an empty scheme (Worms, 
p. 236) produced by the imagination (Worms, p. 238) a diagram or 
symbol - it has no other reality. (MM, p. 219) This diagram is the product 
o f a biological operation which attains perfection in human's whose aim is 
the reduction of information (Worms, p. 238) which is not immediately
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useful. This is why the cutting of matter is relative, that is, it is not a 
property of the matter itself, but of the space stretched underneath it, and 
prey to practical concerns and the exigencies of action. (MM, p. 219 & 
HB, p. 39)
It is important to note, however, that although homogeneous space and 
the divisibility it engenders is artificial and not a feature of either matter 
or movement: there is something in matter which lends itself to such 
subdivision, (CE, p. 219) despite it being possible to see matter in terms 
other than those of homogeneous space. (Capek, p. 261) In matter there 
is a reduction of heterogeneity, a move towards the homogeneous, matter 
never attaining total homogeneity. (Capek, p. 218, Worms, p. 198) So 
homogeneity is only fully realised in homogeneous space, as matter is 
constituted by qualitative change. (Worms, pp. 232-3) The divisibility 
which homogeneous space allows is not only practically useful but is also 
behind the success of science as classically conceived,85 (Delhomme, p. 
73) which allows the Laplacean conception of stable corpuscles where 
there is change only in the relations between rather than of corpuscles. 
(Capek 2, p. 306) But then if there is a continuity of identity in movement 
over time, there needs to be a bond between the different instant states,
85 In Creative F.volution Bergson maintains that science always has practical utility in 
mind. (Mullarkey, p. 126 fit 85) as previously noted, however with regard to the 
current debate it is important to note that according to Matter and Memory, 
immediate data and science in its remotest aspirations are in agreement on the notion 
of continuity. (MM, p. 197) Bergson goes on to suggest that the new physics moves 
against the habits o f thought and the notions o f solidity and absolutely separate 
bodies, which are created by the practical needs o f humans. (MM, pp. 199-201)
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(Capek 2, p. 307) which homogeneity has produced. Whilst there can 
never actually be totally atomised individuals without duration, (MM, p. 
190 & Capek, p. 302, p. 318) in the move towards such a state the bond 
between the quasi-instantaneous states is effectively given by 
homogeneous space (MM, p. 211) which acts to make each position in 
space exactly the same except for its co-ordinates. (MM, p. 330 & 
Mullarkey, p. 13) The geometric figure, cut out from homogeneous 
space, is identical wherever it is. (Delhomme, p. 77) This means that 
qualitative difference is effectively lost (MM, p. 217, Delhomme, p. 77 & 
BDC, p. 44) in a space which is prior to its occupant. (MM, p. 231 & 
Cariou, p. 113) Yet no entity can change place without changing itself, 
i.e. qualitative change is basic to movement. (BCD, p. 48, Antliff 2, p. 
187, Worms, p. 220) So there must be an alternative way of thinking 
about space.
The alternative to the static and empty homogeneous space is concrete 
extension. (Capek 2, p. 303) Extension does not already pre-exist its 
occupation, and is thus inseparable from the 'objects' which are part of it. 
Any movement is not 'in space' but creative of space (Antliff 2, p. 187) 
and a part of duration as it takes time, meaning movement is qualitative. 
(Lecerle, p. 198) What is produced is a transference of state as opposed 
to the transference o f a thing (MM, p. 201 & Capek, p. 275) because 
there is no absolute distinction between an object and the space which it 
is creating. Thus it is a question of the whole changing, rather than a 
series o f relations between fixed objects and points, the latter being a 
mathematical understanding of relative motion. (MM, p. 193 &196, 
Delhomme, p. 118 & Worms, p. 225) But as it is a movement of the
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whole real change and movement are not relative: (Worms, p. 220) there 
is no such thing as movement in general, each movement being 
necessarily different. (Mullarkey, p. 26 & Worms, p. 219) Opposed to 
the simple extended / unextended dichotomy Bergson argues there are 
multiple degrees between the extended and the unextended (Cariou, p. 
114) - extensity being between divided extension and pure inextension. 
(MM, p. 245 & Mullarkey, p. 13) Homogeneous space is conceived, 
(symbolic) whereas perception before it is subjected to the practical 
diagram imposed by our needs is of extension (real). (MM, p. 187 & 
MM, p. 189, Jankelevitch, p. 32 & Worms, p. 219) Extension, the 
alternative to homogeneous space, is thus qualitative and indivisible 
(Cariou, p. 106) yet also diverse (Worms, p. 247) - it is a continuity 
which is not made up of homogeneous repeating units. (Worms, p. 207) 
So extensity possess the general structure of duration, without losing its 
extensive quality. (Capek 2, p. 305)
Marey's photography in splitting up a movement into sections, creates an 
homogeneous as opposed to an extensive space where the individual 
pictures which make up the chronophotograph, are elements, not parts of 
the movement. (CM, p. 180) Elements, as Bergson defines them, are 
symbols. In Marey's case elements are 'still points of a movement', a 
phrase which sums up the oxymoronic character o f the element, as there 
is no point at which a movement is still. (Lecerle, p. 198) To describe 
movement in terms of still points is to describe movement in terms which 
are other to it, and which ultimately destroys it, (Cariou, p. 110) whereas 
an intuition describes something in its own terms, according to Bergson.
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The distinction may then be made between the element which is 
abstracted and the part which is intuited. An element in a machine is 
fully separable, and autonomous, yet this is not the case for an emotion, 
for example, (Jankelevitch, p. 12) nor a movement. Whereas elements 
pre-exist their separability, parts are created in their act of division. 
(Jankelevitch, p. 12) Thus, to take another example o f a qualitative 
movement,86 in evolution the move is not from pre-existing elements to a 
whole, but instead the division of a whole into newly created parts. 
(Jankelevitch, p. 139) Elements, on the contrary can be arranged and 
disarranged as a numeric multiplicity because they are immobile 
(Delhomme, p. 70) producing nothing new. (Delhomme, p. 87) But a part 
is a creation o f  something which is meaningful, a division which is 
internal to that which is being divided, rather than external and arbitrary 
as regards the thing in question.
Dividing a text into its individual elements, say letters, for example, 
allows anagrams, 'I'm an evil Tory bigot' being the fortunate, or 
unfortunate anagram of Virginia Bottomely's name.87 Whilst an anagram 
is not always immediately obvious this does not mean that it is created 
rather than found. The anagram pre-exists its finding, it is in no way new 
- it is merely a  question of juxtaposition and rearrangement. The part, on
86 As Mullarkey notes Bergson's understanding of movement is very broad and 
encompasses "... many other notions of change ..." in addition to what would usually 
be thought of, i.e. a movement in space. (Mullarkey, p. 13)
87 Craig Charles & Russell Bell, The Craig Charles Almanac o f Total Knowledge 
(London: Boxtree, 1993) p. 14.
149
the contrary is produced from a whole which changes every time it is 
divided creating novelty. The contrast then is between the indivisible 
simplicity of the element, versus the complex part which is indivisible by 
any fixed number of pre-existing elements - the letters of the alphabet in 
the case of a text. As the part is not divisible by a fixed number of pre­
existing elements it can be the subject of inexhaustible comprehension, it 
is "... flickering, fluttering and scintillating with virtual qualities" 
(Jankélévitch, p. 230) and thus in a sense infinite. (CM, p. 161) It is the 
part which is gained by intuition as opposed to the intellect which gains 
the element. (Mourélos, p. 61) The part is extensity, the element 
homogeneity.
A photograph of a particular part of a city is an element, it is still, 
whereas our knowledge of the city as a whole might be made up o f a 
number of parts, each one individual and related to another, not 
necessarily entirely separate, but distinguishable and essentially mobile. 
(CM, p. 180) If this distinction is, as the thesis suggested above, linked to 
the notion of a motif as opposed to a concept, then there might be a way 
to link Bergson's notion o f the motif back to language without 
succumbing to the problems which he sees with concepts narrowly 
understood as elements abstracted from a whole. To do this, the thesis 
will now turn to Bergson's account of poetry.
A poem consists of letters, which are elements of the poem, they are not 
carriers o f meaning. To analyse a poem by reducing it to its letters does 
not bring the meaning any closer, letters are partial expressions o f a 
poem, not component parts, (CM, p. 171) they are elements. (CM, p.
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182) The question of which is the simplest element is an illformulated 
question as the simplest is relative to the level which the question is 
aimed at. In one sense the question of the simplest could refer to the 
molecules of a chair, or the subatomic structure and this would be 
perfectly reasonable in a scientific discourse. On the other hand, when 
looking for somewhere to sit down the simplest element is the chair. The 
level of analysis is a level of appropriateness, and this is also the case for 
Bergson. Breaking a text down into its component letters might be useful 
for spelling practice or in gaining a knowledge of the material level of the 
text, however such an analysis appears alien to the level of semantic 
meaning. It is not that the level is not necessary, or that it is a supplement 
o f some description, it is instead that it is not primary in this context. The 
material level, whilst still being present, has to be necessarily closed to 
the semantic realm to at least some degree.
The other way to understand this distinction is in terms of the recognition 
o f wholes in Matter and Memory. Here it is a case that the meaning o f  a 
text is taken as a whole rather than being split up into separate letters 
which are then analysed to give the meaning of the text.
The finding of the correct approach and definition of the part is essential 
in achieving the correct understanding of a poem. The thesis will assume 
although Bergson does not make it explicit at this point, that a part o f  a 
poem would be the meaning of a line, or a stanza, or a section in a longer 
poem - different subdivisions can thus occur, but only at certain levels, 
and there can be parts within parts, though each one should be 
meaningful to some extent in itself. This is in no way a question of
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finding the total meaning in one of the individual parts, or even more so 
in an element, instead one is dividing difficulties. This means that once 
understood the whole can be recomposed to produce the original 
complex indecomposable signification. (Delhomme, p. 155)
It is always necessary to take the whole poem, to understand a works full 
meaning as each individual stanza not only adds to the meaning of the 
whole, as an addition of something new to the pre-existing, but also 
because each new addition changes the meaning of the stanzas of the 
poem which have already been given. Meaning, as will become apparent 
in the subsequent, in a poem, if not elsewhere, is essentially carried by 
rhythm. This might be in terms of taking the individual to the correct level 
via rhythm. This means that the element / part distinction will be defined 
in terms of movement again, where individual elements are still and not 
carriers of meaning, whereas parts are rhythmic (moving) and do carry 
meaning. In this sense, the mobile part will be a rhythmic unit. This point 
will be elucidated further in the subsequent.
The element / part distinction is also definitive of two sorts o f infinity, the 
one related to an intuition of the part, giving an absolute (true infinite) 
knowledge, the other, the element, giving an incomplete knowledge (false 
infinite). The two sorts of infinity are defined in terms of the explanations 
which result from taking an element or a part from a poem. If, Bergson 
claims, he attempts to translate the simple impression a line of Homer 
makes on him to someone who knows no Greek he will do several things. 
Firstly, in attempting to explain the impression, Bergson will translate the 
line, then comment on his translation, additional translations into other
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languages might give additional nuances which bring the impression 
closer, but ultimately they will never capture the original impression, they 
fail to translate every nuance. (CM, p. 161) In short, a translation will 
never give an absolute knowledge of a thing, as a translation is always in 
terms other than the original.
This failure to capture every nuance links to Bergson's claim, that we 
have already touched on that there are things which are infinite. By this 
he means there are things which are 'indivisible', that is, not things which 
have no elements, but things whose very division changes the whole 
which they are. As there can be no elemental division these things can be 
the subject of"... inexhaustible enumeration ...". Anything which can be 
the subject of inexhaustible enumeration is defined as infinite, as one can 
never get to the end of it. (CM, p. 161) In this sense, an intuition is 
infinite. An intuition is never fully expressible, it is always made more 
complex by explanation. (CM, p. 109) The distinction here has to be 
between the false infinite produced with the aid o f homogeneous space, 
all explanations aiming to give the movement back to that which has been 
stilled, and the true infinite, that of intuition whose parts are mobile. 
Elements which are still are infinite due to their incompleteness which 
cannot recreate the whole from which they have been taken. One does 
not reach the original through the elements. The infinite in this case is 
false, as it is merely a failure to grasp the original mobile whole or part. It 
can now be seen why a fluid concept might be considered analogous to 
infinitesimal calculus. If infinitesimal calculus attempts (unsuccessfully) 
to give the part, rather than the element, it is aiming at giving an intuitive 
mobility rather than a 'still', analysed, section. However, calculus still
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relies on breaking change into an infinite number of points, as opposed to 
grasping a motion whole, and this seems central to its initial conception 
and hence to it ultimately only being able to give elements, not parts. 
Space still remains essentially homogenised.
The intuition of a part, as opposed to its analysis, is whole, as it only 
corresponds to itself, it is taken in its own terms. The singular is not 
reduced to equivalence. The intuition an individual has of a line of Homer 
in Greek is 'infinite' because it can never be captured in analysis. Intuition 
is thus concerned to find those units which are mobile, to which 
individuals can correspond, like a line of Homer. Here the 
correspondence with the mobile inner being of the thing is again 
uppermost in Bergson's mind.
The mobile units in poetry which are being corresponded to, are defined 
by rhythm and movement within the line. The fact that Bergson's 
description of poetry should involve rhythm and movement should be of 
no surprise. Nor, in fact is Bergson's account on one level surprising. 
Poetry works by subverting the usual linguistic system, bringing intuition 
into language and hence making words into art goes against their 
essentially utilitarian nature. (CM, p. 80) Such making is partly 
concerned with rhythm and movement which are introduced into the 
words. Both the terms 'making' and 'introduction' are somewhat odd, as it 
sounds almost as if Bergson sees poeticisation as a device,88 and his
88 Formalist critics like Viktor Shklovsky "... aimed ... to outline models and 
hypotheses (in a scientific spirit) to explain how aesthetic effects are produced by 
literary devices ..." (Raman Seiden, A Reader's Guide to Contemporary Literary 
Theory. 2nd ed. (Hcmel Hemstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989) p. 10. (Henceforth
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explanation as an attempt to show how literary effects are produced. 
Poetry, on this account, might be seen as the defamiliarisation of ordinary 
language via particular processes into something artistic. Certainly this 
kind of account would appear parallel to Moore's attempt to explain 
Bergson's approach to humour in terms of recipes and productive 
knowledge which the thesis has previously examined. It has already been 
suggested that, in the form Moore presents it, such an account gives an 
inadequate description o f Bergson's system with regard to humour. Is 
Moore's description of Bergson's method, with regard to humour, more 
appropriately applied to Bergson's description of poetry? If not, is there 
something more than mere instrumentalism at stake in Bergson's account 
of poetry, something more than a delineation o f a set of applied 
techniques? Instead of extrapolating from Moore's account, the thesis will 
look at a fully fledged critical account of this sort, which the Formalists, 
particularly Shklovsky, carried out and compare it to Bergson's own 
account. Such an account is of particular interest as Bergson is often 
associated with the Symbolist89 movement which the Russian Formalists 
were reacting against.
Selden))
89 Bergson notes that although the symbolist movement effectively started the year 
before the publication o f l'Essai sur les Données Immédiates de la Conscience there 
was mutual ignorance on the part of the poets and himself. However his comments as 
regards their work are positive. Henri Bergson, Mélanges, ed. André Robinet (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France, 1972) pp. 843-4 (Henceforth M)
Is Bergson a Formalist?
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In the last section the thesis examined the notion of intuition in light of 
the element / part distinction. Intuition was seen to grasp the mobile part, 
as opposed to the still element, leading to the distinction between a true 
and a false infinite. An intuition of the poem was capable of infinite 
analysis, being rich in content, this being opposed to a false infinite which 
attempted to explain the poem without having grasped it, and was 
therefore doomed to infinitely try to explain what had not been grasped in 
the first place. Poetry is described by Bergson as subverting the 
utilitarian, superficial nature of concepts, as narrowly defined. This 
notion of subversion appears to bear similarity to a position put forward 
by the Formalists.
The present section o f this thesis is concerned to examine whether a 
connection exists between Bergson and the Formalists. To this end it will 
briefly outline the formalist position suggesting from the outset that 
Bergson is somewhat distanced from its theoretical concerns. Although 
poetry might not be analysable in Formalist terms, for Bergson, the 
possibility might still exist that humour is. The thesis to this end briefly 
reminds the reader o f  why this is not the case. Returning to poetry it will 
be seen that Bergson's account relies on the notion of rhythm to subvert 
language and to make intuition real in a non-intuited medium by 
transporting the reader to a particular plane. Such an account would then 
avoid the problems which Bergson sees associated with utilitarian 
language, whilst expressing the intuited. Intuition, which is not fully 
communicable, can thus, through poetry, receive a fuller expression 
which gets closer to its referent. The next section then asks if despite the
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differences already noted between Bergson and Russian Formalism, 
defamiliarisation, a term introduced by Shklovsky, can help explain how 
Bergson thinks poetic language attempts to make the intuited real.
The first question to be asked in assessing Bergson's relation to 
Formalism is whether it is possible for Bergson to think that the 
production of poetry is what Shklovsky (Selden, p. 10) refers to as a 
controlled violence upon ordinary, non-artistic language. If it were the 
case that the poem were no more than a heap of devices, then Bergson's 
emphasis on grasping parts would be rather difficult to comprehend. As a 
series of devices, the poem would be capable of analysis in terms of 
elements which had undergone a rigidifying process, rather than 
constituting a series o f moving parts. Some of Shklovsky's thoughts are in 
this sense not in line with Bergson's own. An example of this lack of 
correspondence between the two thinkers would be Shklovsky's 
definition of literature as "... the sum total of all stylistic devices 
employed in it ... " (Selden, p. 9), that is, the mechanisms which create 
certain effects within a text are seen as defining the artistic nature of a 
text. The Formalists' practice, furthermore, was interested not in the 
production of absolutes, but in the more pragmatic outlining of models 
and hypotheses, so mechanisms are here a means of understanding how a 
poem is achieving its effects - they are an explanatory tool rather than an 
attempt to present any existing actuality.90
90 Boris Lichenbaum, The Theory o f the Formal Method', Russian Formalist 
Criticism - Four Lssavs. trans. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University 
o f Nebraska Press, 1965) p. 102. (Henceforth Lichcnbaum)
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To be clear - the task of a Formalist critic is to find the features in a text 
that cause it to be viewed as specifically literary. (Selden, p. 7) This 
entailed an attempt to discover what made the text deviate from ordinary 
language. In one manner the deviation of the artistic text from the 
ordinary seems quite Bergsonian. The principal difference between the 
two positions lies in the relation Formalists regard as obtaining between 
an artistic text and reality. The Formalists make no attempt to find some 
sort of reality which the text reflects or presents in some truthful manner. 
Instead, 'reality', certainly for the first Formalists, would be merely an 
occasion for the use of literary devices. (Selden, p. 7 & Intro, p. xiv) 
Because reality was, as it were, merely an excuse for the use of literary 
technique, that which created aesthetic effects, the Formalists tended to 
give no moral or cultural significance to the aesthetic form. (Selden, p. 7)
On this model, examining literature would not be concerned with how 
literature was embedded within a particular time, say, an analysis of what 
historical conditions were like when Jonathan Swift wrote Gulliver's 
Travels, as even though this might be important this would not be 
relevant for the specifically aesthetic literary content. The aesthetic 
literary content would be produced by the processes used within the text, 
and although this might allow a particular literary work to criticise the 
current state o f society, the primary aim o f a critical appraisal would be 
to understand how the material had been processed. The process itself, 
for the Formalists, was ideologically neutral, although the obvious 
undercurrent is that change from the 'normal' to the revolutionised poetic
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is good. Again morality as such is left out of this account, as it is obvious
that inverting the values of a particular system can either
(1.) act to criticise that system, by showing the opposite values to be
correct.
(2.) Show the system in question was correct in the first place, by 
demonstrating the evils of its inverted opposite.
(3.) Leave it ambiguous whether the original systems values are, or are 
not correct - the inversion merely acting to drawing attention to the 
system.
The emphasis in Bergson's account on the primary intuition of the poem 
seems far removed from this kind o f analysis. The subversion of language 
by rhythm, according to Bergson, brings the language closer to intuition, 
an existing actuality truly known, whereas for the Formalists the existing 
reality was not known better through poetry, only differently. Formalist 
analysis outlined techniques acting on reality, which was already 
assumed as given, to make it different and to draw attention to certain of 
its features. Would a Formalist analysis better fit Bergson's account of the 
comic, even if it fails to fit his account of poetry? Is it the case that the 
comic is susceptible to this kind o f analysis as it does not (for Bergson) 
concern truth, whereas art, concerning the truth as revealed by intuition, 
is not? This also does not seem to be the case.
The thesis has argued that in the case of laughter and the comic, it is not a 
question of mere technique, a productive process. Humour is not merely a 
matter of a set o f stylistic devices, for even if one interprets Bergson as 
providing an account of the devices used in humour, these always only
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make sense within the framework of his account of rigidity and 
inattention, the individual who has failed to adapt to the current 
circumstances, thus humour is not merely self absorbed for Bergson, 
referring solely to its self.
The nearest Bergson might be seen to come to an account of humour as a 
mere technique is in his description of three processes which can give 
rise to humour - inversion, repetition and reciprocal interference (which 
will be further detailed in the subsequent). Such processes acting on 
material to produce amusement bear a strong resemblance in their method 
o f operation to many of the techniques that the Formalists describe. In 
both cases the material is irrelevant to the process being performed on it. 
But what prevents humour being a question of technique in the case of 
inversion, repetition and reciprocal interference in the same sense as in 
Formalism, is the necessity that the process be visible. For the Formalists, 
showing a technique was the 'most literary' thing a text could do, but not 
necessary for something to be literature. In the case of humour it is the 
technique and its visibility which cause amusement, not aesthetic 
contemplation. Each technical process is an example of the mechanical 
encrusted on the living, and it is the rigidity of technique which is the 
subject of laughter, and only through this rigidity can effects be seen to 
be amusing. The three processes are the very homogenisation and 
juxtaposition of sections of time as a mechanical operation. This idea will 
be returned to, though it is already clear even from the sections in 
Bergson which most support the view that humour could be a mere 
technique, that he is still failing to give recipes, as the technical processes 
do not create humorous products, but instead are themselves humorous. If
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the analogy to cookery held, the recipe itself would have to be tasty, as 
opposed to the meal it could produce when followed. So, to be clear, the 
visibility of the technique in the three processes is necessary if something 
is to be humorous, whereas for Formalism aesthetic effect is not reliant 
on the technique being visible, but literariness is increased if this is the 
case. Bearing the above points in mind it is doubtful that Bergson is 
thinking in an analogous manner to the Formalists in his account of 
humour, and certainly not when he is examining art.
Returning to poetry, the distance between Formalism and Bergson's 
position might additionally be suggested by the references his 
descriptions of art make to organic wholes whose parts are inseparable. 
Such references which shall shortly be analysed in more depth suggest 
that, rather than the notion of a specific process or technique being 
carried out on material,91 Bergson has something else in mind. The artist 
can make the intuited real in the non-intuited, language, by attempting to 
subvert its ordinary system of representation:
... by rhythmical arrangement of words, which thus become 
organised and animated with a life of their own, they tell us 
- or rather suggest - things that speech was not calculated to 
express. (Laughter, p. 156 & Kolakowski, p. 19)
91 To an extent, even at quite an early stage of the Formalist movement, Brik, 
(Eichenbaum, p. 126) analysed rhythm in terms of whole phrases, and in the case o f 
Tomashevsky rhythm became the distribution o f energy within a whole line which 
was implicit in the whole fabric of the poem, as opposed to a structure imposed upon 
language after the fact. (Eichenbaum, p. 126)
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Instead of poetry, on the Formalists' analysis, exercising a controlled 
violence on practical language to draw individuals' attention to its 
constructed quality, (Selden, p. 10) the poet, according to Bergson, 
attempts to evoke in the reader an intuitive perception that is not fully 
communicable, but still closer to full communicability than an analytic 
description could get. (Kolakowski, p. 32) This notion o f evocation deals, 
in I .aughter with the expression of an inward state. The distinction might 
then be between expressive and scientific language, where scientific 
language attempted to communicate via shared and commonly recognised 
rules, as opposed to expressive language which relied on the finding of 
appropriate expressions and the responsiveness of the hearer. (Matthews, 
p. 122) This expressiveness of the language, would, the account suggests, 
attempt to promote the amount of memory entering into the 
communication, making language more personal and less scientific. How 
this expressive language functions will of necessity be different for every 
occasion of its use as any regularity of usage would develop into a 
conventional series of signs and/or rules for usage and be incorporated 
into a motor schema and so cease to promote additional memory entering 
into communication. In this sense Bergson's use o f language could be 
seen as a call for the continuous invention of usage, a constant pushing at 
the bounds of language.
Matthews appears to think that individual expressions are invented to 
represent pre-existing mental states, rather than being inventive of those 
states, so unlike Mullarkey, with regard to concepts, (Mullarkey, p. 185) 
he does not argue for a metaphilosophy, with a need to constantly 
reinvent concepts, or analogously expression. For Matthews it does at
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times seem like it is merely the case of giving something a name, rather 
than inventing a new concept. (Mullarkey, p. 185) Indeed it could be 
argued with regard to poetry that there is no conception of metapoetics 
(analogous to metaphilosophy) because of Bergson's anti-modernism with 
regard to art, i.e. poetry lacks the ability for a perpetual reflection on 
itself, but such arguments will be presented later. Despite the necessary 
imprecision involved in expression and its creation of concepts one thing 
is clear, that rhythm has a specific role to play in evocation, and we shall 
be discussing this in greater depth in the subsequent.
For the Formalists, art was not seen in terms of an attempt to express 
inner states, nor was it defined by any specific revelation which it 
produced. Despite art allowing us to 'see differently' it did not reveal 
reality, and there was no moral or cultural message specifically present in 
the aesthetic. So what value did art have for the Formalists? Art acted to 
shake individuals from the everyday perceptions they had, which brings 
this thesis to the now famous concept o f defamiliarisation. Can this 
concept help us understand how Bergson thinks poetry acts to move us 
closer to intuitions through expressive language?
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Defamiliarisation
In the previous section it was argued that Bergson's account of poetry is 
not simply concerned with a series of techniques, but instead has deeper 
concerns. Poetry makes the intuited real via rhythm and the expressive 
use of language. The possibility that defamiliarisation could be a means 
of understanding this process was suggested in the previous section and 
will now be explored.
The thesis will firstly outline defamiliarisation and its role in allowing 
fresh perception unhindered by habitual patterns of thought. This will be 
seen to be initially compatible with Bergson's understanding of poetry.
The thesis will then highlight potential problems for the truthfiilness of 
communication, arising from Bergson's desire to hide the techniques of 
communication. This position is then contrasted with that of Longinus.
This section will begin by examining whether a better understanding of 
Bergson can be achieved through an examination of the concept of 
'defamiliarisation', a term coined by Shklovsky. Defamiliarisation, as it is 
usually translated, or more literally to 'make strange' (ostranenie), 
became one o f the hallmarks of the Russian Formalists, and according to 
Shklovsky, was a process by means of which the familiar became 
unfamiliar. In the general course o f life, perception becomes automatic,
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things are not truly perceived, as they have been replaced by symbols.92 *
Their difference has been erased, things are perceived in terms of the 
general rather than in their specific uniqueness. This thought could almost 
have been plagiarised from Bergson.
Defamiliarisation aims to de-automatise perception by making individuals 
attend to things which have become stale and commonplace in a fresh 
way. (Shklovsky, p. 4 & Selden, p. 11) A good literary example of 
defamiliarisation would be Tolstoy's choice of a horse as narrator in 
Kholstomer. (AAT, p. 14) Here the unusualness of the narrator draws 
specific attention to the narration and the odd viewpoint allows events to 
be seen from a fresh perspective. Defamiliarisation, by making strange, 
prolongs perception, making it more difficult so that it is no longer 
effortless and automatic. In Bergsonian terms the less easy it is for a 
motor response to operate, the more chance there is of memory images 
taking their chance to come flooding in to perception as they are no 
longer repressed by utilitarian habits. It must be carefully noted, however, 
that it is the 'artfulness' of the object, which is regarded as important, 
which the formalists regard as important not the object itself. (AAT, p. 12 
& Selden, p. 11)
In defamiliarisation it is a question of slowing down and drawing out 
actions, interrupting them, delaying them, in order to force attention to
92 Victor Shklovsky, 'Art as Technique' Russian Formalist Criticism - Four Kssavs.
trans. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
1965) p. 11 (Henceforth AAT)
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focus on those actions, in short, to de-automatise. (AAT, p. 22 & Selden, 
p. 11) Such an altering of the initial material of necessity highlights 
aesthetic technique,93 and such revealing o f technique in turn increases 
the literariness of the text. (Selden, p. 12)94 The revelation of technique 
ultimately militates against realism, as it might be narrowly conceived. As 
techniques no longer serve realism, they instead act 'without motive', that 
is, without a satisfactory realist reason for their presence.95
Here the relation the Formalist doctrines bear to Bergson in terms of the 
problem of practically orientated perception is quite obvious.96 Both 
Bergson and the Formalists identify the same problem, and indeed 
propose similar solutions. The unique rhythmic pattern and the making 
musical of language which is present in poetry, allowing it to say more 
than ordinary language according to Bergson, (Pilkington, p. 14) could 
easily be seen as an instance of defamiliarisation, a making uncommon of 
language by rhythmicising it. Despite these similarities, Bergson's
93 Victor Shklovsky, 'Sterne's T ris tra m  S h a n d y . Stylistic Commentary' Russian 
Formalist Criticism - Four F.ssavs. trans. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: 
University o f Nebraska Press, 1965) p. 56
94 Also Boris Tomashevsky, Russian Formalist Criticism - Four Essays, trans. Lee T. 
Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University o f  Nebraska Press, 1965) p. 84
95 Victor Shklovsky, 'Sterne's T ris tra m  S h a n d y . Stylistic Commentary' Russian 
Formalist Criticism - Four F.ssavs. trans. Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1965) p. 26. (Henceforth STS)
96 The question o f the laying bare of technique in relation to Bergson will be 
explored in the subsequent.
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position is different to that of the Formalists on the question of 
defamiliarisation at its most basic level.
The difference between Bergson and the Formalists on the issue of 
rhythm relates to Bergson's account o f attentive recognition. For Bergson 
reactions to words where the motor schema is dominant, are immediate 
and habitual, no attention is paid to the specificity of the thing. The more 
basic the language, the closer it is to the motor scheme. Secondly there is 
the language which attempts to get as close as possible to the thought of 
the individual. This language gives more of the flow of thought and relies 
less on the immediate motor response and more on the memories evoked, 
in addition to the motor response - it allows a specific difference to be 
introduced into perception. The amount of memory coming into 
perception is reliant on the rhythm, or level of memory's operation, which 
suggests that the rhythm of poetry in some way moves the reader, 
through suggestibility, to a specific level, to a specific rhythm. This 
means there is something analogous in the rhythm of thought and in the 
rhythm of the poetry, rather than something disruptive.
These moves find a kindred spirit in Symbolism where, to take a musical 
example, it is not a case of giving a programmatic depiction of a sunken 
cathedral in the usual sense. The music does not attempt to produce the 
literal sound of being underwater, but instead to try to recreate the 
emotional state which would have been experienced by the listener had 
they been viewing such a scene.97 It is the creation of a space where
97 Jarocinski is very insistent on this point. Stefan Jarocinski. Debussy - 
Impressionism and Symbolism trans. Rollo Myers, introduction by Vladimir
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imagination can roam as opposed to an attempt to paint a particular scene 
in music, (Jankelevitch2, p. ix) which Symbolist poetry, in particular, 
aspired to. This attempt to move the viewer to a deeper level means a 
work of art cannot be reduced to its merely superficial effects, i.e. the 
immediate motor response. Language is always rhythmic to some extent, 
it is thus a question of how much memory is present, how material the 
response is which is important.
But in moving away from the immediate response Bergson also closes the 
material level from conscious communication. Indeed for Bergson, as 
opposed to the Formalists, the techniques used by the communicator must 
be hidden, a distinctly non-modernist view if one takes modernism to be 
an exploration and revealing o f the basic conditions of possibility of a 
practice. This means that the sonic materiality of the utterance, if this is 
interpreted as rhythm, must be hidden, not revealed. This position would 
be in opposition to the method of Joyce's Finnegans Wake.98 for 
example, where Joyce's musicalisation of language brings the actual 
textuality into the foreground, moving away from any idea of a 
transparent communication medium. This move away from transparency 
results in a problematisation o f the very act of communication, if only 
because Joyce's invented words question the basis of language, and the
Jankdkivitch (Henceforth Jank£16vitch 2) (London: F.mst Eulenburg. 1976) pp. 66- 
96. It should be noted that post-Time and Free Will, the emotion it would be a case 
o f the emotion being created in its expression from the movement o f an original 
tendency. This point will be considered in more detail in the subsequent.
98 James Joyce. Finnegans Wake (London: Minerva, 1992).
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way words are understood. As Shklovsky comments, a nonsense word 
forces the reader to go through it in order to get to the actual word. 
(AAT, p. 20) When reading the Joyce inspired A Clockwork Orange."  
for example, words like 'tolchock' have to be read through in order to 
understand their meaning (in this case something like hit or punch), that 
is, read in the context of words already understood. Does this mean that 
there is merely a reinterpretation of the new in terms of the old? Certainly 
Shklovsky's arguments seem to suggest this reduction of difference to a 
repeated same. The question for a Bergsonian interpretation is whether (i) 
there can be a lack of exactitude which would allow a nonsense word a 
greater evocative power via its vagueness, or (ii) whether it is merely 
understood in terms of a pre-existing word, in which case it will lose its 
evocative power, or (¡ii) whether it works merely on the level of a 
superficial effect. Either one o f the two later options would appear to be 
the most likely, both, at best, closing themselves to the material sphere.
Bergson, in opposition to the Formalists, seems to see rhythm not as a 
'making strange', but on the contrary allowing the possibility of greater 
understanding through a lulling rather than a confrontation. For the 
Formalists, the idea that poetry exemplified an economy o f expression 
and transparency, the greatest amount of information being expressed in 
the least words, (AAT, p. 10) was mistaken. Poetry is more difficult to 
understand than prose, the classic example being the Haiku. (AAT, p. 10) 
The important point to note is that the Haiku extends the time taken for 
perception not by either rearrangement or the slowing down o f actions, to 9
99 Anthony Burgess. A Clockwork Orange (London: Penguin. 1972).
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describe every nuance of, say, a movement, but instead by the 
compacting of language into a formal system - a language which by its 
very brevity forces the reader to try to fill the gaps. In this sense Bergson 
could easily be interpreted as moving against the artifice of certain forms 
of expression which draw attention to themselves, yet this is not 
necessarily the case. What is important is the evocative power of the 
words to transport us to a certain level, and if the very brevity of the 
haiku does not detract from this operation, then no problem arises. 
Shklovsky, on the contrary, emphasises the use of rough rhythms, the 
deliberate showing o f  technique, as an essential part of the 
communication. For Bergson, the ease of communication is essential and 
rhythm is the means by which this end is promoted the suggestibility is 
less shock than lulling evocation.
The poet can "... lull the imagination ... rock it to and fro between like 
and like with a regular see-saw motion, and thus prepare it submissively 
to accept the vision suggested"; (Laughter, p. 61) it is as if the 
descriptions which are given in words can make the image almost appear 
before the individual listener,100 because they have been moved to the 
correct level where memory can push itself into consciousness.
However it could well be argued that poetry, as it relies on rhythm is not 
attempting to make the meaning of a communicative utterance clearer, 
but instead to make it more affecting. If this were true then Benda's
100 Longinus, "On the Sublime," Classical Literary Criticism, trims. T. S. lX>rsch 
(London: Penguin. 1965) pp. 99-158. (Henceforth Longinus) p. 121.
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accusation that poetry was more concerned with effects than the 
expression of ideas would be true.101 Bergson's whole conception, 
however is different.
For Bergson it is not a question of the addition o f ornamentation to 
language, or a process undergone by language. Artistic language is 
created by a vertical process so no specific processes can be given for 
making art as this would suggest that the work was predictable and in 
some sense pre-existed its realisation. Though specific techniques might 
be necessary for the realisation of the work itself, the work cannot merely 
be a sum of such techniques.
So far the exegesis of Bergson's position has been in non-musical terms, 
Bergson does, however, give a more 'musical' account of language in a 
later text - here, in addition to the above position he describes what is 
almost a heterogeneous continuity in speech. Diction has to be present at 
the very beginning in understanding a text. Diction is not an artistic 
accomplishment or "ornament", but instead essential. (CM, p. 87) 
Reading acts to reinvent the text and get back to the communicating 
individual's original movement o f thought, to adopt "... his gestures, his 
attitude, his g a it..." (CM, p. 86)
There seem to be two basic points being made in this, passage. The first 
is to see Bergson's concern being to temporalise a text through speech,
101 Robert L. Nicss, Julien Benda: The Poet's Function. Yale French Studies vol. II, 
no. 2 (1949) p. 67.
such temporalisation giving the argument of the philosopher as a whole 
which cannot be broken up into independent homogenised sections. 
There is a constant interpenetration of the past into the present like a 
melodic heterogeneous continuity. Indeed, children should be taught to 
read out loud so they get to the rhythm and structure of a text, and learn 
to follow thought as they would a musical crescendo (CM, p. 87) "... 
following uninterruptedly the crescendo of thought and feeling to the 
point musically indicated as the culminating point ..." (CM, p. 87) 
Bergson thus prioritises the temporal spoken over the homogeneous 
space of the written word. The second is the need to understand the 
rhythm of the text, "... his gestures, his attitude, his gait ..." (CM, p. 86) 
and thus be on the correct level to follow the development of the thinker's 
thought.
It is important to note that both the model of speech and its 
understanding, with its conceptualisation of the movement of thought in 
terms of climaxes and the following of a thread, and indeed music as 
well, seem to be described by Bergson in a very teleological, and perhaps 
gendered manner.102 On the one hand movement itself is being valorised,
102 The feminist music critic Susan McClary makes much o f the common use o f  this 
type of language claiming it is indicative o f an inherently phallocentric way of 
conceiving time. (Susan McClary. "Getting Down off the Beanstalk: The Presence of 
a Woman's Voice in Janika Vandervelde's Genesis II," Feminine landings: Music- 
Gender and Sexuality (Minnesota: University o f Minnesota Press, 1991) (Henceforth. 
McClary) Citron additionally tries to show that musical argument has often been 
described in highly gendered terms. (Marcia J. Citron. "Music as Gendered 
Discourse," Gender and the Musical Canon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
1993) pp. 120-64.)
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but on the other hand in phrases like 'climax' and so forth there seems a 
valorisation of the opposite, the teleological, a concern with fixed ends as 
opposed to the process itself, which is interesting as this seems to be 
exactly the opposite of Bergson's usual position.
On a more positive note the specifically musical nature o f communication 
given via his account of diction, in attempting to recover the movement of 
the communicator's original thought - a grasping of the whole before 
parts, results in what Bachelard might have termed a plan. (Bachelard, p. 
88) It is not a question of merely moving from moment to moment, a 
position Bachelard believes Bergson holds, (Bachelard, p. 88) but instead 
of taking the whole of the past into the future in order to understand the 
plan of the work. Unlike the attempt to understand a thinker's work like a 
mosaic o f separate ideas there is an attempt to grasp the progression of 
the idea, that is its temporal dimension.
One possible way to understand an idea temporally will be to abandon 
the idea o f 'unpacking', resulting in an infinite explanation (as in the line 
from Homer which can allegedly never fully be explained) and instead 
think in terms o f an unfolding occurring in a manner analogous to a 
melodic progression. This will result in a temporalisation o f the concept 
of argumentation where it is not a question of a thinker being understood 
by the discovery of pre-existing elements, but instead by the following of 
the movement o f thought, the impulsion, as it is realised on various 
planes.
Chapter 4 Aesthetics
Music and Art
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Having looked at poetry, in the previous section and defined the role a 
'musical' understanding might have when understanding a text, it is now 
necessary to examine Bergson's conception of music in more detail. 
Although concentrating on music the chapter will, however, like the rest 
of the arts, be discussed for a second reason, namely to explore the 
relation between the aesthetic in general and intuition on the one hand, 
and the sharp division Bergson makes between humour and art on the 
other. Additionally the discussion of intuition and art will be dealt with at 
the end of the thesis when art and philosophy are distinguished.
The discussion will begin by detailing Bergson's claim in Time and 
Freewill that music is an attempt by the composer to communicate inner 
emotions to others.103 This is done by trying to recreate these emotions in 
the listener, a position which Bergson later modified. There is a problem 
in the case of music as regards the apparent repetition of the music's 
rhythm within the listener as an almost mechanical response, with its 
references to hypnotism. The various levels of self-loss involved in music 
will then be seen to be qualitatively, not quantitatively different. It will
103 Bergson in Time and Free Will does not think emotions are something inner and 
separate from their expression. Emotions are instead always a mixture o f inner and 
outer states. (Henri Bergson, Time and Free WilL trans. F.L. Pogson (New York: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1916) pp. 31-2) (Henceforth, TFW) This is tied to 
the notion o f an inner state being given by a physical movement caused by a sign.
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then be asked whether the distinction between poetry and prose can be 
made in terms of a qualitative difference in rhythm between the two. This 
is rejected, primarily because of Bergson's account of aesthetic states. 
The following section will then examine rhythm in more depth as it is of 
such central importance for Bergson's account of linguistic 
communication and poetry, as well as his account of music.
Bergson's starting point for his discussion of music in Time and Free Will 
is that of the artist trying to communicate inner emotions which are rich 
and personal and cannot be understood by the individual who is being 
communicated to, only experienced. (TFW, p. 18) It is not that the 
emotions found in a piece of music are in some way generalised, they do 
not express a general feeling, one which might be amorphous and non­
specific (anger in general), or indeed a Platonic idea, but instead they 
express a specific feeling which is unique to that individual and could not 
be experienced by another. To try to communicate such emotions, the 
artist needs external signs of emotions to create a similar state in the 
listener as was originally present in the artist.104 (TFW, p. 18) It is a 
question of causing the body to imitate an outward sign, even if only 
slightly, which will transport us into the psychological state which called 
them forth. (TFW, p. 18) In one sense such a position is unsurprising as
104 Tolstoy is close to this position - "Art is a human activity consisting in this, that 
one man consciously, by means o f certain external signs, hands on to others feelings 
he has lived through, and that others are infected by these feelings and also 
experience them." (Quoted by Herbert Read. The Meaning of Art (London: Pelican 
Books, 1949) pp. 185-6.)
1 7 5
Bergson maintains that emotions are "... a system of muscular 
contractions co-ordinated by an idea." (TFW, p. 28) An emotion cannot 
be only an idea, as it would then have no intensity, nor can it be defined 
as only a set of muscular contractions, as then the number of contractions 
would determine the emotions intensity, but not its direction. (TFW, p. 
29) In effect this means there are multiple different emotions which are 
situated between the pure internal where "... our ideas, our memories, our 
states of consciousness of every description, ... will turn in larger or 
smaller number in a definite direction" (TFW, p. 31) and pure muscular 
contraction. So in trying to communicate an inner emotion the external 
sign tries to create a movement in the individual which will, hopefully, 
trigger a certain inner state.
There appears to be a major difference between the account of music in 
Time and Free-Will detailed above and that of Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion.105 In the case of the first text the emotion, although novel, 
pre-exists and it is this which is to be communicated, whereas in the later 
text it is only through the music that the emotion, which is virtual, can be 
actualised. (TSMR, pp. 40-1) So the artist can create new sensations, and 
in doing so is also a visionary in bringing out the true self purified by art. 
(Mourelos, p. 219) The emotions, which art invents, may be linked to 
particular objects, and indeed specific reasons may be given why they are 
linked to one particular object as opposed to another, but such objects 
only act as harmonics, rather than the fundamental, (TSMR, p. 42) and in
105 In this respect Mourdos sees a kinship between Laughter and Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion. (Mour£los, p. 219)
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the case of music the emotion is objectless. Indeed the description of 
music as sad is merely a generality which is used to express the new 
emotion experienced as the emotion o f love in two pieces o f music will 
necessarily be different, according to the later text, because the emotion 
is inseparable and particular to each piece of music. It is not a case of 
their being a pre-existing feeling which we have experienced which is 
then triggered, but instead of new feelings "Created by that music and 
within that music" (TSMR, p. 41) which are not tied to a physical basis 
or social convention. (Mullarkey, p. 91) Because the emotions in music 
are not aimed at any particular individual or thing they will not be what 
Bergson terms 'superficial', but instead be 'self-sufficient'. By self- 
sufficient Bergson means that they have no specific 'thing' or 'individual' 
beyond themselves at which they are aimed. (TSMR, p. 254) The general 
love o f mankind would be an example of a 'self-sufficient' emotion, 
something which passes through rather than aims at. (Mullarkey, p. 95)
Another example of a self-sufficient, or creative emotion, would be the 
emotion which virtually contains the image produced from it. This is the 
source o f the great poet who is inspired by creative emotion that is 
unique and which the poet keeps referring back to. This emotion is 
specific to that poem alone, unless another was created which bore an 
inward resemblance to it, like two renderings of the same melody, which 
are both equally satisfactory. (TSMR, p. 47) So there is a diffuse 
tendency which is made concrete in the work of art and is different from 
the effect, (Mourdlos, pp. 217-8) i.e. the realisation of the artwork is 
itself creative, and does not pre-exist its realisation.
1 7 7
Returning to Time and Free Will we find that there is again some kind of 
'sympathy' established between composer and listener which allows 
communication. It could also be thought that there would have to be, in 
the case o f the artist, a shared public code to which his 'external signs' 
would belong. Such a code could, of course, be quite easily described in 
terms of common and habitual expression, and would thus be potentially 
humorous. In order to avoid this, Bergson claims that the external signs 
which the artist uses to try to create the same state in the listener as is in 
themselves are not conventional, as conventional signs would hide as 
much as they convey. (Laughter, pp. 155-6) Conventional signs are 
platitudes, the meaning they may have had has long since been eroded. 
This is why language needs to be used 'artistically', to express things it 
was not calculated to express. That is, artistic language acts to 
authentically communicate specific thoughts, using non-platitudinous 
signs.
Bergson claims that aesthetic feelings are 'suggested' and not caused, 
(TFW, p. 17) using hypnotism as an analogy to explain aesthetic states. 
This indicates that he is not thinking in terms o f the way someone might 
suggest an idea for you to follow, or hint at something, external signs 
trying to 'suggest' an inner emotion, but is instead thinking o f 'suggestion' 
in terms of being entranced:106
To put to sleep the active or rather resistant powers o f  our 
personality, and thus bring us into a state of perfect 
responsiveness, in which we realise the idea that is
106 pilkington has noted that the views o f Valéry are highly similar to those of 
Bergson with regard to art. (Pilkington, p. 139)
suggested to us and sympathise with the feeling expressed.
(TFW, p. 14)
The mechanical imitation here appears to limit free will, the listener being 
taken in by the music's 'suggestion', seemingly indicating an 
understanding of the music which is not bound up with any activity on the 
part of the listener, but rather with an acquiescence to external control.107 
Indeed one might even say that this position is symptomatic of the 
ambiguity between freely acting and being acted, (Douglass 2, p. 222) the 
motor response, versus the memories which come to meet it. Indeed the 
above considerations might suggest an analogy between Bergson's 
account of music in terms of control over another individual and self-loss, 
on the one hand, and the elevated language of Longinus on the other. 
However what is important in both poetry and music in Time and 
Freewill is the conception that it is not a thing or object which is being 
communicated as such, but an emotion. In as much as there is an image it 
is being created in the mind o f the reader or listener in order that certain
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107 It is this kind o f position which Levinas is thinking about when he claims 
"Rhythm represents a unique situation where we cannot speak o f consent, 
assumption, initiative or freedom, because the subject is caught up and carried away 
by it." (Emmanuel Levinas, "Reality and its Shadow," The Levinas Reader, ed. Seàn 
Hand / trans. Alphonso Lingis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) p. 132. [Emmanuel 
Levinas, "La Réalité et son Ombre," Les Temps Modernes 38 (1948): p. 775.]) 
(Henceforth Levinas) A full examination of the relation between Levinas and 
Bergson's aesthetics is unfortunately beyond the scope o f this thesis and would 
require an examination of, amongst other texts. Otherwise than Being. (Françoise 
Armcngaud, "Ethique et Esthétique: De l'Ombre à l'Oblitération," Emmanuel 
I.évinas. ed. Catherine Chalicr & Michael Abensour (Paris: Editions de l'Heme, 1991) 
pp. 499-500)
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emotions which have been developed in the poet into images and thence 
into words can be communicated. (TFW, p. 15) It is the rhythm in each 
case which allows the soul to be lulled, so the reader or listener "... thinks 
and sees with the poet." (TFW, p. 15) But what is important is the 
perception of images still has a freedom to it, in that the image given 
already possess our memories, not as an addition, but as an intrinsic part. 
(TFW, p. 162) So although an image is suggested, what that image is to 
each person, due to their different memories and their character will vary 
between individuals. (TFW, p. 162) So there is always o f necessity an 
element of the individual character and hence freedom in the suggestion 
of an image.
This suggestion is explained by our repeating the sounds heard to 
ourselves so as to carry us "... back into the psychic state out of which 
they emerged, an original state, which nothing will express, but which 
something may suggest, viz., the very motion and attitude o f which the 
sound imparts to our body ..." (TFW, p. 44) This seems to be a precursor 
o f the moves in Matter and Memory the initial motor schema meeting 
memories on a particular level. But what is at stake here is the production 
o f a particular state, or in Matter and Memory, creation o f a particular 
level of engagement which is not automatic but brings in memories 
allowing a greater depth of perception. In respect of the move away from 
automatic perception Bergson's position resembles that of the formalists 
already discussed. But in terms o f the need to introduce us, not to the 
thing, but the state which makes us receptive to the thing, Bergson is 
closer to symbolism.
1 8 0
The degree of depth in aesthetic states outlined above, is directly related 
to aesthetic value, which is assessed by the number of feelings and ideas 
which pervade those states. So a very simple rhythmic piece of music 
might monopolise our soul in a similar way to a complex work by 
Beethoven, but the number o f feelings and ideas the later creates in us 
would be far less. So the more automatic the response, the less aesthetic 
the result - more and less here not signifying quantitative, but qualitative 
differences.
Indeed the notion of suggestion, as it relates to depth in Bergson's 
account of music allows him to differentiate between nature and art. The 
sounds of nature merely express feelings - presumably one could think 
about something like the howling of a dog expressing its discontent. 
These feelings might monopolise our soul in pity for the animal, this is an 
immediate response. Whereas musical sounds suggest feelings (TFW, p. 
15) - that is, music tries to cause an effect in the listener, whereas nature 
merely presents a response. This suggestion is primarily linked to the 
different qualitative intensities of experience induced in the perceiver. 
The qualitative differences o f intensity in these cases is again compared 
to hypnosis and degrees of self-loss or depth. (TFW, p. 17) This notion of 
depth concerns the qualitative intensity with which the aesthetic emotion 
affects the individual. It is only when the aesthetic is at its most powerful 
that the soul is completely "...monopolised...", at lower levels of aesthetic 
feeling the soul is hardly moved at all. By 'loss of the soul' Bergson is 
apparently trying to describe a state where the individual 'loses' 
themselves, and is taken in by the music. Each state of the aesthetic self­
loss is, however, qualitatively different from every other state of aesthetic
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loss. Differences in beauty are often used to illustrate the meaning of an 
intensive magnitude,108 so Bergson's move to make each state of 
aesthetic loss qualitatively different is not per se unusual or controversial: 
although it is unusual to see the distinction framed in terms of the subject 
rather than the object of aesthetic appreciation. The suggestion which 
results in this state of aesthetic loss is primarily linked to the use of 
rhythm in art, and it is to an account of rhythm which the thesis will now 
turn.
108 por exampie the Pan Dictionary o f Philosophy uses Beauty as an example of an 
intensive magnitude. Simon Blackburn et al, A Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Anthony 
Flew (London: Pan, 1984) p. 217.
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Rhythmf Music and Dance
In the previous section the aesthetic was seen to involve a loss o f self 
which was dependent, in the first instance, on suggestion was linked to 
rhythm. This section will further explore the notion of rhythm by detailing 
Bergson's account of dance and its relation to temporality. It is the 
predictability of dance which gives the viewer pleasure, according to 
Bergson. The predictability in question is seen to suggest a dichotomy, on 
the one hand between rhythm which is seen as repetitive and closed and 
on the other melody, which Bergson frequently takes as a metaphor for 
duration and openness in this, and in his later works.
In order to examine the notion o f rhythm, the account will turn to 
Bergson's concurrent discussion o f architecture and the rhythm involved 
therein. The notion of rhythm as a static spatialised repetition given in 
Bergson's discussion of architecture will be seen as essentially habitual. 
In opposition to habitual repetition, another account of rhythm given by 
Bergson will be introduced.
This second account of rhythm is based on an understanding of a rhythm 
as a whole, as a qualitative multiplicity, as opposed to a repetition of a 
static element. This position still, however, seems to leave rhythm, 
despite it having to be grasped whole, as a habitual repetition, as opposed 
to producing creative change, as a melody might. The thesis then 
considers what would constitute a creative rhythm for Bergson. Having 
thus established a basic model for a creative rhythm, the thesis attempts 
to find concrete manifestations o f such rhythms in music, or at least
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rhythms which appear to have creative tendencies. Several possible 
candidates are considered, and two found, Debussy, as described by 
Stockhausen in terms of large-scale timbral change, and Carter's metric 
modulation. Given the extremely limited number of musical rhythms 
which can act as a positive model for creative change, and the fact that 
such rhythms would seem to occur in very few poems, means the 
question of large and small scale rhythms will become increasingly 
important for Bergson.
Ultimately, it will be suggested that melodic rather than rhythmic change 
actually provides a model for creative change in Bergson, and it is 
melody which must be examined to understand the unfolding of an 
intuition.
Watching dance, for Bergson, is pleasurable because of its predictability. 
When movement is submitted to rhythm and music, the spectator can 
predict the movements109 *of the dancer:
As we guess almost the exact attitude which the dancer is 
going to take, he seems to obey us when he really takes it.
(TFW, p. 12)
109 Newell argues this point in terms o f music in general rather than dance, and 
claims this predictability is necessary for a listener's orientation. Robert Newell.
"Music and the Temporal Dilemma," British Journal o f Aesthetics 18 (Fall 1978): p. 
360.
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Bergson claims that the rhythm thus takes "... complete possession of our 
thought and will." (TFW, pp. 12-3) As both the dancer and the spectator 
in this case have the same rhythm, between them a kind of 
communication is established."0 (TFW, p. 12) This spatialisation of the 
music in dance is a sketching out of its movement, which leaves the 
understanding of the music poorer. (Delhomme, p. 48) Indeed Bergson 
emphasises the relation of the quantitative more or less to the body when 
he describes the way an intensity of a sound is judged by the amount of 
muscular effort required to produce it. (Robinet, p. 46) But even before 
an external rhythm is applied to dance there can be predictability. 
Bergson claims that the notion of grace is linked to a perception of ease 
in movement (TFW, pp. 11-2) and this ease is a product of the curve 
which, changing its direction at every moment, holds the future moments 
in each present moment.
Before progressing further, we should note two points. Firstly that the 
description of the spectator with their attention firmly fixed on the dancer 
is highly ethnocentric. In Bali, for example, dance is always implicated in 
larger structures - as de Zoete and Spies note, dance is attended in the 
same manner as "... the sound of trees and streams in the wood."111 It is
110 This kind o f description could, however, equally apply to a military march, 
(Francis Sparshott, "Some Dimensions of Dance Meaning," British Journal of 
Aesthetics Vol. 25 / No. 2 (Spring 1985): p. 103.) if it were not associated with 
Bergson's description of grace which will be touched on in the subsequent.
111 Beryl de Zoete and Walter Spies - Dance and Drama in Bali (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1973) p. 16 (Henceforth, Z&S)
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not that the dancers are not being paid attention to, it is that dance is part 
o f a multiplicity of concurrent activities, and attention in this context is 
something quite different to its European counterpart. So Bergson's 
description of attention, when it comes to dance at least, is not one which 
would be universally applicable.
This is not, however, the only account of attention Bergson gives. In 
Duration and Simultaneity "... it is of the very essence of our attention to 
be able to be divided without being split up."112 Elucidating his thought 
he claims that being "... seated on the bank of a river, the flowing of the 
water, the gliding of a boat or the flight of a bird, the ceaseless murmur in 
our life's deeps are for us three separate things or only one, as we 
choose." (D&S, p. 52 & Bergsonism, p. 80) The ability to encompass 
events as different whilst simultaneously one within our own duration 
would seem to echo the Balinese model of attention already outlined. 
However within Time and Free Will, rhythm, in general, acts like a 
homogenising spatialisation o f the basic temporal qualitative 
heterogeneity - a regularity which stills the progress of time and suggests 
a particular plane o f  attention to us. We should, however, note that this 
model of rhythm is not the only one proposed in Bergson, as the above 
references to Duration and Simultaneity might suggest.
This notion of a fixed rhythm in Time and Free Will is opposed to the 
plurality of levels o f  the past and matter in Matter and Memory each o f
112 Henri Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, with Reference to Einstein’s Theory 
trans. Leon Jacobsen (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) p. 52 (Henceforth D&S)
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these levels having a different rhythm. (Worms, p. 231) These levels of 
the past, when treated rhythmically, are modelled on interference 
patterns, which is why perception is not stroboscopic (what we would 
now think of as digital), as Bachelard thinks. It is not a case of 
rhythmically detaching instants to form a new continuity with all the 
attributes of the old. (Bachelard, p. 77) Instead o f their being a fixed rate 
at which the senses sample, like the 44100 samples per second of a 
compact disc, there is a fixed oscillation whose frequency forms patterns 
of interference with the rhythms of things, continually changing yet 
determining the dominant and non-dominant frequencies (to use non­
technical terms). This means that for any polyrhythmic system there is 
always one or a series of lines which dominate, leaving the others as 
lesser, or non-dominant.113
In Creative Evolution there is a significant shift o f this position as now in 
addition to the multiple rhythms of things which were accessed in Matter 
and Memory, there is an overall duration. So in Creative Evolution each 
rhythm is individual only in as much as it has a tendency to closure and 
exists only in terms o f its participation in the whole of the universe. 
However it is important to note that the duration in which all the other 
rhythms participate does not have a role analogous to an orchestral 
conductor, as it is described by Bachelard. It is not a case of bringing 
several different temporal fluxes together so they can be superimposed, 
become overlaid but independent. (Bachelard, p. 129) Instead the only 
'harmony' is in the tendencies, not the result produced, (Robinet, p. 104,
113 Daphne Oram, An Individual Note (London: Galliard, 1972). pp. 27-49.
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Mourelos, p. 151 & KAP, p. 155) as there is no plan waiting to be 
realised. (Robinet, p. 167) So the system is polyrhythmic, but only in as 
much as those rhythms are derived from a basic rhythm.
There is then another shift of position in Duration and Simultaneity where 
each of the individual times exists as an independent rhythm, but only in 
as much as it is contained in the whole of duration. Thus it is possible for 
consciousness to simultaneously unite several temporal fluxes, gain a 
rhythm for the whole, on the one hand, whilst, on the other, grasping each 
flux individually. Each flux is not reduced to a participation in a whole, 
having no real duration in itself, nor is it a radical plurality, but one which 
can only be perceived in terms of main and subsidiary rhythms, but 
instead as a rhythmic system where the whole is grasped without 
destroying the individual.
Secondly, Bergson leaves several important questions unanswered. Does 
the whole body o f the dancer have to move as a single unit, or may the 
body have a multiple of rhythms, arms and legs, say, moving 
differently?114 The notion that a dancer is just a slave to the rhythm might 
be appropriate in the case of a dance with a singular rhythm, but music is 
often polyrhythmic, (Z&S, p. 26) for example much, if not all, Balinese 
music, and there is a very well established dance tradition in Bali. As de
114 Although Zanner links Bergson to phenomenological accounts of the body, grace 
being a co-ordination o f several body parts. However such a reading o f  grace in this 
instance appears too strong as the exegesis in the main text shows. Zanner, Richard, 
The Problem o f Embodiment: Some Contributions to a Phenomenology o f the Body 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971) p. 166.
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Zoete and Spies point out, Balinese dancers often move in at least two 
temporal dimensions each limb acting as a separate rhythmic instrument, 
(Z&S, p. 119) as does the music.
Additionally, if dance is a model for what might be termed 'rhythmic 
communication,' then there appears to be the possibility that there can be 
multiple coincidences with multiple rhythms in a piece o f music, as 
opposed to one absolute coincidence. It would seem that following more 
than one rhythm as opposed to a single rhythm would involve a different 
kind of attention, perhaps one more akin to a field in which to orient 
oneself, rather than a directional arrow to follow.115
115 Wim Mertens, American Minimal Music, trans. J. Hautekiet (London: Kahn and 
Averill, 1983) p. 100. (Hencforth Mertens) This conception of a field is analogous to 
Tom Johnson's notion o f non-manipulative music. Tom Johnson, 'Shredding the 
Climax Carrot' The Voice o f New Music - New York City 1972-82: A Collection of 
Articles Originally Published in the Village Voice (The Netherlands: Het Apollohuis 
Eindhoven, 1989) pp. 85-9.
This idea o f the musical work as a field can be seen in the work o f  several sound 
sculptors whose works are both played by and form part of an environment e.g. Peter 
Appleton's Rain Microphones (1981) "... an amplified skeletal dome of tensioned 
steel wires - is played by the wind and rain." Roger Sutherland, "Sound Sculptures." 
Audion Issue 22 (July 1992): p.23. Alternatively whole 'sonic-fields' have been 
created where movement within the field actually changes the sound heard, for 
example Rolf Gehlhaar's "STEP BY STEP" Music for Ears in Motion (1981) used a 
16 channel sound system to produce this effect with the speakers positioned in a 
circle around the listeners (Roger Sutherland. "Imaginary Orchestras." Resonance 
Vol. 1 Issue 2 (Summer 1993): p. 25) In a bolder vein it is increasingly popular to 
regard the whole 'soundscape' as a composition, and thus a field in which individuals 
are able to orient themselves. See R. Murray Schafer, The Tuning o f the World (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977). The question which stems from both Gehlhaar's piece
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This notion that dance can be more akin to an orientation within a field 
than to following a particular rhythm is important when the question is 
whether an individual is dancing with or to116 a rhythm. One can easily 
dance between beats, on the off beat or shift between these modes - this 
would be dancing with a rhythm. Bergson, on the other hand, just seems 
to think of dancing to a rhythm, constantly on the beat and being led by 
the music, which seems a very limited conception of dance. Indeed, there 
seem to be various ways of dealing with the whole idea of bodily 
following a piece of music which Bergson simply fails to consider in 
Time and Freewill. However it should be noted that for the Bergson of 
Matter and Memory it would be quite easy to understand the notion of 
dancing to a rhythm in terms o f a motor schema and the subversion of
and Schafer's writings is whether music can be followed in both temporal and spatial 
terms, if a musical field can be understood in terms o f extension, i.e. every move in 
that space changing the whole. If this were the case it would then be possible to have 
a physical relation to music which was not reliant on bodily habits coming to the fore 
through music in the case of Gehlhaar, or in terms o f the whole soundscape as a piece 
of music in the case o f Schafer.
116 Adorno talks withcringly with regard to the dancers involved in popular music, 
especially Jazz, "... who strive to imitate the music" (Theodore W. Adorno. Prisms, 
trans. Samuel & Shierry Weber (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1981) p. 
131) (Henceforth Adorno). Adorno's dislike of the bodily emphasis in popular music 
in general can be contrasted with Sandau who maintains that "Rock's distinct km as 
physical occurs not because other kinds of music are not physical, but because rock is 
so simple and emphatic about it.” (Jerry Sandau. 'Rock 19 Roll Reflections on 
Kierkegaard: Here Comes the Knight', Phil Today. 30. Fall 86. p. 267.)
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this rhythm, dancing with being given by the modification of habit by 
memory to provide a non-automatised response.
Already it can be seen that Bergson's account of dance in Time and Free 
Will is not without its problems. In addition to the above problems, the 
notion that music allows predictability with regard to dance appears to 
present a tension with other accounts of music which Bergson gives. 
Bergson frequently invokes music as a model for time in his writings 
because it is possessed o f a constant flow, which encompasses both 
continuity and change, but also more importantly because of the 
essentially unpredictable nature of the subsequent events in the piece. 
(CM, p. 19) This suggests a tension in Bergson's thinking between 
rhythm on the one hand, which gives predictability as illustrated by the 
dancer, and melody on the other which does not.
This opposition between melody and rhythm is reflected in Bergson's 
claim that [rhythmic] music suspends the normal flow of ideas and 
sensations and instead "... swing[s] to and fro between fixed points ..." 
(TFW, p. 14) This claim comes in the pages immediately following the 
current considerations on dance. The 'swinging between fixed points' 
suggests that rhythm might be based on the difference between various 
"levels", rhythmic movement being constituted between those "levels", 
whether it be volume levels, pitch levels or timbral levels, and the 
individual is moved by the rhythm in some analogous manner. However, 
some of Bergson's other comments seem to suggest a different 
interpretation. The comments in question concern the rhythm of 
architecture which he links to the rhythm found in music.
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Bergson uses the term "architectural" (CM, p. 196) in one o f his later 
works to refer to fixed systems, where elements form distinct building 
blocks.117 It is this notion o f the element as a unit to be repeated which is 
present in his analogy between music and architecture in Time and 
Freewill. The description is of an homogenised space which allows 
repetition, and also reversibility. This is because there are a series of 
elements envisaged like a line which can be moved over in different 
orders as opposed to an organic whole where the past is always part of 
the present. (TFW, pp. 99-100) The same element can be indefinitely 
repeated, like repeating a space and juxtaposed, yet this is only apparent 
(Delhomme, p. 66 & 96) as it is in fact impossible to superimpose 
sections of time, as we shall see in the following.
This is why Bergson turns to the space of architecture, claiming it has 
features which are analogous to rhythm in their symmetry and indefinite 
repetition of an architectural motif. (TFW, p. 15) This suggests that 
rhythm is seen as a fixed repetition of a cell or unit,118 ostinato rhythm to
117 Wishart, in a similar spirit, contrasts the 'architectural' manner o f musical 
composition, arranging pre-existing elements, with the 'chemical' manner of musical 
composition which aims at a continuity of qualitative movement via the evolution and 
change of the initial starting material. (Trevor Wishart, Audible Design - A Plain and 
Easy Introduction to Practical Sound Composition (York: Orpheus the Pantomime, 
1994) pp. 12-13.)
118 The rhythmic symmetry mentioned by Bergson with regard to architecture is in 
the musical case not a property of the rhythmic unit, which is probably the bar. but 
instead o f the arrangement o f those bars. It is necessary to make such a distinction to 
avoid confusion with Messiaen's non-retrogradable rhythms which are horizontally
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give it its correct title. This repetition removes the incessant change of 
life: a single item fills the whole mind. (TFW, p. 16) The apparently 
unchanging unit filling the mind fails to produce the changes "... which in 
ordinary life bring us back without ceasing to the consciousness of our 
personality..." (TFW, p. 16) As McClary has commented, "we are 
continually made aware of the present moment... the completion of each 
cycle yields a sense of satisfaction and security, and we experience the 
possibility that the pattern might be replicated indefinitely, infinitely. It 
sets up no expectation for change." (McClary, p. 119) Rhythm thus 
becomes a 'movement' which has attained stasis as it goes nowhere. The 
pre-existing future is alongside the present in space which are mutually 
external and "... devoid of succession." (Capek, p. 305) The mind is 
moved between the start and end point o f a repeated unit. It opens up on 
to nothing new but only to what has gone before. Thus architecture truly 
is frozen music for Bergson.119 It is as if time were irrelevant to the 
system. Indeed Adorno describes the rhythms of Stravinsky in just such 
terms as bringing about "... the end of musical Bergsonianism" (Adorno, 
p. 193)
To an extent there seems to be an obvious discrepancy between 
Bergson's claims about rhythm in the early part of Time and Free Will (as
symmetrical. Otto Karolyi, Introducing Modem Music (London: Penguin, 1995) p. 
106. (Henceforth Karolyi)
119 Souriau makes a similar connection between architecture and cyclical rhythms. 
(Etienne Souriau, "Time in the Plastic Arts," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
7 (June, 1949): p. 303) (Henceforth Souriau)
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detailed above) and comments made later in the same work where he 
talks about the difference between counting a series of bell strikes versus 
the hearing o f an air or rhythm "... the qualitative impression produced 
by the whole series." (TFW, p. 86) Here the mobile part, as opposed to 
the still element, is again at the forefront of Bergson's mind. To grasp a 
rhythm is to grasp a part, not an element, to use his later terminology. 
Bergson thus contends that it is only the splitting up o f the bell ringing 
into separate notes (elements) which allows the ringing to be seen as 
repetition. Such separation requires a homogeneous medium so the 
sounds can be "... stripped of their qualities." (TFW, p. 87) Analysis into 
elements treats the rhythm as a quantitative countable multiplicity 
consisting o f a series of elements stripped of individual difference and 
placed in an homogeneous space, (Capek, p. 176 & Robinet, p. 19) a 
repetition of the same, (Mullarkey, p. 18) as opposed to a qualitative 
multiplicity with interpenetrating parts. The whole series would remain a 
pure quality if it were grasped whole and not analysed into a series of 
countable elements, the latter leaving each element the same and equal. 
(TFW, p. 46) This gathering (which would in Matter and Memory 
develop into the conception of contraction) retains each o f the successive 
sensations in order to combine them to form a group. (TFW, p. 86) To 
hear notes making up a rhythm as separate requires an abstraction, as 
opposed to hearing the rhythm whole, where the parts, like those of a 
living organism, interpenetrate.120 (TFW, p. 100) If the rhythm is grasped
120 It is interesting to note that Boulez takes exactly the opposite point of view, in 
that he sees the striated time of notes as basic, and necessary for the production of 
secondary smooth time. This is important for Boulez's attack on graphic notation in 
scores, which often use lines of movement rather than individual notes. Boulez sees
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as a qualitative multiplicity any change in the 'parts' will change the 
whole. So if one note is lengthened the whole rhythm will 
correspondingly change (TFW, p. 101) as the parts are inseparable from 
the whole. When counted, each bell ring is stripped of its individuality 
and rendered identical. Differences in quality are missed as these are 
inexpressible in terms o f differences of quantity.121 (TFW, p. 72) When 
the rhythm is grasped whole the past is part of the present, surviving and 
making the present richer. This is because time is a heterogeneous 
continuity (both indivisible and differentiated (Capek, p. 159)) which, 
because it is creative, relies on there being a difference between the past 
and the present, whilst they remain indivisible, although Capek notes that 
this was "... not clearly evident ... before the publication of Creative 
Evolution and An Introduction to Metaphysics." (Capek 2, p. 300) This 
survival of the past is important as it is this which prevents repetition, and 
ensures that the most which can be said about any experienced state is 
that it is superficially similar to a previous state. This is because the 
superficially similar state can always be understood in terms of the 
previous state, but also because the individual experiencing, superficially.
the lack of specificity in graphic scores as a denial of the historical evolution of music 
towards greater and greater precision o f notation. Pierre Boulez, "Time. Notation 
and Coding," Orientations - Collected Writings, cd. Jean-Jacques Nattiez and trans. 
Martin Cooper (London: Faber and Faber, 1986) pp. 84-9.
121 Kant interestingly argues the opposite line to Bergson. Kant claims that music is 
perceived as music because it is taken to be qualitative, whilst in actual fact it is the 
basis in mathematics, that is the quantitative, which allows it to have the effects it 
does. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (First 
Published in German 1790; Indianapolis: llackctt, 1987) p. 199 (Ak. 329).
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the same state is different from the individual who experienced the first 
state because their personality is in a constant process of change as they 
accumulate new experience. (Capek, p. 164) What this means is that 
memory prevents us going through the same state twice, each moment is 
novel as the whole o f the past is stored in our memory. (Capek, pp. 164- 
6) Events which differ temporally thus, of necessity, differ qualitatively. 
(Capek, p. 166) Memory is thus essential for the understanding of 
becoming, as opposed to a series of successive disconected instants - 
(ADM, p. 469) that is a homogenised space. Memory is thus essential for 
duration, (Delhomme, p. 154) even in matter. (Capek, p. 303)
As memory constantly adds the past to the present a rhythm can be 
grasped which will not form a single repeated item filling the mind as in 
architecture. The rhythm will no longer be understood as a repeated 
element, but instead as a continuously changing mobile part. The 
difference between these two accounts of rhythm is the same as that 
between a mathematical and a melodic continuity, with the mathematical 
continuity being made from a repeated discontinuity, is reliant for its 
division on a homogeneous time which is equivalent to space. (Capek 2, 
pp. 300-1) The numerical breaks movement down, (Delhomme, p. 110) 
whereas the melodic continuity grasps the growing qualitative multiplicity 
as a whole movement, no elements being isolable as singular notes.
To grasp a whole, what Bergson refers to in Matter and Memory as 
'contracting' the present requires memory in order that the past notes can 
be brought into the present to produce the grasped whole. To grasp the 
whole movement also requires individuals to stop thinking in terms of any
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external cause for a rhythm, for example the playing musicians or bell 
ringers. (TFW, p. 47) With this notion of grasping a qualitative 
multiplicity Bergson is attempting to move away from spatial images of 
juxtaposed distinct notes and get to pure change. Duration is something 
other than a multiplicity o f external states. (Capek, p. 127) Indeed Capek 
sees the move away from spatial images and indeed tactile ones as 
essential when it comes to music as this is a confusion o f two 
heterogeneous strata. (Capek, pp. 86-7) One should be interpreting music 
in auditory terms.
So, to summarise, Bergson proposes two models for understanding 
rhythm. The first is related to dance and is based on the ability to 
anticipate the rhythm's future course as it is habitually repetitive. The 
future appears to be contained in the present. The second is a rhythm 
grasped whole which is not anticipated. In the second case each future 
beat, even if it was superficially the same as the last, would qualitatively 
change the whole o f the rhythm which had already been heard. Yet as a 
mechanical repetition o f the 'same' such a rhythm could hardly be said to 
be creative. This lack o f creativity is important as it appears to be a move 
towards a form of homogeneity and an attempt to spatialise time, an 
architectural repetition o f the 'same'.
There is, however, another criterion which must be met. A changing 
rhythm, if it is to be followed, as when reading poetry, understanding a 
speech, or in a piece o f music, must be changing slowly. This is important 
if qualitative change is to be grasped and followed, as opposed to being 
registered merely as a series o f atomised states. Each qualitative change
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in rhythm must in some way be prefigured by the previous rhythm: 
though this in no way means that it must be predictable from it. Indeed 
the distinction between the graceful curve, where each event is 
immediately referring only to that previous to it, as opposed to taking in 
the whole of its past is of vital importance, as will become increasingly 
evident. This is why Chattelun's interesting comparison between 
Classical and Romantic music is flawed.122 He claims that whereas the 
rhythms of Classical music are necessarily founded and created within 
the bar [mesure] structure, the capricious rhythms [rythmes capricieux] of 
Romantic music are instead merely imprisoned by the bar. The example 
of romantic music Chattelun uses is the main theme of Beethoven's Ode 
an die Freude. yet the rhythm, in this section of the Ninth Symphony in 
particular, is for the most part steady and unchanging. Yet even if 
Chattelun's distinction is right, the very fact the rhythms in Romantic 
music are capricious would militate against them being creative and 
prefiguring the rhythms to come. Wagner, another Romantic composer 
might provide an alternative model when he attempts to break down the 
dominance o f the bar line by concentrating on the accenting and 
intensification o f spoken rhythms, rather than meter.123 * However
122 Maurice Chatterlun, "De L'Experience Musicale a L'Essentialisme Bergsonien,” 
Actes du Xe Congres des Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française (Paris: 
Librairie Armand Colin, 1959) p. 64.
123 Richard Wagner, "Rhythm Determined not by Artificial Metrics but by the 
Natural Liftings and Lowerings o f the Speaking Accent," Wagner Qn Music and 
Drama - A Compendium o f Richard Wagner's Prose Works, ed. Albert Goldman &
Evert Sprinchom / trans. H. Ashton Ellis (New York: Da Capo, 1964) pp. 199-203.
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Wagner's rhythms, in this instance, will again not be creative, each 
rhythm heralding the next, as the rhythms are instead tied to a textual 
argument or the rhythms of a simple cyclical rhyme scheme, if anything, 
and it would be this which was followed rather than the any continuous 
creative rhythmic change.
So if Romantic and Classical models of music cannot provide a model for 
understanding rhythms in terms of creative change, then perhaps a 
Twentieth Century piece of music can act as a suitable model. To this 
end several Twentieth Century pieces and techniques will be examined, 
the first being phase shifting as used in the works o f  Steve Reich.
Reich's Piano Phase (1967), for example, makes the process124 which 
structures the music audible. The piece consists o f  two pianos initially 
playing the same repeated material in unison, but then one of the piano 
players gradually moves forward out of phase with the other player who 
is keeping constant time. The second pianist, as he is playing at a slightly 
faster tempo with respect to the first thus moves through a series of out of 
phase positions until the two pianists reach unison again.125 In this piece 
the listener is able to follow the rhythm not merely because it is
124 Process in Reich's music, as Ligeti points out is o f  a different order to the 
thematic development found particularly in the 19th Century, especially Beethoven. 
Simon Trask, "The Pioneer," Music Technology Vol. 4 / Issue 6 (May 1990) 
(Henceforth Trask)
125 Roger Sutherland, "Steve Reich," Electric Shock Treatment Issue 3 (Summer 
1992) p. 12 (Henceforth Sutherland)
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repetitious in terms o f  the material, but instead because the process which 
structures the piece and gives creative change is itself being repeated.
However there are three problems for Bergson with this example. Firstly 
as the process is treating the material as a fixed element to be repeated, 
the process is itself rigid and mechanical, and cannot produce true 
creative change. That is it relies on a homogenisation and separation of 
an initial element and forms an indefinite architectural repetition of that 
element. Secondly, as each unit fails to open onto the next in its repetition 
it is closed. Thirdly, the anonymity of the actual process126 is also, for 
Bergson, a problem, as will shortly be shown with regard to the 
distinction between photography and painting. Reich's phase shifting 
works can thus not be a model for a continuously changing rhythm where 
each rhythm prefigures the next.
Two alternative approaches to creative rhythmic change would be music 
which relied on acceleration and deceleration of rhythmic pulse to 
gradually change rhythms on the one hand, or alternatively, looking at 
musical rhythm in terms of large scale timbral change. Can either of these
126 To a certain extent the anonymity o f process in Reich is different to that in 
someone like Roland Kayn. Whereas Kayn is quite happy to set an electronic system 
up and leave it to produce the music without interference, Reich moved away from 
the use o f electronic devices "... largely because of their mechanical sounding rhythms 
and pitches and the lack o f  bodily involvement in making music with them." (Reich, 
quoted by Sutherland, p. 13) For him there was a need in his music for the tiny 
nuances and variations which human performers give. The difference between Reich 
and Kayn would not, however, affect the argument presented and the anonymous 
nature o f the process which produced the original score.
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produce the Bergsonian model of creative rhythmic change which is 
required?
The first alternative, changing the speed of a composition, has been a 
frequent manner of adding expressiveness to performances in the 
Western art music tradition. Indeed the change in speed of a performance 
could be argued to result in a qualitative rather than a quantitative change 
in the rhythm of a piece. Performance variations might seemingly remove 
the regularity of rhythm as an absolute notatable value, (Bachelard, p. 
126) but this does not entail 1. creative rhythmic change with, the past 
interpenetrating the present, or 2. that these performance variations are 
essential to the music: the rhythm of a work is perfectly preserved when 
it is performed on a player piano. The second point becomes all the more 
important when regarding the work of Conlon Nancarrow's work, for 
example using two cannoning lines, one of which speeds up from an 
initially slow tempo, the other slowing down from a faster tempo. It is the 
very lack of performer variation which makes this piece possible. 
Performer variation, however, is not a particularly astounding way to 
change a rhythm continuously, nor one which changes any of the actual 
relations between elements within a rhythmic unit. It is a question of 
nuance - nothing new is really added.127 *The rhythm remains essentially 
the same. So this music cannot provide a model for a creative change. 
But even if a whole piece consisted of the gradual slowing down o f a
127 An exception to this would be the constant interplay between more than one
rhtythmic line, say in Reich, but even here, as we have noted, rhythm is created from 
an unchanging basic principle.
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rhythm,128 each moment would merely refer to the one previous, not the 
whole evolution of the piece, very little o f the past would need to be part 
of the present.
There is another more radical notion of acceleration which might provide 
an alternative model for creative change. Stockhausen pointed out that if 
a rhythm is recorded on tape and played back at a high enough speed it 
will coalesce into a single sound, a particular timbre. Here the speed of a 
rhythm causes qualitative change in the sound.129 *However, it is not a 
qualitative change in rhythm, but instead a change from  rhythm to timbre, 
in Matter and Memory's terms a change in extension. However as in the 
previous examples it is only the rhythm previous to the current which is 
required, the whole past could be totally absent, so this too would not 
provide a model for a creative rhythmic change. It must be emphasised at 
this point that this account is not trying to produce the conditions for 
something to be a creative rhythm, just to find an example of a creative 
rhythm.
128 It is important to note that we have not refered to Reich's piece Four Organs 
(1970) where a single chord is repeatedly played being held for a slightly longer 
duration on each occassion. This is because marraccas are used to form a steady 
pulse over which this change occurs, so the musicians can keep a steady time. So 
although the duration o f the chord is increased, the music does not in one sense 
rhythmically slow down.
129 Karl Heinz Stockhausen. Stockhausen on Music, ed. Robin Maconie (London:
Marion Boyars, 1989). p. 47. (Henceforth Stockhausen)
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Although the change from rhythm to timbre might not be compatible with 
creative rhythmic change it is still possible that larger scale changes in 
timbre itself might allow rhythm to be thought of in a different sense. 
Such an attempt to define rhythm on a larger scale in terms of timbre can 
be seen in Stockhausen's highly colouristic analysis of Debussy130:
I was thinking about trends in registers of certain textures, 
about increasing and decreasing trends in density and in the 
character of density overall, o f gradual shifts in 
predominating colours, from dark to bright, or from metallic 
to muted colours, and so on ... I spoke of textures being 
perforated - I used the word textures as opposed to 
structures - and of rising or drifting shapes, sawtooth shapes 
of masses. (Stockhausen, p. 44)
Here rhythm as timbre gives continuous variation.131 Indeed Isao 
Tomita's Snow Flakes are Dancing emphasises exactly these qualities in 
Debussy's piano music, chords, scales, dynamics and harmonic pitch 
moving towards a notion of pitch as the property of a spectrum, a 'tone
130 Bergson notes that Debussy's music, "... employs the continuous melody which 
accompanies and expresses the unique movement and unbroken dramatic emotion" 
(M, p. 844) o f Maeterlinck's work (Péleas and Mélisande presumably). Here it is the 
melodic rather than timbrai progression which is o f  primary concern, and we shall 
have more to say about Bergson's relation to melody in the subsequent. Bergson also 
notes that he has an "... instinctive predilection for the work of Debussy." (M, p. 844)
131 In this respect Gyorgy Ligeti's Atmospheres (1961) (prominently used in Stanley 
Kubrick's film 2001: A Space Odysseyt with its slowly shifting timbres produced by 
multiple instrumental parts, up to 56, might be another model for rhythm, however, 
as Ligeti notes, the rhythm in this piece has in fact been "neutralised". (Trask, p. 56.) 
The sense o f timelessness which this results in is also present in the similarly 
constructed works of Aldo Clementi whose 'idées fixes' was the death of time.
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colour melody', o f sorts. Indeed Jankelevitch comments on Debussy's 
feeling for timbre. (Jankelevitch2, p. viii) This piece clearly demonstrates 
how Debussy can be understood as a continuous process of 'colouristic' 
change where each timbre relates not only to the prior but to all those 
which have gone before.132 This would then be one model for creative 
rhythmic change. It is also interesting to note how viewing chords in 
colouristic terms means that any change o f pitches or individual note 
dynamics within a chord will lead to a qualitative change in the whole 
colour, i.e. the whole chord can be viewed as a qualitative multiplicity.
Are there any other models, apart from the large scale rhythmic change 
just discussed, which might also illustrate Bergson's notion of creative 
rhythmic change?
An alternative model might be the modulation of time signature referred 
to as metric modulation and first used by Elliott Carter in his Cello 
Sonata (1948). An example of metric modulation would be the change 
from a time signature of four-four to six-four made by changing two 
crochets to a triplet, followed by exactly the same change for the 
remaining two crochets, the time signature then being easily changed to 
six-four by replacing the triplets with six crotchets. (K&rolyi, p. 104)
132 Tomita's early work can be contrasted with that o f Walter Carlos (laterly Wendy) 
who, although using very similar equipmental resources, in particular the Moog 
modular, concentrated, in his early work, at least, on Bach. Instead of concentrating 
on timbral movement and colouristic effects, Carlos produced work which, more 
often than not, made the Moog sound not unlike a conventional keyboard instrument 
with a somewhat unusual timbre.
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Here each o f the qualitative rhythmic changes prefigures the next to 
produce genuine newness. Carter himself claims:
... every individual momentary tableau is something ... that 
has interestingly evolved, yet is also only a stage of a 
process that is going on to another point; and, while every 
moment is a fascinating and beautiful thing in itself, still 
what's much more fascinating is the continuity, the way each 
moment is being led up to and led away from.133
So each change in Carter is prefigured by the previous which in turn is 
prefigured by a previous one, each change referring back to the whole 
process of continuous evolution. It would be quite possible to use the 
technique o f metric modulation without creativity, but in the Bergson 
influenced Carter this technique is used to create a truly creative rhythm. 
The past is continually part of the present in Carter, each rhythmic 
change taking in the whole of the past in its development.
There are, then, at least two possible models for creative changes in 
rhythm. Firstly, the account of rhythm in terms o f large scale timbral 
change and, secondly, Carter's metric modulation as described above. In 
Bergson's terms the models of movement presented are vertical as the 
whole of the past can be found at each moment - virtually, if not actually, 
as there is no way of knowing how any part of the melody's past will act 
to impregnate the future at any particular point.
133 Allen Edwards, Flawed Words and Stubborn Sounds: A Conversation with Elliott 
Carter (New York: Norton, 1971 ) p. 92.
'But the difficulties encountered in finding a suitable model for creative 
change in rhythm suggests that (i) Bergson's account of creative rhythmic 
change applies at best to a very limited set o f examples and (ii) that 
Bergson's account of creative change is primarily based on melody, 
where continuous variation is somewhat easier to understand, as shall be 
argued shortly. The second conclusion is not at all surprising given that 
both Debussy's 'tone colour melody' and Carter's metric modulation are 
attempts to produce a rhythm which takes melody as its model for 
change. Indeed in the case of Schoenberg's Klangfarbenmelodie, it was 
the desire to make a melody out of tone colour in the same way one 
would make a melody out of pitch relationships which was at stake.134
In addition to the limited set of examples of creative rhythmic change 
outlined above the rhythms in poetry might be seen to be problematic for 
Bergson. As poetic rhythms tend to be repetitive, ostinato almost they 
will be unable to give creative qualitative change. Indeed Bergson does 
link poetic and ostinato rhythm together, claiming that poetic rhythms lull 
the soul into "... self-forgetfulness ..." (TFW, p. 15) This suggests the 
architectural repetition o f the distinct unit which fills the mind with one 
idea. It is also interesting to note that the power of poetry in Laughter. 
like that in Time and Free Will, is linked to hypnotism, and again it is the 
ability of the poet to place the listener / reader in a state where they are 
suggestible to an idea which can form an image, by rocking the 
imagination "... to and fro between like and like with a regular see-saw 
motion ..." (Laughter, p. 61). This technique is used to make the
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134 Michael Hall, i: Faber and Faber, 1996) p. 99.
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indefinite by stages into a vision which can be accepted by the reader / 
listener. (Laughter, p. 61) It is a question of getting the reader / listener to 
the right level, the right rhythm to allow the poet's communication. So in 
this way it is not the instantiation of a creative rhythm which is important 
in poetry.
Whilst poetry generally might not be possessed of metric modulation or 
an analogous equivalent, it would still appear quite possible for most 
poems to be interpreted in terms analogous to those of large scale timbral 
change. Although timbral change appears to be the easiest way to think 
about large scale change, Benjamin Boretz provides an alternative when 
he maintains that "... the rhythmic structure o f  a piece is ... simply all o f 
its musical structure ... The theory of rhythm, then, is nothing more or 
less than the theory o f musical structure in its most comprehensive form 
... ".,35 Given Boretz's position, it would still be possible to view large 
scale changes in rhythm in terms of creative qualitative change. So many 
poems could be viewed in terms of large scale rhythmic change, the 
obvious exceptions being extremely short poems, especially Haiku. If this 
were the case, however, non-creative rhythmic change on the small scale 
could be taken as a model for creative qualitative change on the large 
scale. This is not because there is an 'artificial' analysis of creative 
qualitative change which fails to grasp the whole part, and instead gains 
the element - as would be the case in analysing a melody into individual 
notes. Instead the analogy would be with cinema, where a 'lower' level 135
135 Benjamin Boretz, "In Quest o f the Rhythmic Genius," Perspectives o f New Music 
9, no. 2, and 10, no. 1 (1971): p. 154.
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non-creative rhythmic change fails to give a higher level creative 
qualitative change and real movement.
In contrast to rhythm, melody acts, as already mentioned, as a model for 
non-homogenised change in that the melody is never in any of its tones 
but merely passes through them, i.e. a melody cannot be reduced to the 
set of individual tones which it uses. (Capek, p. 145 & Delhomme, p. 
147) A melody can never be treated as an aggregate, of individual tones 
as these tones are inseparable from one another and also from the 
silences in the piece. (Capek, p. 327) In this sense there is always a 
contraction of the past into the present in the case of melody. (MM, p. 
242) This example demonstrates clearly why transition cannot, as 
Lovejoy thinks, be reduced to discrete states. (Capek, p. 121) Melody is 
constantly coming into existence, this is its specific way of enduring 
(Making, p. 184) it is the purest impression of succession (Mullarkey 
notes the following references to support this position - CM, p. 149, p. 
19, TFW, pp. 100-1 & p. I l l )  yet as Mullarkey points out Lacey is 
wrong when he thinks that the existence o f things which change in a 
manner unlike that of melody provides a counter-example to Bergson's 
conception of change. (Mullarkey, p. 140) The fact is that melody is a 
paradigm of change which does not need to be tied to a measurable space 
and cannot be assimilated to quantitative relations, certainly in Time and 
Free Will according to Losev, (RM, p. 135) melody provided a pure 
movement in pure time. (Briusov quoted in RM, p. 125n)
But if melody was purely temporal then the question of how it existed in 
space would be immediately raised, but as, all sensations of necessity
208
participate in extension in Matter and Memory the problem does not 
occur. (Capek, p. 323) Indeed melody, when polyphonic, is an example 
of the simultaneous existence of sounds in spatial configurations, whose 
only difference from the usual spatial relations entered into is in the 
degree of their stability. (Capek, p. 323) Indeed Capek thinks spatio- 
temporal relations are easier to think about in terms of musical polyphony 
than the usual models employed. (Capek, p. 326) Sounds are clearly 
spatialised being beside or alongside one another. (Capek, p. 325) Each 
polyphonic line, by the time of Duration and Simultaneity is becoming in 
the whole o f becoming, a simultaneity of fluxes (Capek, p. 326) each at a 
different tension. There can be the transversal overlap o f lines without 
loss of individuality. (Capek, p. 324) So whilst there is an analogy to be 
made with space, the polyphonic lines being alongside each other and in 
parallel movement, they are without "... complete mutual externality..." of 
static spatial elements and so not homogenised: (Capek, p. 325) a 
position quite different from clean cut atomised images placed side by 
side. There are several points which must be stressed at this juncture.
Firstly although one could argue, as Bachelard does that melody is never 
monodic but always tied to harmony, (Bachelard, p. 130) for Bergson 
harmony is ultimately in the tendencies rather than the product, as already 
mentioned, whilst rhythms and levels can synchronise, even if they are at 
different speeds.
Secondly as pieces of music are often constructed with a theme and 
variations, it might seem that their principle for construction was a 
recurrence o f  the same, i.e. the theme, in various 'disguises', this in turn
(
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giving continuity to the work. The model of theme and variations also 
means that any of the various recurrences of the 'group' o f notes can be an 
origin, an original theme, there is no need for what is taken to be the 
principle theme to be initially stated then developed. This argumentation 
is used by Bachelard to suggest that it is the ability to start again which is 
important, not continuity - any point can be a beginning. It also, 
according to Bachelard, suggests that the origin is itself a construction.136 
(Bachelard, p. 123)
This position is interesting as it ties into Bergson's description of the three 
processes of comedy, which are described in very musical terms, where it 
is a case of disguising the initial material to give variations. The problem 
might be solved if treating a piece of music as a theme and variations was 
seen essentially as a spatialised understanding, yet to follow a piece fully 
this kind o f understanding would seemingly need to be present. 
Bachelard, interestingly, quotes Landry in this regard. Landry thinks that 
as time cannot reverse, the reversal of a theme is the result o f a 
spatialisation which is "artificial, and only perceptible on paper". 
(Bachelard, p. 126) What this suggests is that certain processes are not 
spatialising as they are not reliant on notation, whereas others are reliant 
on notation, and almost cannot be understood without notation.137 We
136 It is interesting to note that Webern's Variations for Piano Solo. Op. 27 (1936) is 
regarded by Petrassi as pure variation with no theme or original basis, for variation, 
on this reading the piece would be absolutely non-heirarchical. (Sleeve notes to 
Maurizio Pollini (Piano) - Anton Von Webern - Variations for Piano. Op. 27 / Pierre 
Boulez, Second Sonata for Piano - Deutsche Grammophon 1978 (Stereo 2530 803))
137 Whether a reversal o f a theme or even structuring a piece as a palindrome is
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have already seen how Bergson has criticised the understanding of 
melody in spatial terms which sees it as a series of elements without 
continuity, i.e. not as a melody: indeed the ability of time to appear 
reversible is a hallmark of such spatialisation and mechanism. Whereas 
Bachelard could argue that it is only the audibility of structures which is 
important in terms of their status as spatialised copies, it is uncertain 
whether Bergson can. Indeed if the complex structures, in at least some 
cases, only make sense when a theme eventually emerges, (a theme 
which was already in some sense present), the continuity between the 
theme and the development of the piece would only be recognised 
retrospectively. (Bachelard, p. 123) A particular case of this would be the 
second movement of Schnittke's Concerto Grosso No. 4 / Symphony No. 
5. (1988) where it is only in the final bars that we arrive at the few 
unfinished bars from the second movement of Mahler's unfinished piano 
quartet from 1786 from which the rest o f the movement has developed. 
This is even more the case for a refrain which is not recognised as such 
until it has been repeated. (Bachelard, p. 124) Indeed as Stephen points 
out in the case of a tune, when notes are heard for a second time "... the
essentially perceived as artificial is debatable, it certainly does not appear so in say the 
first movement of Giacinto Scelsi's Chukrum (1963). Perhaps a more clear cut 
example o f something "artificial and only perceptible on paper" would be Mauricio 
Kagel's use o f notes on a score to form two dimensional figures which are then 
rotated about various axes, mirrored, increased in size, stretched etc. (Karolyi, pp. 
115-8) Here there seems to be a clearcut divide between the sound and the result 
where the musical material is quite literally spatialised to produce the variations, 
however the results, in say Transcion I (1958-60) and Transcion II (1959) do not 
seem contrived or merely academic, which one would think they would and indeed 
should.
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actual effect produced is different and that, indeed, is the whole point of a 
refrain."138
Throughout this discussion Bachelard has been implicitly relying on 
memory, and the past coming in to the present, the returning refrain 
which is not fully separable from the current refrain, for example. Indeed 
it is Bachelard's bizarre insistence that the future is inseparable only from 
its immediate past, for Bergson, which makes him fail to see how 
Bergsonian his account, in one sense is. It is only because the past can 
come into the present that there can be novelty, and also that there can be 
'repetition'.
There is a non-spatial way to understand a theme and variations which is 
not reliant on the notion of a disguised repetition. This would rely on the 
notion of a virtual repetition. For each theme there are an infinity o f other 
themes which virtually exist on higher and lower planes behind the 
current theme, and which can only be realised by moving to those planes. 
Every move to a new plane, as was the case with memory earlier in this 
work, changes the whole, it is an internal change in bringing out certain 
tendencies which existed in the initial thematic material but which were 
not actualised at any particular moment in the melody's progression. 
There could then, on this reading, be a distinction made between a 
spatialised purely technical processing o f thematic material which was 
without creative and artistic merit, and a vertical creative movement of
138 Karin Stephen, The Misuse o f Mind (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd., 
1922) p. 64
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the material, whose results would be creative. What this then means is 
that any theme can be an initial starting point for a series of variations, as 
each of these themes carries with it, virtually, all of the other themes and 
variations which may or may not be actualised in its vertical creative 
movement. It is not a question of multiple origins, but instead what is 
actual and what virtual in any particular expression of an original creative 
emotion, which was discussed in the above.
In much of the previous debate the thesis has been concentrating on how 
music can act as an example of a heterogeneous continuity by looking at 
the various structures present, but there is another account of 
heterogeneous continuity given by Bergson which suggests that it is not 
so much the structure of the music which is important in defining 
heterogeneous continuity, but something more fundamental.
In Duration and Simultaneity Bergson claims that a melody comes close 
to a heterogeneous continuity, but that "... it still has too many qualities, 
too much definition, and we must first efface the difference among the 
sounds, then do away with the distinctive features o f sound itself, 
retaining of it only the continuation o f what precedes into what follows 
and the uninterrupted transition, multiplicity without divisibility and 
succession without separation, in order finally to rediscover basic time. 
Such is immediately perceived duration, without which we would have 
no idea of time." (D&S, pp. 44-5) This passage might be taken to mean 
that there is an absence of qualitative difference in pure duration which 
results in a homogeneous continuity, as Lovejoy and Ushenko do, 
according to Capek, however this would be a mistake. Bergson in this
passage, as elsewhere, emphasises the notion of a multiplicity without 
division, i.e. terms which interpenetrate, yet are still different. (Capek, p. 
120) If, as has already been pointed out individuals focus on the 
individual tones, there will merely be a multiplicity o f external elements.
Given the above Capek, influenced by Ingarden claims that there is a 
difference between becoming as non-contingent and a contingent 
manifestation o f becoming. There is a universal character of becoming, 
(Capek, p. 171) which is exemplified in melody but which is at the same 
time is inseparable from it. Yet it would seem that by trying to efface the 
differences in the melody Bergson is moving towards a homogeneous 
undifferentiated continuum. However Capek cleverly side-steps this 
problem by pointing to the way even a single thing can be one yet 
multiple. (Capek, p. 127) The same tone or chord held for a prolonged 
time, say electronically generated, does not continue to be the same even 
if apparently unchanging.139 Our memory contracts the past into the 
present, the new 'phase' is different from the old precisely because it has 
the past in addition to the present. This means the present is inevitably 
new. It is important to note that the 'abstracting' involved in the example 
of melody is not a tracing of lines o f facts, an extrapolation, but instead 
perceptible to the individual who is prepared to remove themselves from 
the habits o f perception.
139 A musical example o f this phenomenon would be Francois Bayle's L'Épreuve par 
kfron, part four o f L'Expérience Acoustique.
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Returning to the question of theme and variations, and given the above, it 
could be argued that it is the tendency present in becoming which is 
important and not the individual theme and variations which are a product 
of this movement which is not separable from it. It is the constant clash 
of two movements in opposite directions, one towards a quasi-repetition 
of the past, a circling, and the other towards pure creativity. These two 
tendencies corresponding to the two movements to be found in the élan 
vital, (Mullarkey, p. 66) the 'élan créateur' (ADM, p. 485) as opposed to 
the repetition and identity, characteristic of matter, a circling, but not an 
immobile repose. (Jankélèvitch, p. 221) So whilst this 'geometric matter' 
appears as an obstacle or inertia against life's forward progression, 
(Delhomme, p. 56, p. 71 & p. 180) it is instead just a question o f two 
movements in opposite directions. (Delhomme, p. 72) The circling 
'geometric' tendency is not a nothing, merely a negation of gesture and 
invention, (Delhomme, p. 56 & Jankélèvitch, p. 221) a counter current. 
(Delhomme, p. 5) Indeed "[i]n certain animal species ... or vegetable 
(fungus) life is ... hypnotised or paralysed by matter ... the élan succumbs 
to an invading torpor", (Jankélèvitch, p. 169) yet even here it is not a 
simple immobilisation but a formation o f active territories, but ones 
which are circling rather than progressing. (Jankélèvitch, p. 175) In 
musical terms the recurrence o f a theme. However, this immobilisation is 
a risk which is always present,140 (Delhomme, p. 5 & p. 179) but also 
necessary as without this material tendency life would be unable to 
create. (Delhomme, p. 5 & Jankélèvitch, p. 270 & p. 170)
140 Bruno Paradis, "Iniictermination ct Mouvements dc bifurcation chez Bergson". 
Philosophic. No. 32 (1991), p. 30 (Henceforth Paradis)
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It is this material opposition which allows the dissociation o f life (which 
Mullarkey thinks contains both matter and life at a virtual level) 
(Mullarkey, p. 82) and its progression by the accumulation of potential 
energy in its circlings. (Jankélèvitch, p. 171) These tendencies are in 
conflict, each species being a negation, and each form an invention - yet 
both are necessary for expression, the internalisation o f this conflict. 
(Delhomme, p. 180)
If we take this analogy further we find that the propulsive force (i.e. life 
(Delhomme, pp. 176-7)) which unfolds does so unpredictably and 
creatively141 without the teleology (Mullarkey, p. 63) found in 
Schopenhauer, for example. (Jankélèvitch, p. 223) There is no pre­
existing plan (KAP, p. 155 & Robinet, p. 123) as evolution is durational 
in that its elements do not pre-exist their realisation. Instead evolution is 
defined by its own expression which moves from the virtual to the real, 
which is life itself. (Delhomme, p. 176) Indeed Mullarkey sees the élan 
vital as a type of organisation (Mullarkey, p. 63) acting by division o f the 
virtual into the real, (Delhomme, p. 64) the very action of time itself. The 
actualisations of the virtual do not resemble the virtual (KAP, p. 150) as 
this would presuppose they already existed waiting to be realised, but are 
instead genuinely creative, though partial, expressions o f the virtual. 
(Gunter, pp. 12-3)) This genuine creativity, as we have already noted, is
141 Cohen, Richard A,. "Philo, Spinoza, Bergson," The New Bergson, ed. John 
Mullarkey (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999) pp. 26-7.
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always reliant on "... all the past o f the organism ... its heredity - in fact, 
the whole of a very long history." (CE, p. 20 & Capek 2, p. 300fn.)
Without this tendency towards creation, the actualisation of the virtual, 
the structure of music would be like that perceived by Adorno in Jazz; a 
series of processes which can be arranged in any order and which would 
fail to form a coherent whole:
... no piece of jazz can, in a musical sense, be said to have a 
history, just as all its components can be moved about at 
will, just as no single measure follows from the logic o f the 
musical progression ... (Adorno, pp. 124-5)
History requires a thread, the memory of the past coming into the future 
as opposed to being a spatialised series of atomised states. Yet it is this 
lack of the past, a living in the moment which characterises Stravinsky, 
according to Adorno. In taking its inspiration from painting music has 
taken on spatialisation, and lost its essential feature, becoming.142 There 
is a stasis achieved by rhythmic repetition, there are '"static blocks' of 
sound juxtaposed without motivic-thematic development."(Witkin, p. 
172) So Stravinsky, like Jazz, according to Adorno, works by 
juxtaposing and arranging a collection of spatial elements without any 
creative tendency organising them through time. There is a tension 
between the creative and the material, the two sources of artistic 
production.
142 Theodore W. Adorno, Philosophy o f Modem Music, trans. Anne G. Mitchell & 
Wesley V. Blomster (London: Sheed and Ward Limited, 1987) pp. 191-3. "... an 
undermining o f temporality, he abhorred. "Robert W. Witkin, Adomo on Music 
(London: Routledge, 1998)p. 197. (Henceforth Witkin)
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Painting, Perception and Truth
The starting point for the last section was the role of 'suggestion' with 
regard to dance and aesthetic appreciation. Suggestion was seen to 
involve an almost hypnotic process which transported the viewer / 
listener / reader to the correct level to experience what the poet was 
communicating. This response was not to the large scale rhythmic 
organisation of the poem, but instead to the small scale ostinato rhythm. 
Ostinato rhythms in general whether in architecture, poetry, dance, or 
music were then contrasted with creative rhythms, the first failing to give 
creative change, the later producing creative change. Several rhythms 
were then explored to see if any of these were examples of creative 
rhythms.
This section will take up these themes again, examining Bergson's claim 
that the notion of suggestion achieves truth. It is this notion of truth 
which allows a distinction to be made between art and humour, art 
attaining a specific truth, humour relating to the general. How this 
specific truth is communicated is then examined with regard to Bergson's 
wider account of art, which tends to be couched in terms of painting.
An attempt is then made to explicate the difference between photography 
and painting in terms of the inscription of time in an artwork which, 
according to Bergson, is truthful and thus unique, as opposed to that 
depicted in photography. This second attempt, however, will also be seen 
to be problematic, as the actual inscription of time would involve the 
material level and this is what art, according to Bergson, must hide. An
alternative would be to look at the notion of inscription in terms of 
following the lines traced within a picture, yet this account ultimately also 
appears to apply to long exposure photographs, as well as suggesting a 
succession which could be stopped at any moment. Bergson's relation to 
cinema is then explored to see if the criticisms he makes can shed further 
light on the differences between painting and photography.
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Aesthetic feelings 'suggest' because they are contagious, and they are 
contagious because they are sincere and manifestly reveal truth, and 
manifest truth has the power of conversion. (Laughter, p. 162) This 
power of conversion allows Bergson to make a distinction crucial for his 
account of art. The feeling art communicates might be generally agreed to 
be 'true', but this does not mean according to Bergson, that the feeling is 
general. Everyone, for example can have a pain, but the pain of Hamlet is 
unique and true. It is true by virtue of Hamlet being recognised in his pain 
or suffering as a living individual. (Laughter, p. 162) Here the distinction 
is between art which gives the living, moving, adaptable and thus 'true' 
individual, versus humour which gives the individual as imitating the 
mechanical and automatic, thus distorting the unique, living reality.
Specifically how does the artist gain the truth which is then 
communicated? As the basis of all knowledge, according to Bergson, is 
perception the initial truth will need to come through this route. A perfect 
artist "... would perceive all things in their native purity: the forms, 
colours, sounds of the physical world as well as the subtlest movements 
of the inner life." (Laughter, p. 155) Such an artist cannot, however exist
Ias an artist's perception is only ever expanded in one direction, each of 
these directions corresponding to a sense, this is why the arts are divided 
as they are, each art corresponding to a particular sense.143 (Laughter, p. 
155) Artists, on this model, move other individuals beyond their ordinary 
range of perception, which is conditioned by the exigencies of everyday 
life, to perceive things which did not previously explicitly strike their 
senses, (CM, p. 135) but which are potentially available to everyone. 
Artists thus bring out that which already exists unnoticed, like developing 
a photographic plate. (CM, p. 135) However care must be taken in 
understanding what 'exists' means at this juncture. It is not that the detail 
is potentially available, in that it exists waiting and ready to be 
discovered, but instead that in bringing out detail is also creative of that 
detail. The virtual knowledge we have made actual has narrowed our 
engagement with the world. (CM, p. 137) It is a case of enlarging 
perception by moving away from the exigencies of everyday life. There is 
thus a qualitative change in what is perceived. More memory enters into 
perception enriching it and moving the individual away from their 
utilitarian response. More details are projected out onto the object, the 
circuit of perception becomes wider. This qualitative change is best 
exemplified by painting.
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143 Bergson's review of a (then) recent work on Wagner interestingly emphasises the 
change o f text into sound which avoids having to describe the work o f Wagner in 
terms o f a synthesis of various artforms, which would obviously cause problems if an 
artist's perception is only ever expanded in one direction. (M, pp. 818-20)
Painting is always tied to perception, but is not merely the reproduction 
of the pre-existing, it makes explicit that which is perceived without 
being noticed, the virtual. But why is the content of the original 
perception not noticed? Bergson claims that in ordinary perception, 
because there are a variety of views presented simultaneously by reality 
which are equally ’brilliant', they are cancelled out by each other, and it is 
the artist who reveals these singular brilliant vanishing visions, by 
isolating and fixing them so spectators will be unable, henceforth, to 
avoid seeing reality in the same way the painter did when he painted it. 
(CM, p. 136) By this he means that the artist instead of focusing on the 
general attains the specific instead of the utilitarian reduction of 
difference to sameness. This then means that the artist in attempting to 
suggest something to the viewer is attempting to move them to a certain 
level so that every time they see the object o f  a painting they will be 
forced to view it on that level, moved away from their utilitarian 
preoccupations. Given that art attains the specific it might seem odd that 
Bergson should not see photography as an art form also attaining the 
specific.
In a later work Bergson attempts to distinguish between painting and 
photography not primarily in terms of the 'finished product', but instead in 
terms of the actual process of production. He remarks, for example (CE, 
pp. 340-1) that there is a crucial difference between putting together a 
jigsaw and painting a picture. The assembling of a jigsaw is not 
theoretically tied to time, practice can make the final assemblage emerge 
at greater and greater speed, the end result remaining unchanged. So on 
this basis neither quilts nor mosaics (CE, pp. 89-90) are art as they can
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both easily be made to a fixed plan. The painting of a picture, on the 
other hand, cannot be slowed down or speeded up and remain 
qualitatively unchanged. The actual act o f painting, according to Bergson, 
has a close affinity to time. It is this affinity to time that Bergson wants to 
claim leads to the unpredictability of the result, (CE, pp. 155-6) - even 
though one might know the style of the painter in question and actually 
have seen the subject he is working from. In fact the artists themselves do 
not know what the result of their work will be prior to its completion 
(Rescher, p. 19) It is not a question o f assembling pre-existing elements, 
the work does not pre-exist its realisation. (CE, pp. 6-7) It is not a plan 
where the time is irrelevant where the lengthening or shortening of 
duration will have no effect on behaviour (Bachelard, p. 54) but an 
evolving process and one which is close to the melodic development 
already discussed. Antliff does not make the explicit link to melody,144 
but he could have done so, he claims that each state in the painter is 
transformed by the previous, and indeed the whole history of the work's 
creation, so by this reason alone the painting will not be predictable, (CE, 
p. 7 & Antliff 2, p. 197)
But more than this is at stake as the movement of actualisation itself is a 
movement between planes with nothing behind it - music and paintings 
are expressions of themselves, not o f a hidden psychological world or
144 Antliff does however link the process o f  change to the artists personality, and if 
an internal state is being expressed by the artist it is not unreasonable that the states 
changing throughout the process o f painting will be in a dynamic relation with the 
picture painted.
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ontology. (Delhomme, p. 172) As with the case of intuition previously 
examined the actualisation of the artist's intuition is itself creative as it is 
the differentiation of a virtuality whose result is not predictable. In this 
sense the tendency behind a work which is made concrete, will inevitably 
be different from its effect (Mourélos, pp. 217-8) as its realisation, the 
movement between planes, always involves effort and change.
Photography, for Bergson, does not bear the same relation to time as 
painting, it gives the illusion of seizing the world 'instantaneously'.145 *A 
possible counter-example, long photographic exposures, will be dealt 
with presently. As opposed to the essentially unpredictable nature of 
painting as creation, photography's fixed time, the time of exposure, 
makes its results predictable given the equipment, lighting conditions etc. 
Photography has no circuit of modification between the subject and its 
lens, each moment does not modify the next. The stillness of the 
photograph captures time as an instant, whereas the painting captures 
time as a process, one which is inscribed in paint. So painting grasps a 
moment of 'psychological' time, as opposed to the photograph's 
impersonal abstract motionless time.
This distinction additionally relates to the difference between a time 
which is not concerned with the unit, any moment whatever will do, as
145 As will quickly be apparent the notion o f automatism which Bergson links to 
photography is quite different to that usually ascribed it in aesthetic theories where 
automatism is responsible for photography's access to things which have, at the very
least, once existed, for example K. Jones, "The Metaphysics o f the Photograph," 
British Journal o f Aesthetics Vol. 25 / No. 4 (Autumn 1985): pp. 372-9.
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opposed to an artistic description, which emphasises the privileged 
section of duration. Duration is often most keenly felt when waiting is 
involved, "An hour of joy is infinitely shorter than an hour of 
expectation." 146 In Bergson's famous example waiting for sugar to 
dissolve in water, the very experience an individual has of duration, as 
opposed to a unit as an hour (CE, p. 10 & 339) seems to make a similar 
point, yet there is more to this example than simply the need to wait. As 
Deleuze comments, one waits for the sugar because it has a different 
rhythm of being to our own, of which we become aware in our waiting. 
So a relationship with the sugar is entered into by the individual who 
waits, but also with duration as a whole, as in Creative Evolution there 
are multiple durations but each of these being individual only to the 
extent that it participates in duration as a whole. (Bergsonism, pp. 31-2 & 
77) So there is a certain correspondence between the rhythm of the sugar 
dissolving and the internal rhythm of the viewer / participant. (Capek, p. 
190, Robinet, p. 18 & Worms, p. 223) There is thus, for Bergson, a 
truthfulness about painting as it always inscribes an individual unique 
psychological time, as opposed to the general impersonal moment of the 
camera,147 not only because one has to wait but because the individual is 
in a relation with the subject's duration, and duration as a whole. "... for
146 Joseph Solomon, Bergson (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1911) p. 19; 
and William Shakespeare, As You Like It (Act III, scene 2) Quoted in Solomon, p.
23.
147 The time taken to view a painting und the fact that it cannot be taken in in a single 
glance (Souriau, p. 294) is irrelevant to the current considerations as such an 
argument could cquully upply to a photograph.
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us, conscious beings, it is the units that matter, for we do not count 
extremities of intervals, we feel and live the intervals as of definite 
intervals. " (CE, p. 339)
The actual inscription of the time taken to paint a picture, however, 
would appear to be visible, if at all, only through the material basis of a 
painting becoming noticeable, for example the speed of the brush strokes 
- yet art is supposed to hide its material basis. Rembrandt is famous for 
pushing viewers back from his paintings, and the abstract expressionist 
Barnett Newman for insisting his paintings were viewed close to, the one 
denying the material basis, the other emphasising it. According to 
Douglas all art can be self-reflexive, can do violence to itself. (Douglas 2, 
pp. 220-1) This self-reflexivity has two facets, the first is the deliberate 
attempt to subvert the mechanisms of the camera by drawing attention to 
those techniques which cinema relies on. Douglas concentrates on the 
means by which cinema depicts space, but his argument could equally 
apply to other techniques. (Douglas 2, p. 220) The second facet o f self- 
reflexivity is the employment o f films within films, news footage, grainy 
television pictures, i.e. that which draws attention to the medium through 
comparison with other media. (Douglas 2, p. 221) Thirdly the use of 
symbols, ticking clocks for example to be a symbol of mechanised time. 
(Douglas 2, p. 221) Symbols can o f course equally be used to show an 
affinity with non-mechanised time when the artist so desires, for example 
Matisse removing the hands from the clock in The Red Studio (1911). 
(Antliff 2, p. 192) The arguments presented by Douglas seem to suggest 
that if an art form can be self-reflexive, by the above described 
techniques it can be self-conscious and in this way progress. (Douglas 2,
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p. 219) Indeed Douglas goes even further stating that great art always 
exposes its own artificiality. (Douglas 2, p. 224) However it has already 
been suggested that Bergson is anti-modernist in not seeing the exposure 
of the medium's conditions of possibility as artistic. This anti-modernism 
would certainly directly apply to the Douglas' first type of self-reflexivity 
drawing attention to the techniques which cinema relies on and arguably 
the second which is reliant on comparison with other media, as much the 
same point could be made with regard to a film o f people watching a film 
in a cinema. The reason the first two examples are problematic for 
Bergson is due to a larger metaphysical point. Each plane or level which 
is worked on, with the contraction of perception must regard the other 
planes as inert in order to support itself. So life treats matter as inert, and 
vice versa. Each level denudes the one below of duration, i.e. treats it as 
repetition. (Mullarkey, p. 146) A similar relation seems to exist between 
the artist and his material, the material realm being excluded from the 
aesthetic appreciation. Even in the case of the artist the process of 
creating an art work is divided into two tendencies, that which is creative 
and that which is technique. (CM, p. 94) In terms of technique Bergson, 
apart from the more obvious meanings of the term also highlights the 
relation of the artists works to other works as well as "... the demands of 
the material upon which he operates and which is imposed upon him as 
upon all artists; it concerns in art what is repetition or fabrication and has 
nothing to do with creation itself." (CM, p. 94)
So if the technique must be hidden then perhaps time can be inscribed in 
the picture in terms of a symbol, but why should a clock ticking in a film 
say anything about the mechanism of the film, to use Douglas' example?
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(Douglas 2, p. 224) If a painting shows the life cycle of a plant from seed 
to death, it is giving a symbol of time, but there is no clear reason why 
that should relate to the time the painting took to paint.
Another possible way to allow the inscription of time to be self-reflexive 
would be to look not at the painting in terms of its material basis, but in 
terms of a following of the movement a line inscribed within the work. 
One could, perhaps, see the tracing of mobile lines within a picture as 
being a representation of movement, an 'active line' unlimited by fixed 
points as the much-quoted Klee would say.148
Bergson in Time and Free Will had already, as we have seen, 
distinguished between a jerky, disjointed movement where each 
movement fails to prefigure the next, each movement being seemingly 
separate and not opening out onto its successor, and the graceful 
movement of curves, each 'moment' on a curve prefiguring the next. 
Every moment here is a non-arbitrary change in direction. (TFW, p. 12) 
This allows the clear prefiguring o f the subsequent movement at each 
stage.149 however each 'moment' does not contain the whole. Indeed even
148 Paul Klee, Pedagogical Sketchhook. ed. Walter Gropius and L. Maholy-Nagy and 
trans. Sibyl Maholy-Nagy (London: Faber and Faber, 1953) pp. 16-8.
149 Artaud gives an alternative account o f movement which he finds in Balinese 
theatre which is close to dance. He describes the 'actors' as "... mechanised beings ..." 
giving "[a]n impression o f inhumanity ..." (Antonin Artaud, "On the Balinese 
Theatre," The Theatre and its Double, trans. Mary Caroline Richards (New York: 
Grove Press, 1958) p. 58)
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when Bergson talks about the graceful form as a recording of a 
movement and the living being's sinuous line moving out throughout the 
whole - spreading as a basic principle in little waves, this line may not 
itself be visible, (CM, p. 229) despite it being the original intention 
behind the figure which is seized by the artist. (CM, p. 230) This is why 
artists cannot be trained by teaching them to draw geometric curves and 
figures. (CM, p. 241) The eye of the artist should instead be seeing the 
graceful creative movement of which the form is a recording. (CM, p. 
243) This should hardly come as a surprise as the very use of a line to 
depict movement is frowned upon by Bergson as it suggests that the 
movement could have stopped at any point on its journey along that line, 
i.e. that the line is underpinned by homogeneous space. (MM, p. 217) A 
line cannot symbolise duration which has already ceased, it cannot 
represent duration in its flow. (MM, p. 191) The same applies to a 
photograph, which although it can also trace lines of movement; the car 
headlights recording lines through the city in the cliched long exposure 
merely gives an homogeneous time, rather than a true inscription of 
duration.
Even though a line cannot act as an inscription of duration in a picture, 
there might be another way in which the time which it takes for a work to 
be created to become visible in an art work. Colours are used in Matisse's 
work, according to Antliff, to create a rhythmic duration, an extensive 
field of operation. (Antliff 2, pp. 188-9) This field of colour fluctuates 
due to the ambiguity between volumetric depth and the unmodulated 
decorative surface, leading to a rhythmic pulse being introduced into the 
reading of the picture (Antliff 2, p. 191) this pulse originally being
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introduced into the very act of its creation. (Antliff2, p. 197) This rhythm 
has the power to place the individual on a certain level through rhythm, 
as did poetry, and indeed Antliff refers to the section of Time and Free 
Will already examined in this thesis on poetry. (Antliff 2, p. 197) 
Emphasising colour in his description of Bergson's aesthetics might seem 
perverse considering his lack of colouristic description, however it is not 
as perverse as it seems. The two visual artists most prominently 
mentioned by Bergson in his comments on aesthetics are Corot and 
Turner, both o f whom were very concerned with colour and the effects of 
light.150 And indeed it is this concern with colour which informs 
Matisse's work on Antliff s account creating a space which is closer to the 
intuitive extensity, than the academic intellectual renaissance space. 
(Antliff 2, p. 187) The homogeneous cutting of space by perspectival 
grids, which make the change in scale of a picture appear merely 
quantitative, were dispensed with, (Antliff, p. 189) leaving the picture as 
a heterogeneous space for exploration. It is interesting to note that this 
extensive field created by rhythm and the fluctuation of colour is without 
direction. In the same way an ostinato rhythm in poetry sets up static 
pulse without any necessary direction, or relation to the past in the 
present, so the picture gives a static rhythm, one which is not creative or 
melodic. So even though a certain rhythm might be inscribed in the
150 Having said this the clear relation o f these painters to impressionism, particularly 
Corot whose dicta "always be true to your first impression" encouraged both Monet 
and Pissarro which might be considered problematic as "... the attack on 
impressionism in the name of Bergsoian d u r é e  was common currency among the 
Parisian avant-garde by 1909." (AntlifT2, p. 203n)
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colour rhythms of a piece, there is no progression. The rhythm of a 
duration might be inscribed, but not its evolution.
Duration, then, can seemingly not be inscribed in a picture, yet what is at 
stake is not some item which can be separately identified in the picture. 
There is no separation between content and duration in an evolution, as 
each change in speed is a change in being, (Paradis, p. 20) an internal 
modification. (CM, p. 20) The evolution in time cannot be separated from 
what the thing is, it is not that it bears the mark of time as something 
separate. Indeed the lack o f internal modification in a physical system, is 
one of the major features which Bergson ascribes to cinema and it is to 
this, his most famous account of the relation between an art form and 
time, that this thesis will now turn.
Cinema and Music
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The first chapter of Deleuze's Cinema 1 is directly concerned with the 
notion of the mobile part, versus the divided still time of the 'photographs' 
which make up a film. Bergson thinks that the motion in a projected film 
is super-added to a series of immobilities (Douglass 2, p. 212 & Cariou, 
p. I l l )  as it is only possible to grasp the individual 'photographs' which 
make up a film as separate entities, as opposed to grasping them as a 
movement. (Douglass 2, p. 213 & Lecerle, p. 195) For Bergson the fact 
that time is fixed in 'separate' 'photographs' means time is essentially 
frozen in the moment by the camera it is not a question of a contraction 
o f moments in memory within a certain thickness of time, or the 
privileged section of psychical duration we have waiting for the sugar to 
dissolve in the water, (CE, p. 339) but is instead a series of separate 
anonymous moments. Movement thus becomes homogenised, there can 
be a movement of an immutable object across an inert pre-existing space, 
as opposed to movement being a qualitative change in the whole.
Deleuze, in contradistinction to Bergson, insists that cinema does not 
give stills but instead gives movement. At a fast enough projection speed, 
contra-Bergson, movement is given, as opposed to a series of snapshots. 
(Douglass 2, p. 215) The lower level striation of time into immobile 
sections, 'photographs', is rectified in its projection to give immediate 
movement in a cinematic projection. (Cinema 1, p. 2) This movement is 
an illusion, but if something is an illusion then, according to Deleuze, the 
very reproduction of that illusion is, to some extent, its correction. This 
seems an odd argument against Bergson's position, as Deleuze is 
suspended between two positions.
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Firstly, that spectators are given movement by cinema, not stills, that is 
there is no noticeable illusion, and the converse, that the presentation of 
something as illusion is in some sense its rectification. The two positions 
appear incompatible. Either spectators are subject to a noticeable illusion 
or they are not. Secondly, Deleuze says that even if the means are 
'artificial', this does not imply that the results are. (Cinema 1, p. 2) This 
suggests that the basis or condition of something does not necessarily 
affect the thing based or conditioned by it, accusing Bergson of a fallacy 
of composition (for example, if all the parts of a machine are light, this 
does not mean that the machine built from the light parts will itself be 
light.)
Bergson's objection, however, seems more fundamental than this, namely 
that the very model of time which is presented by cinema, the anonymous 
mechanical time being given as the foundation for real movement, is 
wrong. According to Bergson cinema does not place us in reality, 
(Douglass 2, p. 212) as reality can never be understood 
cinematographically. (Douglass 2, p. 210) What we are given is a spatial 
illusion; (Lecerle, p. 196) a stroboscopic time where instants have been 
taken from the whole of becoming allowing time to be slowed, 
accelerated, or immobilised. (Bachelard, p. 77) Yet time, for Bergson, if 
it is anything must be creation (CE, p. 341) so the idea that sections of 
time could be taken out of becoming and juxtaposed with each other 
appals him as it suggests that the present also contains the future in a 
hidden form. Additionally when watching a film all events are always the 
same, time unfolding like the "unfurling of a fan" (Douglass 2, p. 213) 
with no modification being made to what is shown no matter how fast the
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film was projected; (Douglass 2, p. 212) this is one of the reasons why 
time lapse films will have very limited insights for Bergson. (Douglass 2, 
p. 211) There is no internal modification, as there is with painting. When 
a painting is made the speed of its execution is an essential part of what it 
is, as we have noted, yet this is not the case for film according to Bergson 
as the time is mechanical, impersonal and homogenised. However 
Douglass in claiming that Bergson's arguments address only projection 
speed as opposed to shooting speed (Douglass 2, p. 215) suggests that 
insights can be gained from time-lapse photography. The projection 
speed does appear to qualitatively alter what is projected. But the point is 
that this alteration is mechanical and does not affect the whole, no matter 
how fast a film is played the same events will happen - all the pre­
existing elements will be juxtaposed next to each other in an 
homogeneous space waiting to unrolling. So whilst time-lapse 
photography may give insights, Bergson's more pressing concern is the 
spatialisation of time by film resulting in the removal of its creativity.
There is however more to Bergson's claim that time-lapse films, for 
example, have limited insights. The cinema camera, like any tool, extends 
the realm of interaction with the material realm and prolongs the natural 
organs. (CE, p. 141) Tools are what Bergson calls artificial organs, (CE, 
p. 141) and what Brion Gysin might call "... externalised sections o f the 
human nervous system." (Ticket, p. 156) The problem Bergson sees with 
these artificial organs is they do not extend the 'soul'.151 Tools are
151 Henri Bergson, The Meaning o f the War - Life and Matter in Conflict, trans. 
unspecified (London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1915) p. 34.
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inflexible, being inattentive and having no intuition. The time of the tool 
is impersonal, the tool cannot access different 'rhythms' of duration. It 
might be agreed that there are 'rhythms' of duration which in principle 
cannot be accessed by human's, (M&M, p. 206) ultrasonic bat calls for 
example, and that a tool in shifting these frequencies into the audible 
range so they can be heard does appear to extend perception. Indeed 
there is an analogy between contraction and the bat detector, the 
individual contracting rapid vibrations into slower ones, however it is 
only an analogy as it is only a change in the material speed, not a change 
allowing a correspondence between an external and internal rhythm i.e. 
perceptual adaptation, which is at stake. The detector does not constantly 
move between different planes in order to adapt: it is not attentive. A tool 
forms no circuit with its perceived object, it may extend our reach, but 
not our grasp. (Douglass 2, p. 225)
In the case o f cinema 'perception' refers to vision specifically and, as 
Deleuze comments, it is for Bergson as if there had always been cinema. 
(Cinema, p. 2) That perception is of necessity cinematographic. What 
Deleuze fails to mention is that Bergson has a generally negative opinion 
of vision in his post Matter and Memory writings. In Matter and Memory 
Bergson argues that the temporal gaps between sounds, smells and tastes 
leads to a notion of their being accidental and contrasts this with the 
continuity given by vision. (MM, p. 197) However this position becomes 
untenable for the later Bergson, particularly with regard to sound. 
Bergson has argued that the concept of nothing, as both a relative and an 
absolute were false, and thus that all negative existential judgements are 
in turn false. (Mullarkey, p. 129) This idea functions analogously in the
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case of sound. Cage, in Harvard University's anechoic chamber, "... as 
soundproof and reverberation-free as was technologically possible ... 
[heard] a constant singing high tone, and a throbbing low pulse" his 
nervous system and blood circulating respectively. "1 had honestly and 
naively thought that some actual silence existed ... I had not really put 
silence to the test. ... Try as we may to make a silence we cannot ... no 
silence exists ...",52 His most famous piece, 4'33" (1952) in which no 
notes are played emphasised 'ambient' sound and its continuity. Silence is 
merely an absence o f the particular which was being looked for, and any 
attempt to repress external sound only leads to an awareness of the sound 
of the self. Analogously, for Bergson, being is always before nothingness, 
hence being, like sound is only suppressed, but never erased. (Mullarkey, 
p. 128 & Delhomme, p. 178) Indeed it is a case of not finding what is 
being looked for, (Delhomme, p. 70) just like not hearing what one 
expected to hear, leading to the consternation o f the audience at the first 
performance of 4'33" (1952). There is no escape from sound, like there is 
no escape from being.153 (Delhomme, p. 180) Even when all sound is 
removed, just like after all beings have been suppressed there is still a 
remainder, in the case of being it is a pre-constituted being, always 
presupposed on the horizon of our speculations (Making, p. 187); and the
152 David Revill, The Roaring Silence: John Cage - A Life (London: Bloomsbury, 
1992) pp. 162-3.
153 This point is to the forefront of Levinas' mind in the account he gives o f the II ya, 
although a fuller account is beyond the scope o f this thesis. Emmanuel Levinas, 
"There is: Existence without Existents," The Levinas Reader, ed. Sean Hand / trans. 
Alphonso Lingis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) pp. 33-4.
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audible manifestations o f  own our own living functions in the case of 
sound.
The later comparisons between sight and hearing, given the above 
considerations, reverse the terms of the earlier distinction. Bergson 
describes vision as the "... sense par excellence ..." (CM, p. 147) before 
condemning it for preventing individuals from grasping change in itself. 
Vision tends to extract invariable figures and then supposes them to 
change place without intrinsic qualitative change, the movement being 
super-added [surajouterait]. Bergson does recognise that vision need not 
be this way, if it realises that the visible mobile coloured patch is actually 
constituted at another level of 'mobile vibrations', a movement of 
movements. The problem is that Bergson fails to say how vision can be 
of change in itself, pointing instead to the claims of scientific knowledge 
about this movement o f  movements. (CM, p. 148) This, despite Bergson's 
intention, serves only to reinforce his initial criticism o f vision. This point 
is particularly telling as Bergson sees the disruption o f the continuity of 
hearing resulting from the absorption o f visual images into auditory 
perception, again linking vision to a lack o f continuity, an homogenous 
spatialisation of pure movement. (CM, p. 148)
Instead of vision, hearing is taken as the ideal kind of perception to cope 
with change. According to Bergson, it is easier to think about change and 
perception without fixity in terms of hearing than in terms of vision, (CM, 
p. 147) as in the case o f sound there is no necessary tie to something 
'underlying' vehicle, (Capek, p. 325) and there is no illusion of any 
mathematical 'still' instants. (Capek, p. 325) Sound gives a continuity to
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perception, as opposed to the cutting and fixing of vision - there is thus 
no need for a correction supervening on perception in hearing. Vision 
might be necessarily cinematographical for Bergson as Deleuze notes, but 
this does not necessitate that hearing is also.
The artistic form associated with hearing is, naturally, music, and it is 
worth briefly reiterating Bergson's position on music at this point as, 
curiously enough, such a discussion has a significant contribution to make 
with regard to Bergson's criticisms of cinematographical movement. 
Bergson, the reader may recall, claims that melodies are indivisible. (CM, 
p. 147 & CM, p. 71)) By this he means that melodies have no elements, 
only parts. If a melody is broken down into a sequence of notes it is lost. 
Each note is in one sense inseparable from its whole past, the totality of 
its past is virtually present and pushing into the future. The notion of the 
grasping of a melody as a whole, as opposed to individual notes is a 
qualitative as opposed to a quantitative understanding based on 
homogeneous space.
The separation o f a melody into individual notes causes it to be 
spatialised, reduced to a succession, whereas a melody in order to be 
perceived as a melody, has to have a constant interpenetration of its 
parts. (CM, p. 149) In this sense, a melody forms the model of the 
understanding of time as duration - a series of qualitative changes which 
permeate one another without definite outlines, in short a heterogeneous 
continuity. The reason this account is of interest to the foregoing talk of 
cinematographical movement is that it could be argued that a melody, if 
heard as a whole would be a transformation of what on one level, was 
separate note elements into a whole on a non-analytical level, i.e. as it is
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actually heard. The notes, 'fixed' elements, would apparently become 
movement through an 'illusion', that is in exactly the same way that 
cinema works. This kind of argument though is the exact opposite of the 
argument Bergson puts forward against individual notes (that is elements) 
being taken as parts of a melody, which sees them as an abstraction away 
from the continuity of the melody, yet analogously this is exactly what 
Deleuze correctly argues would be the case for cinema.
There is no cinematic still, cinema gives an immediate image of 
movement and to think of the cinematic still is to think a non-existent 
abstraction. So it would seem on this basis at least that music was on a 
level with cinema. The reason Bergson does not take up this argument is 
linked to his view of rhythm. When dealing with music Bergson's positive 
account o f creative change is linked, as has been described, to melody, so 
a steady unchanging rhythm can underlie creative melodic change. In the 
case of cinema, the steady unchanging rhythm of, for example 24 frames 
per second, is not seen by him as a basis for 'higher' level creative change 
which might be analogous to a melodic change.
But, one may ask, why should painting or cinema have to be 'true' on all 
levels? As a model, an art form might fail at the lowest level to give a 
creative change, but at a higher level it might clearly indicate the nature 
of movement and time. This is much the same point as was made in the 
case of music where an unchanging rhythm on one level could seemingly 
produce creative rhythmic change on another. The question is one of 
contraction, or its impossibility in film, where Bergson is denying that it 
is possible for the viewer to contract the movement 'captured' by the
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cinema camera without seeing the individual frames. Yet there seems to 
be no reason why the mobile part should not be ascribed to cinema apart 
from or on another level than the psychological inscription of time, and, 
in any case, this idea, it was previously suggested, is itself questionable. 
Even if Bergson were right and film did give false movement on the one 
hand, and on the other his account of painting was also unproblematic, 
that the photograph did give, as opposed to the painting, a mobile part 
there would still appear to be some problematic examples.
In Len Lye's film Particles in Space 'images' were scratched directly onto 
the film rather than there being a number of photographs making up the 
mobile image. Here the individual image, as artistic creation has taken 
time to create, duration being involved in the very process of its creation. 
There would still, however, remain Bergson's idea that the motion given 
by the film was false, even though at its 'lowest' level duration was 
involved in the creation of each frame. Perhaps Lye's film could be 
regarded as animation, rather than as cinema proper, but what would 
Bergson's attitude to animation be? Certainly if each scratching making 
up the animation takes time it will give a mobile part, according to 
Bergson. If Bergson wanted to continue to argue against the motion given 
by animation he would have to argue that the motion produced was an 
attempt to fix the mobile parts by treating them as elements on a level 
which closed off the perception of their individual creation, but if  this 
were the case then contraction would be possible as the individual frames 
would no longer be being seen.
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Looking back to Bergson's description of aesthetic feeling highlights a 
larger problem with his whole attack on cinema. In the case o f art it is the 
effect produced which matters, rather than the means used to gain that 
effect. So aesthetic status, for Bergson, is not based on the thing (as 
understood by common sense or science) but on the effect it has. 
(Laughter, p. 163) Art can thus rely on what at the 'objective' (scientific) 
level is illusion, as only the effect is important. If cinema appears to give 
movement, this is all that should matter. Analogously, if a painting, for 
example Canadian Club (1974) by Richard Estes, is indistinguishable 
from a photograph, then both will be equally 'valid'. The process of 
production is irrelevant as only the effect matters (even if Este's skill 
might elicit greater admiration than the photographer's).
This then means that art is 'truthful' only in terms of what is being 
communicated, not in terms of how it is being communicated. Whilst 
Douglass notes that Bergson does not talk about the 'artificial' effects of 
cinema, wheels going backwards etc. or its link to a renaissance space 
which is gridded and related to the camera obscura (Douglass 2, p. 215) 
he fails to understand the implication o f this absence. Douglass alters 
Bergson's prescriptive appeal for thought to do violence to itself by 
taking reality as a starting point not the concept, inverting the usual 
direction of thought, and instead uses it as an invocation to cinema to do 
violence to itself by showing its own mechanisms, Gehr's pulsing corridor 
in Serene Velocity, the general use o f zoom lenses, Brakhage's 
cameraless film Mothlight (1963) with its moth wings stuck to the 
celluloid or indeed (Douglass 2, p. 220) Markham's La Jeteé (1964) 
which is made up almost entirely of stills. As has already been noted with
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regard to artistic language, Bergson is profoundly anti-modernist so the 
whole notion of cinema doing violence to itself would at best only serve 
to show its inadequacy and failure to be a true art form.
Before progressing onwards there is one other question which remains as 
regards cinema and this concerns the question of recording. Regardless of 
whether a recording is digital (the constant sampling rhythm) or analogue, 
a recording allows a form of repeatability which allows sections to be cut 
rearranged, reversed, repeated - in short placed in homogeneous space. 
From this point o f view cinema would fail by the very fact of being a 
recording, not because montage has occurred, but by the very fact it is 
possible, as opposed to impossible.
Cavell in arguing against a movie being a recording is in some senses 
making a similar point to Bergson, but without this seeing this as a 
criticism. Cavell, in his argument, makes a comparison between a movie 
and a recording o f a piece o f music. Firstly to be a recording there must 
be an event which one can be present at separately from the recording. 
Secondly to be a recording there is a question of fidelity or transparency, 
the recording should attempt to be indistinguishable from the original.
This position is problematic as it is uncertain what would be meant by 
being present at a recording as a separate event. Does this suggest a 
recording must take place in a single take, and if so could a film in a 
single take be considered a recording e.g. Pascal Aubier's ten-minute film 
consisting of only one shot?154 This brings us to the second point Cavell
154 Tarkovsky, Andrey, Sculpting in rime - Reflections on Cinema, trans. Kitty
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is making, namely why should musical recordings be seen to be 
concerned with fidelity? In many pop recordings, for example, the snare 
drum is placed through a gated reverb in order to give it a particular 
sound, is this still a recording? It is certainly less concerned with fidelity 
than the production of a certain 'unnatural' effect. Again the use of 
multitracking suggests that a recording can be multiple events, i.e. there 
is no question of fidelity to an actually occurring event, as the whole 
never occurred simultaneously in 'real time'. This might appear unfair to 
Cavell as he might be thinking o f a classical concert, and he does 
compare a movie to a stage play, however classical recordings are often 
assembled from many different takes, and the most prized recordings 
used both compression and valve microphones, which introduce 'warm' 
harmonic distortion. Even on the most 'pure' uncompressed recordings of 
Siegbert Ernst there are still issues. Firstly the use of large diaphragm 
microphones which tend to flatter the sound, despite his tendency to use 
transformerless models. Secondly, as with any stereo recording there is 
the question of space, how this is depicted, whether through phase 
differences or volume level in the case of most techniques. The problem 
is that in one sense there seems to be nothing which will fill the criteria of 
being a recording.
Ultimately what Cavell seems to be arguing is that cinema is, of 
necessity, a modernist art form in that it is to be read in terms of the 
devices (what he terms automatisms) employed by the film maker. This 
position would seemingly mean that the primary difference between a
Hunter-Blair (London: The Bodley Head Ltd., 1986) p. 114.
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recording and a film was the visibility of its devices, as it would be for 
the formalists, and that the skill of the film maker would be understood in 
terms of the mastery of those techniques, everything is meant. The 
problem though seems to be that everything is 'secretly' modem, there is 
no purity of recording, and no benchmark for fidelity.155
The next section will examine how artists are supposed to access the 
truth. Bergson claims this access to truth is linked, as previously 
mentioned, to the different perception which (genuine) artists' have, but 
what constitutes this difference?
155 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed - Reflections on the Ontology of Cinema
Enlarged Edition ed. (London: Harvard University Press, 1979) pp. 183-9.
Deeper Perception
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If art does go 'deeper' in perception, there is still the question of how the 
artist manages to do this. Firstly, art overcomes the pragmatic utilitarian 
to gain access to individuality. (Laughter, p. 157) As in intuition, art 
represents a move away from the utilitarian, it involves perception for its 
own sake, not for the sake of action. (Lacey, p. 188, CM, p. 138) Art is 
thus not instrumental, nor does its account lessen the universe - instead it 
enriches it. (Jankélèvitch, p. 163) This enrichment is a product of art's 
naive perception which, because it occurs without the interference of 
habit memory (Jankélèvitch, p. 128) is a more direct vision of reality. 
(RM, p. 23) Indeed, Bergson links philosophy to art in this respect, (CM, 
p. 138) claiming philosophy should renounce the utilitarian habits of mind 
which are always aiming at action.
Valéry is of great relevance in this regard as, although he talks about 
individuals seeing a thing's significance before seeing the thing, he also 
claims that art represents a move away from seeing things as signs. 
(Pilkington, p. 135) On one level Bergson can wholly agree with Valéry 
when he claims that the individuality of things escapes human knowers 
unless it is to their advantage to perceive it (Laughter, p. 152) - things are 
often merely identified by labels, or by one or two features, (Laughter, p. 
153) which means, they are scarcely known at all. (CM, p. 138) The 
individual is working at a level of generality which has totally erased the 
individual in favour of the homogeneous same.
On the other hand, Bergson disagrees with Valéry on one important 
point. For Bergson the mobile continuity accessed by art only acts as a
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sign for duration and so has no value in itself, whereas for Valéry this is 
not the case. For Bergson, a picture is not a movement, it is a symbol, a 
symbol which moves away from generality, and one which gains its force 
from being an isolation of what has previously been seen in a crowd of 
equally 'brilliant' perceptions, but it remains merely a symbol none-the- 
less.
An artist's vision, as opposed to the utilitarian, is independent o f the 
requirements of action to mediate the immediate, solidify movement and 
spatialise. (Delhomme, p. 42) The artist is thus disinterested, (Pilkington, 
p. 13) surpassing ordinary perception in aesthetic contemplation and 
perceiving things in their 'purity'. (Laughter, p. 155) This congenital 
distraction is something the rest of humanity is not allowed, and if 
complete would produce the perfect artist. (Laughter, p. 154) This 
distraction is a product o f nature, according to Bergson, which works 
only in one direction, a sense. (Laughter, p. 155) Each art relates to a 
particular sense (Laughter, p. 155, AntlifT2, p. 202) which perceives the 
data from that sense for its own sake. Yet the enhancement of one set of 
faculties which in madness puts the individual out o f equilibrium with the 
world (Mullarkey, p. 55), seems close to the position of the artist, 
establishing the common link between artistic genius and madness.
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Artistic Truth
Bergson attributes a deeper perception to the artist, as the previous 
section commented, but what is it that the artist is perceiving and 
subsequently expressing in the art work? In the case of poetry it is 
thought, although as an art form it does not appear to be attached to any 
particular sense. In the case of painting it is deeper perception of the 
moment which is it at stake and in music emotion. What about tragedy 
and other fictional narrative? The thesis has already commented that the 
difference between art and humour is between the specificity of art's 
subjects and the generality of humour. Whilst comedy relates to the type, 
a generalised individual, the artistic, for example tragedy, relates to 
singular individuals.156 (Lacey, p. 189) So comedy of necessity cannot be 
"... more than skin-deep" (Laughter, p. 168) as art would remove 
individual's resemblances to other individuals, i.e. their generality. 
Tragedy, on the other hand, must be deep to move away from generality 
and resemblance. If tragedy does relate to individuals and art 
communicates some kind of truth it is incumbent upon Bergson to explain 
how this truth, is given in the case of a fictional character. The invention
156 This line of thought is carried through to the later account in Creative Evolution. 
although the account does differ in that intuition is not only linked directly to 
perception but also to  the intention o f life which is gained via sympathy. Here it is 
still the individual which is perceived by the artist, but perception is specifically in 
terms of the lines which bind and give an organism significance, which allows the 
organism to be mutually organised, rather than merely assembled. (CE, pp. 176-7) 
This kind of position is close to that expressed in Bergson's essay on Ravaisson. 
(CM, pp. 229-30)
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of a fictional character does not merely appear to give an object of 
perception with additional detail, so what 'truth' does a narrative give?
In order to understand what kind of truth might be at stake in drama it is 
necessary to understand what Bergson considers to be required of the 
dramatist or novelist.
Instead of dwelling on surfaces the dramatist must look into his self. 
(Laughter, p. 166) In the case o f humour we saw that, for Bergson, it was 
impossible to see ourselves as amusing, as self-insight would give a depth 
and require a sympathetic relation which would negate the possibility of 
humour. Additionally, individuals only become thoroughly acquainted 
with their "... own heart ..." (Laughter, p. 166) and the outer signs of 
another can only ever be interpreted defectively via analogy to ourselves. 
(Laughter, p. 166) If this is accepted, then it follows that the fictional 
individual, if artistic, can only be produced or extrapolated from the 
individual author and, as Bergson points out, Shakespeare thus must 
have created Lear, Hamlet and so forth wholly from his knowledge of 
himself, from his own experiences. However "... the biographies of poets 
would seem to contradict such a supposition. How indeed, could the 
same man have been Macbeth, Hamlet, Othello, King Lear and others?" 
(Laughter, p. 166) What kind o f explanation does Bergson give to solve 
this 'apparent' problem? Bergson says that a dramatist creates a character 
by following a branch of their life which could have resulted in them 
being, for example, Lear. (Laughter, p. 167)
There are points - at all events there seem to b e - a l l  along 
the way, where we may branch off, and we perceive many 
possible directions though we are unable to take more than
one. To retrace one's steps, and follow to the end the faintly 
distinguishable directions, appears to be the essential 
element in poetic imagination. (Laughter, p. 167)
In this instance, the notion of the sketch might give a suitable model for 
such 'rough' explanation or imagination. If a dramatist attempted to work 
from external observations, according to Bergson, they would inevitably 
compose characters from fragments, and such a character could not be 
living. So, instead of taking fragments "... filched from right and left, as 
though it were patching together a harlequin's motley ..." (Laughter, 167) 
instead it finds "... the potential in the real, and takes up what nature has 
left as a mere outline or sketch in his soul in order to make of it a finished 
work of art."157 (Laughter, p. 168) So the artist through their imaginative 
capacities gets to the truth by looking into himself to create living 
singular and thus truthful individuals, as opposed to the generalised 
abstracted types of comedy.
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157 10 years later Bergson says that all the great creators o f living, acting human 
types (like Shakespeare) have the embryo's of diverse personalities virtually existing 
within them because their "... personality is rich and multiple; in contrast to that of 
most men which is one sided, that is to say destitute." (M, p. 844)
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Repetition
There is, however an apparent problem for Bergson's account o f fictional 
characters. The thesis has already detailed how repetition functions with 
regard to habits, where instead of moving with attention in unison with 
the flowing continuity of life, there is an inattentiveness and a lack of 
responsiveness to life on the part of the potentially amusing individual. 
There is another characteristic of life which has already been mentioned 
which is important at this juncture, the constant flow and qualitative 
change which cannot be grasped by a series of homogeneous elements. 
This constant change and constant creation of qualitatively different 
states shows life to be a negation of repetition. (Laughter, p. 32) To view 
life, falsely, as repeating, is to see it as a mechanism, a negation of life. 
(Laughter, p. 34) An individual recreates themselves constantly by the 
very fact of existing, (HBP, p. 183)'58 and it is this constant recreation 
through time, which Bergson maintains is necessary for the dramatist to 
trace when they create a living character, as has been previously 
described.
If, however, life is characterised by the constant creation of novelty (CE, 
p. 23) and cannot be a simple unfolding of a preordained structure, how 
can a drama be, in some sense at least, true to life if the author has pre­
determined what will happen? This criticism works in two ways. 158
158 Also Mark Muldoon, "Time, Self and Meaning in the Works of Henri Bergson, 
Maruice Merleau-Ponty and Paul Ricouer," Philosophy Today (Fall, 1991) p. 256.
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Firstly, Bergson talks, with some derision, about the notion that time 
could be like a reel of film unwinding, already set out, but this seems to 
be equally the case when a book is being read, or a play is being 
watched. It seems as if time exists in the play as a series of events and 
characters whose future is unknown, but in fact this is only an appearance 
(unless the play is totally improvised). The future is known, the actors 
play to a predetermined script, Cordelia dying at the end of every 
performance of King Lear. It could be argued that there is a change of 
pace possible in a play, as there is in reading a book, but this does not 
seem to obviate the apparent determinism. Indeed in a book this is even 
more the case as it is possible to turn to the last page and see what 
happens. The play's fixed and rigidly predictable time becomes something 
rigid attached to the living flexible time of the actors whose fate is not 
fixed and pre-ordained. A play could, no matter how serious, be seen as 
potentially amusing as humour is a rigid counterfeit following life's 
suppleness, (Laughter, p. 38) although the fact it is not seen as such 
might be due to convention, if nothing else. The fictional character as part 
o f the play would then seem not to be a living being, but a repeatable 
unliving one as Levinas claims:
The characters in a book are committed to the infinite
repetition of the same acts and the same thoughts ...
(Levinas, p. 139)
The second reason is that the fixing o f the play in words in producing the 
written text in some sense takes it away from the constant evolution of 
life in time and space, suggesting it has been or could be split into 
sections and repeated i.e. placed in homogeneous space. Bergson might 
argue that this is the wrong way to treat the play - it is understanding it in
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terms of the fixed rather than than in terms of duration, as a whole with 
inter-penetrating parts, and his account of diction has already argued for 
something similar.
Indeed it would even be possible for Bergson to argue against this notion 
of spatialisation if a play, to some extent, always involved a processing of 
the initial material for its realisation, although such a position is a 
simplification of the one he holds, as we have seen. By distinguishing 
between the creative act and the material realisation of that act, with 
reference to the work of the sculptor, Bergson can claim that creativity is 
bound by the materials in which it is expressed:
... it concerns in art what is repetition or fabrication, and has
nothing to do with creation itself. (CM, p. 94) (my italics)
Analogously it could then be argued that the basic raw story material has 
to be arranged to produce the plot, but that this has nothing to do with 
the initial 'story' intuition, only with its material expression.
This kind o f  idea suggests the anti-modernist requirement to hide the 
techniques used by the artist in the creation of his work, which Bergson 
espouses. Matter for Bergson is treated, at a certain level, as pure 
repetition and the creative impulse works against this matter, attempting 
to efface the material characteristics of a thing. Matter, as it inhibits 
life,159 (Laughter, pp. 28-9) unsurprisingly, becomes another source for
159 It should be noted, however, that life requires matter as an obstacle in order to 
create, just as the eye is both necessary for vision and an obstacle to vision. 
(Jankdtevitch, p. 247)
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humour. At this point it is clear why, as discussed previously, art must 
hide its material basis on Bergson's account. If matter was brought to the 
fore it could be potentially amusing and thus remove sympathy. How 
exactly does Bergson think that matter is comical?
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Matter
One of the primary modes in which matter inhibits life is by making 
language amusing. This is particularly relevant to the difference between 
serious art and comedy because it involves the notion of repetition which 
was at stake in the story / plot distinction mentioned above. Here a joke 
about language is distinguished from one which is in language by the 
inability to translate the joke in the former case. (Laughter, p. 103) A 
joke about language brings the material basis to attention in its 
inflexibility. We are taken to a lower level of association which is not the 
correct level at which semantic meaning is operating.
Bergson maintains that it is language which becomes comic in word play. 
Lacey pinpoints the apparent problem with such an account when he asks 
who the object of humour is in this case. This 'who' is important because, 
Bergson maintains, as already pointed out, that humour is always aimed 
at humans. Bergson might argue it is those who put their trust in 
language, but if it is language itself, as Bergson says, which is becoming 
amusing in word play, (Laughter, p. 104) this explanation would not 
appear plausible. Bergson does, however, offer another explanation.
It has often been claimed that superiority theories of humour cannot 
account for word play, (AoL, p. 89, Swabey, p. 213, H&I, p. 21) despite 
Leacock lamely trying to counter such arguments by claiming that puns 
were a triumph over words. Bergson's account, which is often seen as a 
variation on the theme of superiority theories, still needs to see humour as 
being against someone, as we have seen, but does try to circumvent this
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apparent problem. The clever move Bergson makes here is to link the 
notion of word play to that of thought.
The process of thought which is in some sense seen as a living flow is 
disrupted in word play and directed to the material basis, so instead of 
having a flow of thought, there is instead a lack o f attentiveness to it, 
which allows the material aspect to dominate and form mistaken 
associations. Instead of taking language on an expressive level, word play 
brings us back to the physical level as the word (as opposed to its 
signification) becomes the object of attention. The clearest example of 
this is taking the figurative literally, where "... attention is fixed on the 
material aspect of a metaphor..." (Laughter, p. 115 & AoL, p. 125)
Word play, in terms o f puns and double meanings is referred to by 
Bergson, as reciprocal interference which is one o f  three processes he 
outlines which can create jokes.
These three processes are repetition, inversion and reciprocal 
interference, which act as the material antitheses to the "outward 
characteristics"160 of life - which are constant qualitative change in time 
and the self-containment and individuality of each series in space. (AoL, 
p. 121) Life appears as a constant change which never reverses or 
repeats, (Laughter, p. 88) yet humour can portray it as i f  it were a 
repeating mechanism with reversible action and interchangeable parts.
160 "Such are the outward characteristics - whether real or apparent is o f little 
moment - which distinguish the living from the merely mechanical." (Laughter, p. 89)
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(Laughter, p. 101, AoL, p. 122) So although repetition is not actually 
possible in 'life', it is possible in an abstract intellectual conception which 
cannot grasp life. (CE, p. 46 & KAP, p. 150) That is it is possible to 
place life in a homogeneous space. These three processes apply to both 
actions and situations and additionally language. This is because thought 
is treated as a living thing, and thus its translation, language when 
processed can appear mechanical and lifeless. (Laughter, p. 119) This is 
especially important as language feels as if it "... contains some element 
of our own life." (Laughter, p. 129) It makes our thought appear 
mechanical and illadapted to a situation.
In order to flesh out what Bergson means here, it will be useful to 
examine some examples. Puns are the most common example of 
reciprocal interference. Here the material aspect of the word, in this case 
its sound, links the word to another one in a separate series. This 
suggests that the systems in question are not self-contained and individual 
but are in some sense interconnected. What is at work here is again the 
dream-like associationist logic which treats words as fragments taken 
from their context to form a new web of relations which is inattentive to 
the level of the word's operation. So one word can function independently 
in two totally separate series. This isolation of words which allows them 
to function in the two series only occurs because they are treated as 
elements, rather than component parts of whole meanings. Puns and word 
play, then, form a counterfeit of thought. Some puns can obviously be 
disguised insults and so be amusing for two reasons, both of which are 
explainable by Bergson's account. Although Bergson's account does not 
deal with 'slips of the tongue', (accidental word play) such examples
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produce no real problems for his account. Slips of the tongue can either 
be laughed at because they are treated as if they are in fact deliberate, or 
alternatively, in the case of a 'repressed' or apparently repressed meaning 
which finds expression in an accidental slip of the tongue, the 'disguised' 
or apparently disguised nature of the utterer's meaning can cause 
amusement.
An example of the second of the processes, repetition, would be a tragic 
hero being imitated in a play which would, Bergson thinks, immediately 
turn the work into a comedy. (Laughter, p. 164) Yet, as Lacey points out, 
tragedy quite often does involve repetition and is not thus rendered funny 
(Lacey, p. 194) - for example the son repeating the mistakes of the father. 
A distinction might be made between self-conscious imitation as opposed 
to mere repetition, in order to deal with Lacey's point. The tragic hero, on 
this view, would lack knowledge of his repetition, whereas the comic 
type would not. There are two problems with this reply. Firstly, although 
the comic character can have knowledge of a repetition which is 
happening (Monty Python's classic 'Do you Ever Get that Sense of Déjà 
Vu?1 sketch) this does not necessarily seem to be the case - quite often 
the repetition will be hidden from the character in question. The second 
objection is simply that repetition is amusing because it appears to 
militate against life, so it would not seem to matter whether there was or 
was not knowledge on the character's part of the repetition in question as 
long as repetition was seen to be occurring. Perhaps the reason that 
repetition in the case of the tragedy is not funny is because it evokes 
sympathy in us and, as the reader will recall, humour has of necessity to 
be without sympathy. It might then be plausible to see self-conscious
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imitation as removing sympathy. However, actors playing Shakespeare in 
modem dress (Lacey, p. 194) imitate a more 'traditional production' self­
consciously, yet they fail to amuse.
Bergson can be defended against these criticisms of his account of 
repetition by making his notion of repetition clearer. It is repetition within 
a play, not of a play, which concerns Bergson. The repetition of the tragic 
hero's actions and so forth creates comedy, (Laughter, p. 164) a part of 
what he earlier refers to as clockwork relations. (Laughter, pp. 35-6) The 
repetition within a play as imitation does not give an exact copy, or 
attempt to do so. The minor characters repeating the main characters 
become "... several different copies of the same model, that is just what 
the naturalist does in order to define a species. He enumerates and 
describes its main varieties." (Laughter, p. 165) The process here is 
exactly the same as that linking central and peripheral examples, the 
peripheral being merely exaggerated copies of the central examples.
A technique related to repetition, what Bergson refers to as translation, is 
the basis for parody (Laughter, p. 123 & AoL, p. 122) - to take a series 
o f events into a different key than their own. (Laughter, p. 118 & 119) To 
take the serious as minor, the black knight in Monty Python's Holy Grail 
who refers to his arm being severed as 'merely a flesh wound', or 
conversely to make mountains out of mole hills - the hysteria caused by 
the mucky fork, to use another example from Monty Python - in both 
these cases it is behaviour which is inappropriate to the level of 
operation, in short an inattention to life. This behaviour on the wrong 
level always leaves a reference to the original, even if the original is not
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actually present, as often we are acquainted with the natural expression 
which is parodied. (Laughter, p. 122)
In the third process, as the name 'inversion' would suggest, something is 
repeated, but in inverted form. For example, a man who empties his pipe 
on the terrace below is the subject of complaints from the terrace owner: 
"What are you doing emptying your pipe on my terrace? What are you 
doing putting your terrace under my pipe?" is the witty reply (Laughter, 
p. 120, AoL, p. 127). Such inversion obviously refers to the initial 
starting point which is inverted, and that is why it is amusing. (Swabey, 
p. 41 & p. 42) As Kant says of Stem, it is the turning of things upside 
down which allows us the pleasure of putting them the right way up 
again.161
Monro thinks that Bergson's explanation of inversion is unable to 
adequately explain all relevant examples. The prisoner lecturing the 
magistrate (Laughter, p. 94) does not seem amusing merely because there 
is an inversion here, but because there is an additional infringement o f  
society's rules and indeed individuals' roles. (AoL, p. 123) Bergson 
claims that the examples used are pure, so it cannot be argued that the 
example is a composite o f different types o f humour. There is no doubt 
that society's rules are being infringed, and Bergson could readily 
acknowledge this, the question is how this is occurring. It is not a 
question, as it was in ceremony of bringing out the intrinsically humorous
161 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point o f View, trans. Mary J. Gregor (First 
edition in German 1798, but based on much earlier lectures; The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1974). p. 104 (Ak. 235)
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quality by viewing it on an essentially non-functional level. Nor is it a 
case of comparing the real with the ideal. What is humorous is that 
society's rules have been infringed by inverting them, and it is this 
inversion which is important, in Bergson's example, not the infringement 
of the rules per se, as Monro seems to think.
In each of the three processes described, it is the process which is 
mechanical and inflexible, and hence amusing. What is the reasoning 
behind Bergson's view that the three processes must be mechanical? 
Firstly the very fact that the processes can be applied as mere techniques 
without attention to their matter suggests that the process is not vertical 
and creative. Secondly the isolation of the individual 'item' which is to be 
repeated, which is reliant on homogeneous space for its extraction is 
'anti-life'. It is the very taking of sections from a qualitatively changing 
whole ('life'), and treating it as a series of separable items which can be 
arbitrarily changed and processed, which causes the three processes to be 
laughed at. In short it is the homogeneous spatialisation of life.
An artistic act, on the contrary, is integrated into a whole and has a 
history, it draws from the whole of its past, as opposed to a comic 
process which is atomic, does not call its whole past into the act. The 
whole development cannot be understood in terms of a process or series 
of processes, these are merely techniques of manufacture which do not 
concern the novelty of creation itself. Technique as an art can thus be 
contrasted to technique as a knack,162 which is purely a material process.
162 Plato, Gorgias. trans. Walter Hamilton (London: Penguin, 1960) p. 43 (462).
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What is most interesting and also most puzzling about the above account 
of humorous repetition is the role which music plays in it. Bergson talks 
about the three processes as taking a "... series of events and repeating] 
them in another key ..." (Laughter, p. 118) and claims that "... the École 
des femmes does nothing more than reproduce and repeat a single 
incident in three tempi." (Laughter, p. 91) The thesis has already shown 
what a positive role music has in Bergson's philosophy, in particular, how 
it helps us understand duration in terms o f continuous qualitative change, 
how sound can be a better medium for understanding becoming than the 
visual, and so forth, yet here these processes are being described in 
musical terms and not being treated positively.
Additionally, as was shown earlier, there is an ambiguity between the 
large scale architectural structure which music often has and the results of 
that structure which have positive 'fluid' characteristics. Why, then, does 
he not think that repetition in this case can produce a 'fluid' result? The 
answer may be that, whereas musical technique provides a development, 
a process which progresses through stages, it presents the partial 
appearance of qualitatively different newness, whereas in fact all it 
produces is caricature - the same repeated after being processed. There is 
no initial tendency being expressed, all the processes merely act on the 
surface.
We do not generally laugh at music, though there are of course musical 
jokes, which appear to conform to the main models proposed by 
Bergson. Les Dawson's 'wrong notes' appear to be small misfortunes. 
Playing tunes on 'inappropriate instruments', for example the musical saw,
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bring the material level to the fore. Incongruous eclecticism, for example 
the Naked City track Speed Freaks which cuts between contemporary 
country and western, adult orientated rock, light jazz, dub Reggae, 1930's 
country and western, funk, 1970's heavy metal and thrash metal in under 
two minutes appears to deliberately cut between fixed elements. John 
Zom's String Quartet - Cat O' Nine Tails (Tex Avery Directs the Marquis 
De Sade). which appropriates the gestures of cartoon music for sadistic 
ends, places together two spheres which do not 'truly' connect, sadism 
and cartoon violence. Parody, which takes an established style and 
exaggerates it, fits in with the account of repetition which Bergson gives. 
In each of these cases it is a 'non-musical' process which is involved, or at 
least a process which draws attention to itself.
The account Bergson has given of a melody's qualitative change and 
progression has so far remained unquestioned, yet the three processes 
used by humour are actually analogous to those of the twelve tone 
technique which uses inversion, retrograde, retrograde inversion and 
transposition to provide melodic progression. These techniques might be 
seen as modem inventions, but similar techniques can be found in the 
significant French composer Guillaume de Machaut (1300-1377) and of 
course in Bach's The Art of the Fugue (1749-50). Bergson could deny 
that such examples were properly musical, or properly artistic, however 
such a denial would appear overly prescriptive, the vast majority of 
people surely agreeing that the works of these composers are 
unquestionably music, and artistic.163 Indeed the whole notion of music
163 There are philosophers who would disagree with this position, the most 
prominent being Cavell, who, for example, asks:
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as "an order no less admirable in a symphony of Beethoven, which is 
genius, originality, and therefore unforeseeability itself' (CE, p. 224) 
does not seem to apply to Fugues, for example, which Iannis Xenakis 
interestingly refers to as "... abstract automaton conceived two centuries 
before automated science."164 However Xenakis also says that the syntax 
of the fugue is not always stable, so even within the set structure there is 
the possibility of liberty. Indeed in this sense even a canon is between 
freedom and liberty, the dux is free whilst the comes is enslaved to its 
repetition. But if a musical structure was strict, if there were no changes 
in syntax possible, would it still be music? According to Bergson not, and 
this is a position which is widely held, that a work has to be something 
beyond its technical means, which are necessary parts o f an expression, 
but not sufficient for that expression. This is made clearer in a later work:
How can fraudulent art be exposed? Not, as in the case of a forgery or counterfeit, by 
comparing it with the genuine article, for there is  no genuine article o f the right kind. 
(Stanley Cavell, "Music Discomposed," Must we Mean What we Say? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976) p. 189.)
Even if this position was tenable with regard to 'modem' art, although this is in itself 
highly debatable, it certainly does not apply to Bach's Art of the Fugue, and it would 
be right to regard anyone who doubted this work was in fact music was ignorant as 
to the meaning o f the term 'music'. See also A Matter of Meaning it pp. 213-37 in the 
same volume.
164 Art/Sciences: Alloys, The Thesis Defence of Iannis Xenakis, 1976 quoted in C.D. 
booklet to Kraanerg released on Sombient Records. This kind of position is 
supported by Fleming who claims that the simple theme o f The Art o f  the Fugue 
deliberately draws attention to the mechanical and formal element of the musical 
production. William Flemming, "The Element o f Motion in Baroque Art and Music," 
Journal of Aesthetic and Art Criticism 5 (December, 1946): p. 124
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What is there more systematically architectonic, more 
reflectively elaborate, than a Beethoven symphony? But all 
through the labour of arranging, rearranging, selecting, 
carried out on the intellectual plane, the composer was 
turning back to a point situated outside that plane, in search 
of acceptance or refusal, o f a lead, an inspiration; at that 
point lurked an indivisible emotion which intelligence 
doubtless helped to unfold into music, but which was in 
itself something more than music and more than intelligence 
... to refer to this emotion the artist had to make a constantly 
repeated effort, such as the eye makes to rediscover a dark 
star which, as soon as it is found vanishes into the dark sky. 
(TSMR, pp. 252-3)
Music is thus always balanced between the freedom of its creative 
impulse and the determinism of its material means. Yet there appears to 
be a tension between the Creative Evolution and Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion, as in the first work Beethoven is used as an 
example o f a vital order "unforeseeability itself' as opposed to a 
predictable geometric order, whilst in the later work Beethoven is 
"systematically architectonic." Has Bergson shifted his position between 
the two works on this matter? We will suggest not.
A vital order, like that found in a work of art can only be expressed 
approximately and after the event. (CE, p. 223) The patterns such works 
form, especially in the case of music, are not static but under a constant 
process o f development through time. The architectonic structure of a 
Beethoven symphony can only be experienced after the whole has been 
heard, that is in retrospect, as its structure is constantly evolving through 
time as we listen - new at every moment and unforeseeable. It is, like all
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art works, an invention, not a mechanism.165 Given Bergson's position on 
art the question arises as to the relation art bears to philosophy, how 
these two modes of creative understanding differ.
165 Henri Bergson, La Pensee et le Mouvant - Essais et Conférences. (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1960) p. 247fii.
264
Philosophy versus Art
We have already seen how art and philosophy can be seen to be moving 
in the same direction, (M, p. 1148) i.e. away from ordinary perception 
and the habits of thought, and indeed intuition, the very ability to perceive 
differently, is proved possible by the existence o f the artist: (CE, pp. 176- 
7 & RM, p. 19) that a viewing of the world does not have to be reliant on 
a "... practical, narrowed and impoverished perception." (Mullarkey, p. 
160) It is the artist, who attempts, through their work, to make us 
perceive the world as they already have, to induce us "... to make the 
same effort ourselves ... to make us see something of what they have 
seen" (Laughter, p. 156) this is why philosophy has an artist like 
intuition. It is in this sense that the artist is not qualitatively different from 
the non-artist, each individual being able to create de novo by altering our 
vision. Thus intuition is a resource which can lead to "... new inventions, 
art forms, theories and emotions." (Mullarkey, p. 160)
The non-utilitarian vision of art can be contrasted with that of science, art 
grasping the intention and mutual organisation o f a living being:
The intention of life, the simple movement which runs 
through the lines, that binds them together and gives them 
significance ... (CE, p. 177 & AntlifE, p. 197)
whereas science sees a mere assemblage of parts. However Bergson also 
claims that the scope of art is limited, in a manner analogous to "... 
external perception ..." (CE, p. 177), in only relating to the individual. Art 
cannot go beyond what is visible in objects, towards some sort of 
essence, it does not grasp the universal because it does not generalise, it
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instead gains the unique individual. (Jankelevitch, p. 162) This limitation, 
however, does not apply to philosophy as it is capable of instituting an 
enquiry of the same sort as art, but instead of dealing with the specific it 
can instead deal with life in general, (CE, p. 177) yet without reducing 
individual difference.
The reason art cannot get to life in general as opposed to the specific 
living being is directly connected to the notion of self-reflexivity. An 
artist does not need to analyse their creative ability, they can be content 
to just sculpt, paint etc. - indeed to analyse their creative ability, would 
require them to turn thought on itself. This self-reflexive quality is to be 
distinguished from thought about the techniques an artist uses and the 
relation their art has to other works, which Bergson describes as the 
"intellectuality" of the artist. (CM, p. 94) These techniques, as we have 
previously noted, have nothing to do with creativity itself and it is to 
creativity itself that this notion of self-reflexivity refers. This lack of self- 
reflexivity, the inability to analyse the creative ability of the artist is a 
direct product of the methods employed by art as opposed to philosophy, 
which is modernist in as much as it places the techniques it uses at its 
heart. (Paradis, p. 27) Art is a product of one direction of attention, which 
relates to one of the senses, being freed from its wedding to practical 
needs, as we have already seen, but this is not the case for philosophy. 
Whereas art's detachment from practical needs is almost accidental, 
philosophy's is "... intentional, logical and systematic." (Laughter, p. 154) 
Philosophy appeals to both intelligence and intuition because it is 
concerned with both matter and spirit. (M, 1148) It is this systematic 
detachment which allows philosophy to turn thought on itself and allows
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it to turn the object of its enquiry away from art's specificity, to life in 
general. (CM, p. 94)
Instead of merely getting to the individual, philosophical intuition, in a 
process analogous to that o f science, not only sees the individual lines 
which animate living beings, but also "... prolongs the individual facts 
which it perceives into general laws." (CE, p. 177) The individual facts, 
in themselves can never be merely raw data, but in addition, always 
indicate probable conclusions, although these do not by themselves 
guarantee certainty. It is only when these probabilities accumulate that 
the equivalence of certainty can be reached. Each line of facts indicates a 
direction for truth, but it is only the convergence of lines when they are 
prolonged "to the point where they intersect," (TSMR, p. 248 & M-E, p. 
6) which will allow the probable conclusion as regards an accumulation 
to be found. There is thus an ability to extrapolate from individual facts 
towards a point of convergence, i.e. life itself.
There is an additional difference between art and philosophy, and this 
interestingly relates to duration. Whilst we have seen that the very rhythm 
of life can be perceived by art which allows the mutual organisation of its 
parts, as opposed to the mere assemblage of elements, what art cannot 
do, according to Bergson is move beyond the present. Although it allows 
us "... to discover in things more qualities and more shades than we 
naturally perceive ..." (CM, p. 157) it only acts on the surface. Unlike 
philosophy, art cannot extrapolate out from the present, it cuts away the 
relation to the past, despite enriching the present. Philosophy on the 
contrary, can prevent the past being isolated from the present, permitting
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"... anterior perceptions to remain bound up with present perceptions, and 
the immediate future itself to become partly outlined in the present." 
(CM, p. 157) Philosophy, unlike art, takes the vital before it is scattered 
into images; ((M, p. 1148) Quoted by Lacey, p. 160 & p. 189)) removes 
the static character placed upon reality by utilitarian needs, and allows us 
to perceive the constant movement which constitutes reality. When 
Bergson is talking about art in The Perception of Change he is obviously 
referring to visual art as opposed to music as he makes extensive use of 
melody as an example of the heterogeneous continuity of the past with 
the present earlier in the same essay. This of course does not mean that 
music becomes philosophy, as it has no means of reflecting on its own 
heterogeneous continuity. Indeed in another lecture given in the same 
year Bergson claims that art can only give the same satisfactions as 
philosophy on rare occasions to "... those favoured by nature and 
fortune." (CM, p. 129) This suggests that even when listening to a 
melody it is often not heard in terms of a pure heterogeneous continuity 
but instead as a series of fixed atomised states, it is spatialised. 
Spatialisation in this instance can be the product of thinking about the 
notation of the music, the intervalic values present, or indeed trying to 
talk about music in terms of painting, substituting spatial juxtaposition for 
the auditive temporal order. (Jankélèvitch 2, p. viii) Philosophy on the 
other hand allows us to gain a direct perception o f change without 
spatialisation. It is the self-reflexive ability which allows us to see how 
the melodic structure can lead us to a different perception of both 
individual examples like melody and ultimately to reality as a whole:
Reality then no longer appears then in the static state, in its 
manner of being; it affirms itself dynamically, in the 
continuity and variability of its tendency." (CM, p. 157)
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Everything, even space, (Making, p. 184) becomes a subspecies of 
duration, (CM, p. 129 & p. 158) and loses its stillness "... by breathing 
life once again into the phantoms which surround us and by revivifying 
us." (CM, p. 129)
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Conclusion
We shall now summarise the most important points from the above 
chapters, at the same time drawing out the important conclusions from 
the analysis.
Humour, for Bergson was seen to be directly related to a practical view 
of reality, working with general concepts and without sympathy. This 
method of working ensured that humour only concerned that which was 
external to the self (thus there could be no self-mockery) and was not 
concerned with the whole individual. Madness, in contradistinction was 
something which did affect the whole individual, and was thus not a 
subject of amusement.
The artist, in contrast to this position, was characterised by their naive 
perception which had moved beyond practical and habitual responses due 
to one of their senses being detached from utilitarian demands. This 
meant that the artist gained the individual rather than the general, and 
worked not from outward appearances, but instead from an inside 
knowledge revealed through a sympathetic relationship. It was thus not a 
question for the artist of finding and assembling elements but instead of 
grasping the intention of life in its organisation o f a living being.
This sympathetic relationship was linked to the distinction between 
suggestion and expression. Suggestion, in art, was a product of rhythm, 
and understood as a material response which attempted to suggest, to the 
receptive subject, a certain level on which to perceive, as opposed to the
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immediate response of expression. This distinction, made in Time and 
Free Will seemed to prefigure the distinction between pure motor 
responses, and those responses which involved memory in Matter and 
Memory. This allowed a distinction to be made between a purely 
superficial motor response to an art work, and the deeper enriched 
response involving more o f the individual. The presence of rhythm in art 
turned out to be part of a larger concern with time in art.
In looking at the question of rhythm in art there were two primary 
considerations. Firstly the difference between grasping a rhythm whole as 
opposed to understanding it in terms of a fixed repeated element and 
secondly the notion of what it would mean for a rhythm to be creative, 
open out onto novelty, and cease to be static and architectural: the need 
for the past in the present. As opposed to the notion of repetition and 
homogeneous spatialisation which lead to the death of time, a denial of 
the past coming into the present, melody provided an example of a 
heterogeneous continuity, in short a model for duration.
In contradistinction to the creativity of melody, only two types of 
rhythms, understood in musical terms, could be found which were 
creative: Carter's metric modulation and Stockhausen's colouristic 
description of Debussy, and in both these cases the rhythmic change had 
taken melody as its model. Indeed for art in general the static rhythm 
acted to suggest the correct level, rather than act as a model for evolution 
or progress, say in poetry. But what was found to be most original in 
Bergson was not the naive perception of the artist, nor the fact that both 
poetry and music were temporal, but that time was involved in art works
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not traditionally regarded as temporal. So in visual art the very act of 
painting was unpredictable as it involved duration, a privileged 
experience o f time in addition to a system of feedback where what was 
already painted effected what was going to be painted. Instead of art 
being an assemblage which could be created at varying speeds without 
changing the end product, there was the creation of novelty which 
depended on the speed of its creation. What was produced was 
dependent on the speed and the number of times the 'same' thing had been 
painted. Duration was not a separate mark made upon the work, a 
spatialised symbol of some description, but instead inseparable from 
what the work was. Photography, on the other hand, attempted to make 
duration irrelevant to its production. There was no feedback between the 
camera and its subject, only a physical, automatic, apparently repeatable 
process.
Cinema was taken, by Bergson as the epitome o f a spatialised work. The 
time on film could be slowed, accelerated, immobilised or reversed 
without any change in what was viewed, there was no internal 
modification of the events as there was in painting. The time projected by 
the cinema camera appeared to be separate and irrelevant to the events 
portrayed. Movement had been homogenised by the cinema camera into a 
series of still elements which failed to give movement. However, as 
Deleuze pointed out, there was no cinematic still - cinema did give 
movement, contra-Bergson because individuals did not see individual 
photograms, but instead a whole movement. In this respect Bergson was 
seen to be mistaken.
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There were also problems, as regards the relation of photography to 
photorealist works, if the difference between them could not be discerned 
by the viewer. This problem, in part, was seen to derive from Bergson’s 
anti-modernism, modernism being understood as the work's showing of 
its own techniques o f production. This position was explored via a 
contrast with early Russian Formalism showing how defamiliarisation, 
and the various techniques which made texts literary, were only possible 
through homogeneous spatialisation, like the three process of humour. 
These processes, despite drawing attention to perception itself merely 
resulted in an interpretation of the old, in supposedly new forms. Yet 
Bergson did not, as we saw, shy away from using the notion o f technique 
in regard of artistic creation. Instead it became a case of art denuding the 
level below of duration, treating it as a material support, a tendency 
towards repetition, which had nothing itself to do with creation. These 
techniques then were opposed to creativity which had a whole history, in 
painting each technique used was a response to an impetus which was 
trying to find expression. It was the difference between the expression of 
internal difference and a series of externally imposed processes which 
was seen to be crucial. This clash of tendencies was most explicitly 
explored in music, which was unpredictable, and constantly balanced 
between freedom and constraint. On the one hand material techniques 
were necessary for expression, whilst on the other they actively hindered 
the continuity of expression. These moves led to Bergson being able to 
both deny that art was merely a rearrangement o f  the pre-existing, whilst 
at the same time ensuring that the notion of process remained intact in his 
conception. It also gave a potential position from which 'music' derived 
from a series of techniques, what might be termed formulaic, could be
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criticised as non-artistic, as could 'music' based exclusively on notatable, 
rather than audible structures.
But the problem here, even more so than in the case of photorealist 
painting, is whether it is possible to produce an art work without true 
creativity, one which is indistinguishable from an art work which did 
require creativity. For example an infinite number o f pictures can be 
generated sharing "... a common style [from] an underlying system for 
organising visual structure"166 by the computer program AARON, 
without any Bergsonian notion of creativity being present and these can, 
according to Holtzman, be regarded as art. (Holtzman, p. 188) Bergson 
could argue that there is a notion of a fake art which appears creative, but 
in fact is merely an assemblage of pre-existing elements. But what is 
immediately interesting about AARON is how the the rules of the 
program exist only to recreate a particular style, there is no notion of 
anything new emerging, no vertical movement, so in a sense it is not 
unreasonable to see the work as non-artistic. The question is then 
whether a system could function as a technique, something which 
although needed for the creation o f the artwork, was itself separate from 
the creative tendency (when viewed at a particular level).
The answer to this question, in part, will depend on the relation between 
freedom and constraint, how determinate the structure is and as such a 
definitive answer cannot be given, only individual instances considered. 
There is however another consideration, whether the system is
166 Steven R. Holtzman. Digital Mantras (Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT, 1995) p. 
188
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appropriate for dealing with the artistic form in question or not. When 
Xenakis uses calculations pertaining to Brownian motion to create his 
piano piece Mists (1979), is he merely confusing two heterogeneous 
levels, a scientific expression being used on an artistic plane? If it is a 
confusion of levels, as suggested, it could be claimed that Mists is not a 
work o f art as instead o f dealing on a level close to that of an original 
intuition, it deals with the phenomena in terms of a quantitative 
understanding. This kind of move would leave Xenakis potentially 
humorous, as humour's inattention, as we saw, was a failure to adapt to 
circumstance, a failure to act on the correct level with regard to any 
particular situation.
The duration present in music, grasping a whole melody, all the notes of 
the past being part of the present was echoed in the temporalisation of 
language through diction. Instead of homogenising time making each 
word into a separate element, there was the possibility of grasping mobile 
parts, following a thinker's thought in a text - following its evolution. 
Duration, however, was also essential in the attempt to move beyond 
concepts as they were narrowly defined. Instead of these narrowly 
defined concepts which acted to homogenise duration by spatialising it, 
leaving the new as a mere rearrangement o f the old, fluid concepts relied, 
in the case of metaphor, on possessing the same generative process as 
their adherents. It was no longer a case o f producing a new concept to 
name a pre-existing thing, but instead of creating a concept, which also 
created a level o f reality. This level of reality, created with multiple 
metaphors, pointed back to an original productive intuition which could 
only be understood through an image. It was a question of finding a
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creative tendency, one imbued with duration which did not remain the 
same as it moved through different layers, but instead bifurcated to create 
those layers. This was a change, which like music had no underlying 
vehicle, no homogeneous space to allow it the stability of an object with 
fixed qualities, but instead gave a movement which was a change in the 
whole.
This operation was clearly visible in the structure of Laughter. The 
original intuition as regards comedy was expressed in a series of central 
examples actualised by the intuition's vertical movement - horizontal 
associations giving an outward resemblance similar to that found in 
dreams. This meant that the results of the intuition's vertical movement 
through planes was unpredictable, each actualisation on a plane also 
creative of that plane, and creative as regards new tendencies. So the 
initial tendency was bifurcated in the act of creation producing new 
tendencies which were virtually present in the initial tendency, but not 
actualised. That is, as Mullarkey argues, possibility is created 
retrospectively by itself, and so is not, on this account unreal. Whilst 
possibility can be an illusion, that the past contained the present before it 
had been created, that there was no novelty, (as has been previously 
noted) it is also the effect o f the realisation of a virtuality such that the 
tendency, when realised, then also exists as a fact in the virtuality it 
emerged from. So if there were a world where only orange things existed 
at one point in time, it would only be the splitting o f orange into yellow 
and red that would create the two colours in the present, and at the same 
time allow the two colours to come into existence retrospectively.
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However the very fact the colours are placed in the past as a possibility 
does not mean they are unreal. (Mullarkey, pp. 171-4)
In the movements of bifurcation, in the need to move beyond practical 
perception, and in the use o f fluid concepts (including metaphor), as 
opposed to scientific concepts, Bergson's philosophy appeared to aspire 
to the condition of art. However despite these apparent similarities 
philosophy and art were clearly differentiated by Bergson. Philosophy, 
Bergson maintained, dealt with life in general, as opposed to art which 
dealt only with the specific. This ability to deal with life in general was 
linked to philosophy's self-reflexivity which allowed it to analyse its own 
creative ability, which art could not. This was due to the systematic 
method o f philosophy, as opposed to the luck relied upon by art. 
Additionally because art only dealt with the individual, as opposed to life 
it could only give the present, although in greater depth, rather than 
giving the past with the whole of its present. So philosophy was in this 
sense privileged over art, despite art showing that intuition understood as 
the ability to go beyond practical perception, was indeed possible.
What then is Bergson's original aesthetic contribution? The emphasis on 
going beyond ordinary perception does not appear in itself particularly 
original, indeed Schopenhauer argued for a similar position, as he does 
with regard to general concepts, the link between memory and music, 
madness and artistic creativity as the inability to adjust perception to 
utilitarian needs and the ultimate mobility of reality.167 However in each
167 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World and Will as Representation, trans. E. F. J. 
Payne, vol. I & II (New York: Dover, 1966). especially Vol. I p. 186, Vol. II p. 137,
277
of these cases there is a difference, because each, for Bergson involves 
duration and novelty.
Whereas for Schopenhauer the visual artist saw and painted Platonic 
generalities stripped of time (grasped perceptually rather than 
intellectually), Bergson, as we have seen, insisted on the individuality of 
what was painted, its creation being durational at its very heart. Indeed 
although for Schopenhauer, the higher art o f music more fully expressed 
the Will and movement [Bewegung], music being a non-spatialised 
understanding, it also simultaneously left it de-temporalised. In the 
subject's musical ecstasy (if a subject could still be identified) the 
representational structures of time breaking down leaving the 'subject' in 
a state which was ambiguously both with and without time. As we have 
seen Bergson's description of music is quite different being the very 
model for duration, the heterogeneous continuity. It is the duration at the 
heart of his aesthetics in each of the arts which distinguishes it from other 
philosophies.
Ultimately the durational creativity at the heart of his aesthetics means he 
can embrace an anti-modernist vision of art, one which wishes to hide its 
material conditions (or rather places them on a different level to that of 
aesthetic appreciation), whilst on the other hand not collapsing art into 
illusionistic paradigms through his emphasis on the movement and 
creativity and the presence of duration in each art form. This is a unique 
achievement and one which is as relevant today as when it was written.
p. 71 ff.
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